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SUMMARY 
 
This thesis empirically examines whether the neoclassical economic model provides an 
adequate framework to analyse a couple’s labour supply behaviour in Britain using recent 
data from the British Household Panel Survey. The thesis comprises three empirical 
chapters. The first chapter uses the instrumental variable (IV) estimation procedure to 
model the hours of work of married couples. This approach allows us to test whether some 
of the assumptions of the neoclassical model (e.g., income pooling and Slutsky properties) 
are satisfied by the data. In addition, further variables that have been identified as 
distribution factors in the literature are introduced to the empirical model to assess whether 
they play a role in explaining a couple’s hours of work. The first chapter only considers 
couples in which both spouses work. In the second chapter, the sample is amended to 
include all couples (i.e., those that work and those that do not) and the analysis conducted 
models a couple’s labour market participation decisions rather than their hours of work. 
After testing for income pooling and the impact of distribution factors, a further variable, 
the wife’s mother-in-law work status when the male spouse was aged 14, is introduced into 
the model. This is done to determine the effect of “cultural” variables on labour market 
decisions. In the last chapter, this issue is explored further by explicitly modelling attitudes 
to a woman’s role in the labour market. This approach uses a bivariate ordered probit 
model given the ordinal nature of responses to the attitudinal questions and again restricts 
the analysis to couples only. Finally, gender-role attitudes are introduced to the labour 
supply framework used in the second chapter in order to evaluate whether beliefs regarding 
women’s role impact on a couple’s labour market decisions.   
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Introduction 
 
What was once the basis of  dozens of  Victorian 
novels may form the basis for new economic 
models of  household behaviour! 
(Mark R. Killingsworth, Labor Supply, 1983) 
 
At first glance, this thesis title suggests it constitutes an additional contribution to the vast 
economic literature on labour supply analysis in Great Britain. On the one hand, it does 
indeed, as it tackles the common theme of male and female labour market behaviour. 
However, on the other, it endeavours to exploit relatively novel concepts that have not 
been widely used in previous studies of labour supply. The study of labour supply decisions 
is important for understanding behaviour and thus policymaking. It can help in analysing 
the dramatic changes in employment trends over the past years as well as help predict 
future patterns. It also allows the study of the consequences of taxation and welfare 
programs on an individual’s decision to work and the number of hours of work. Blundell 
and MaCurdy (1999) state that “understanding labour supply behaviour is vital in 
formulating proposals that build in work incentives while providing income support” 
(p.1561).  
For a long time, low-income families in industrialised countries have relied on the welfare 
system for financial assistance and in-kind transfers. However, this type of benefits often 
decreased the incentive to work of its recipients. Nowadays, many governments, including 
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the UK government, attempt to design policies that promote work, known as “welfare to 
work” programs (Blundell, 2000). Policymakers can impact on two important components 
of labour supply. They can affect wages, and therefore work incentives, through taxation. 
They can also influence non-labour income through policies on benefits and pensions. 
Wage and non-labour income responses can be analysed through the computation of wage 
and income elasticities. Indeed, as stated in Pencavel (1986), the aim of most empirical 
research in labour supply has been to estimate the magnitude of the impact of a number of 
variables such as wages and income on measures of labour supply. However, Pencavel 
(1986) adds: 
Such quantification is naturally an important ingredient 
of any science, but in many laboratory sciences refined attempts at calibration 
represent a stage of research that usually follows, not precedes, the testing of 
hypotheses (p.5). 
In other words, it is important to evaluate the suitability of the framework used to estimate 
labour supply responses. Testing some of the hypotheses of the early neoclassical model is 
precisely the aim of this thesis. If the assumptions on which the neoclassical model relies 
are not verified empirically, wage and income responses estimated within this framework 
may be suspect for use in policy analysis.      
In the last thirty years, economists have attempted to elaborate new models of economic 
behaviour, which have addressed issues that were deemed to be outside the realm of the 
discipline during most of the twentieth century. In particular, labour economics has 
changed from being solely concerned with analyzing labour supply, to elaborating 
frameworks for the analysis of household production and intrahousehold resource 
allocation (Manski, 2000).  
For a long time, the individual decision-maker was the sole object of study of neoclassical 
labour supply analysis. This implied that the researcher could avoid tackling the issue of 
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interactions between the “economic man” and others around him. However, the increased 
participation of women in the labour market was one of the factors that prompted 
researchers to re-evaluate the assumptions of the popular earlier neoclassical model, known 
as the unitary model, as it was acknowledged that the latter might not be suitable to analyse 
married women and men’s labour market behaviour (Dex, 1985).  
According to Katz (1997), “the extent to which intra-household analysis represents a true 
paradigm shift within microeconomics is unresolved” (p.26). The author believes there are 
mainly two approaches that have challenged the unitary model of household behaviour. 
One approach has used tools from neoclassical economics to explore intra-household 
relations. The other, developed by feminist economists, has called for a review of the 
assumptions of the neoclassical model and a more interdisciplinary attitude towards gender 
issues in the household. As mentioned by Katz (1997), both strands of the literature are not 
necessarily incompatible. This thesis attempts to provide an assessment of the suitability of 
the neoclassical approach to the analysis of household labour supply in Great Britain. 
However, as will become clear, its aim is not to fit in one particular school of thought, nor 
to cover all the criticisms that have targeted the neoclassical framework. Rather, it consists 
of a series of empirical papers that test various concepts in order to distinguish some of the 
elements that need to be accounted for in policymaking and some of those that can be 
ignored.   
In the UK, an unprecedented increase in the labour force participation of married women, 
and more specifically women with pre-school children occurred throughout the second half 
of the twentieth century, while opposite trends have been found regarding male 
participation. In 2002, the female employment rate was 72% compared to a male 
employment rate of 82% (Robinson, 2003). A number of other changes that have affected 
British households in the last fifty years have exacerbated the need to explore in more 
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detail household behaviour in general, and labour supply more specifically. Indeed, studies 
from different social sciences have all highlighted the demographic changes that have 
occurred in post-war Britain. McRae (1999) reveals that the mean age at first marriage and 
first birth have increased while total fertility has decreased. Furthermore, in the same 
period, the divorce rate has increased six fold and cohabitation before marriage has become 
increasingly popular. Finally, the number of lone-parent families has trebled. Despite all 
these changes, Summerfield and Babb (2003) state that in 2000, 54% of British men and 
52% of British women were married and a quarter of non-married adults aged between 16 
and 59 were cohabitating. In this thesis, a choice is made to focus the analysis on the labour 
supply of couples as they represent a majority of households in Great Britain, albeit a 
slightly decreasing one. As stated in Dex (1985), the terms “household” and “individual” 
have often been used interchangeably in the economic literature, with the former 
constituting a “smokescreen”, the use of which “has helped to hide the neglect of genuine 
households for generations of economic analysis” (p.74). It is precisely this neglect that is 
addressed in this thesis. 
The present analysis is divided into three empirical chapters and uses data from wave 13 of 
the British Household Panel Survey. Each chapter incorporates its own data section, 
theoretical and empirical literature review and econometric methodology. In chapter one, 
following parts of the work of Clark et al (2002, 2004), a working couple’s supply of hours 
to the labour market is investigated in order to explore whether the unitary model of 
household behaviour, which has been used in earlier studies of household labour supply, 
provides a satisfactory framework for the analysis of the latter. The unitary model stipulates 
that the household acts as one entity. It imposes a series of testable restrictions, among 
which symmetry of wage effects and income pooling, which are empirically tested in 
chapter one. The condition of symmetry stipulates that an income-compensated change in 
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the wage of the husband has an impact on his wife’s hours of work that is equal to the 
impact of an income-compensated change in the wife’s wage on his supply of hours 
(Ashenfelter and Heckman, 1974). The restriction of income pooling is equivalent to 
assuming that each spouse’s individual non-labour income does not affect labour supply 
decisions: only the sum of a couple’s unearned labour income does (Blundell and MaCurdy, 
1999). Another feature of the unitary model is that by assuming a single household utility 
function, it does not provide an appropriate framework to analyse intra-household 
decision-making. A number of models have been developed in the economics literature to 
address this issue. The latter allow for the fact that spouses may be able to affect decision-
making to suit their own preferences. In other words, they acknowledge the existence of a 
spouse’s bargaining power.  Therefore, a further test of the unitary model, described as an 
indirect test by Hoddinott et al (1997), is to investigate the impact of measures representing 
a spouse’s bargaining power on their own labour supply and their partner’s. Two types of 
measures that can proxy for bargaining are used in the analysis. One measure, the sex-ratio, 
is external to the household. Two other measures, the age difference between spouses and 
whether the wife is older, are measures that are internal to the household. Regarding the 
estimation procedure, male and female labour supply equations are estimated using 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the Instrumental Variables procedure (IV) respectively. 
Results reveal that income pooling is not satisfied by data on the hours worked of couples 
in Great Britain while Slutsky symmetry is (provided non-labour income is assumed to be 
pooled). The sex ratio is found not to impact on a couple’s labour supply. Regarding age 
differences, only the binary variable indicating whether the wife is older influences her 
labour supply but it is unclear whether this effect constitutes a bargaining one. 
In chapter two, the analysis conducted in chapter one is replicated on a sample of all 
working-age couples, but focusing on participation rather than hours worked, as done in 
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Del Boca (1997). A bivariate probit model is used in order to analyse a couple’s labour 
market decisions. The income-pooling test, conducted on working couples in the first 
chapter, is now replicated for all couples. Pooling seems to describe male behaviour but 
not female. Next, the measures of a spouse’s bargaining power used in the hours-of-work 
framework are introduced into the participation model. Unlike in the first chapter, the sex 
ratio is found to impact on labour market participation but not in the direction anticipated. 
Age difference only affects male participation casting doubt on its suitability as a 
distribution factor.  
Bargaining is not the only concept that has surfaced recently in the labour supply literature. 
Fernandez et al (2004) argue that the work status of a husband’s mother when a teenager 
might influence his wife’s labour supply behaviour. The second part of the analysis 
investigates the consequences of introducing this measure into the model of a couple’s 
labour market participation. This has not been previously done using British data. Results 
reveal that the working status of a wife’s mother-in-law influences her work behaviour. 
This suggests that “cultural” factors, which are not normally accounted for in neoclassical 
models, play a role in the determination of labour supply behaviour.  
In chapter three, data on gender-role attitudes which are available in the BHPS, are used to 
further explore the link between preferences/culture and labour market behaviour. The 
sociological literature provides a background for a better understanding of the 
determinants of gender-role attitudes. A bivariate ordered probit framework is used to 
model the joint determination of gender-role attitudes among couples. The impact of 
childhood variables, human capital indicators and demographic factors on the formation of 
attitudes is analysed. To the author’s knowledge, this methodology has not been applied in 
this context before. Measures of attitudes towards the role of women in the labour market 
are derived and introduced into the model of labour market participation developed in 
 16 
 
chapter two. While attitudes do seem to affect labour supply decisions, they have a mixed 
impact on key policy related labour supply variables.  
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Chapter 1   
A study of  the supply of  working 
hours of  British couples 
1 Introduction 
In a number of areas in economics, particularly in early welfare applications, traditional 
economic models have postulated the family as a single decision and consumption unit. 
More specifically, in the analysis of labour market behaviour, the principles of the simple 
neoclassical model of labour supply, originally developed to describe individual decisions, 
were applied to the study of households. These models, referred to as the “unitary” 
approach in the literature, impose two types of restrictions on behaviour: income pooling 
and Slutsky properties, which have often been tested empirically. In recent decades, 
different models of household behaviour have challenged the unitary model by looking 
more closely at interactions between family members and using concepts such as a spouse’s 
bargaining power, to improve the modelling of intra-household resource allocation. Today, 
it is widely acknowledged that the household is not a ‘black box’ and that interactions 
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among members might impact on consumption, labour supply and other behavioural 
decisions, and hence on welfare.  
This chapter follows the work of Clark et al (2002; 2004) who analysed household labour 
supply using British data from 1997. Elements of their research are replicated here with 
more recent data. Two research questions are investigated in the present analysis. First, 
tests are conducted in order to verify whether the data satisfy the assumptions of income 
pooling and Slutsky symmetry imposed by the unitary model. Second, an analysis of the 
consequences of introducing measures of bargaining power in the household labour supply 
framework is done.  
2 Theoretical framework 
Before providing an overview of the various models that have been used to describe 
household behaviour, one important point needs to be clarified. Blau et al (2006) state that: 
“a household consists of one or more persons living in one dwelling unit and sharing living 
expenses” (p.6). The authors emphasize that not all households are families as a family 
consists of “two or more persons, related by blood, marriage, or adoption, living in the 
same household” (p.6). In this thesis, the terms household and family are used 
interchangeably to mean a nuclear family constituted of a couple and their dependent 
children, if they have any.1 As will be shown later, the unitary model of household 
behaviour, and more specifically labour supply, which is examined in this chapter, uses a 
framework that is similar to the one used to describe individual labour supply. The 
following section provides a brief overview of the latter. 
                                                 
1 Ferber (2003) is critical of the fact that economists have not attempted to reach a universally accepted 
definition of the “family” and that the neoclassical framework has taken the nuclear family as the basis of 
analysis thus ignoring other types of families such as extended families or families constituted of homosexual 
couples. 
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2.1 Individual Labour Supply 
In his review of the literature on male labour supply, Pencavel (1986) states that the 
derivation of individual labour supply equations is a direct application of standard 
consumer theory as shown by Hicks (1946); and formulates the framework to analyse an 
individual’s supply of working hours as follows:  
Assume T is the total time available to an individual and equal to the sum of this 
individual’s hours of work in the labour market h  and their hours of leisure l ; in other 
words lhT += . Let A  represent the individual’s personal attributes and x  their level of 
consumption; the individual’s quasi-concave utility function is then defined as:  
),,,( εAhxUU =   [1.1.1] 
where ε represents an individual’s tastes, which are unobservable to the researcher. The 
individual must reach the highest attainable utility given the budget constraint: 
px = wh + y   [1.1.2] 
where w  is the wage per hour; p  is the price per unit of x  and y  is non-labour income. 
Note that the budget constraint is homogeneous of degree zero in p , w  and y . 
This chapter only considers the case where the individual works. As established by standard 
consumer theory, they choose their hours of work so that the negative of the marginal rate 
of substitution of working hours for commodities equals their real wage rate.   
The first-order conditions of the constrained maximization problem are (provided h > 0):  
x = x( p,w,y;A,ε)  h = h( p,w, y;A,ε)  [1.1.3] 
The labour supply function h = h( p,w, y;A,ε)  satisfies a number of properties. First, it is 
also homogeneous of degree zero in p , w  and y . Second, it satisfies the properties of 
 20 
 
symmetry and negativity.2 In this framework, a small increase in the wage results in an 
income effect h δh∂y  and a substitution effect s. Conventional consumer theory requires that 
the latter be positive (or non-negative). It represents the effect of an income-compensated 
rise in the wage and stipulates that more hours of work will be consumed (less leisure) 
when the wage increases (assuming utility is constant). The income effect on the other 
hand, implies that as the individual’s wealth increases (due to the wage increase), their 
consumption of leisure will increase if the latter is a normal good, which means less hours 
of work will be supplied. The overall effect of a wage increase depends on the magnitude 
of these two separate effects. The Slutsky equation is expressed as follows:  
∂h
∂w = s + h
∂h
∂y   [1.1.4] 
The expression above can be re-written as:  
Eu = Ec + w ∂h∂y   [1.1.5] 
where Eu is the uncompensated wage elasticity of hours, which can be obtained by taking 
the derivative of an individual’s log labour supply function with respect to their log wage.  
Two other types of elasticities are usually reported in the literature: the income 
compensated-elasticity (denoted by Ec  in equation 1.1.5 and computed from that equation) 
and the non-labour income elasticity, which is a measure of the magnitude of the change in 
hours worked when non-labour income changes. Let Ey  designate the latter, then:  
Ey = ∂ lnh∂y y    [1.1.6] 
This simple labour supply model has been referred to as the “neoclassical” model by 
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980): “a name (they) use to label the assumption of linear budget 
                                                 
2 Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) show that symmetry and negativity derive from the existence of consistent 
preferences.  
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constraints with fixed, known prices” (p.86). It has been extended to account for non-
linear budget constraints (taxation and social security), and restrictions in hours worked 
(see Deaton and Muellbauer (1980)). However, accounting for these extensions is beyond 
the scope of this thesis.  
The framework above is appropriate to study individual behaviour. In households, labour 
supply cannot be investigated in isolation for individuals, as the decision to work of one 
individual is bound to be determined, in part, by the behaviour of other household 
members as well as interactions among members. Indeed, as stated by Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980): “one of the dangers of not recognizing interdependencies between 
consumers, is that we can mistake highly constrained behaviour for free choice” (p.13). The 
next section describes the different models that have been used to explore the economic 
behaviour of individuals in households and more particularly their labour supply. 
2.2 Family labour supply 
In her review of the different models of intra-household resources allocation, Doss (1996) 
highlights many of the issues that economists have to tackle in modelling household 
behaviour. Can the various utilities of household members be represented by a single 
aggregate household utility function or should one take these into account separately? 
Similarly, is there a single budget constraint at the level of the household representing the 
household’s pooled income or are there different constraints? In addition, do individuals 
make separate or joint production (and consumption) decisions?  
In the simplest framework of family labour supply, which is also the earliest one found in 
the literature, the husband does not take his wife’s labour supply into account when making 
his own labour supply decision. However, the husband’s earnings are considered as non-
labour income in his wife’s labour supply model. This approach is called the ‘male 
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chauvinist’ model. It is consistent with the individual’s labour supply framework described 
above except for the fact that for the wife y  includes her husband’s labour income in 
addition to her own non-labour income (Killingsworth, 1983).3 As mentioned in Davies et 
al (2000), the treatment of male and female labour supply is asymmetric. Moreover, there 
are no cross-equation restrictions and both husband and wife maximize utility 
independently (Lundberg, 1988). In this framework, economists bypass the issue of utility 
aggregation. However, the model relies on strong restrictions regarding the 
interdependence of a couple’s labour supply behaviour. A different model, which also seeks 
to be consistent with standard consumer theory, assumes the existence of a joint utility 
function. It is known as the “unitary” model of household behaviour. Both its theoretical 
underpinnings and empirical implications are discussed in the next section. 
2.2.1 The unitary approach  
Samuelson (1956) analyses the problem of family utility in the more general discussion on 
community indifference curves. After demonstrating by proof that the latter do not exist, 
he asks: “if community indifference curves are impossible, how can we expect family 
demand functions observed in the market place to obey the consistency axiom of revealed 
preference or any other regularity condition?”(p.9). He argues that one could claim that one 
person has total control of the household and thus that the family demands express his/her 
consistent indifference curves but says that this is highly improbable particularly in Western 
societies. He thus suggests that assuming “family consensus” or a mutual agreement over 
consumption decisions is probably less far-fetched. According to the author, when 
analyzing families, there is a need to acknowledge that one member’s tastes and marginal 
rate of substitution will be affected by other members’ consumptions. He assumes a family 
                                                 
3 See Chapter 2 (footnote 2) of Killingsworth (1983) for applications of this model. 
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in which each member has their own consumption of goods and indifference curves 
ordering those goods. Furthermore, preferences among own goods do not depend on the 
behaviour of other members, but preferences of all members remain interrelated by a 
“social welfare function” that takes into account the ethical worth of each member’s 
consumption. The family then acts to maximize this joint welfare function. The joint 
decisions only have to determine the distribution of the household’s pooled income among 
family members. Moreover, income must be distributed in a way that ensures keeping the 
“marginal social significance of every dollar” equal. The author then establishes inferences 
on family demand by stating the theorem of revealed group preferences which stipulates 
that if the indifference curves of all members of the group have the conventional regular 
convexity, and that this also holds for the social welfare function, and if optimal lump sum 
transfers always occur inside the group, then there exists observable demand totals that will 
only depend on prices and total income, furthermore, the demands will have the revealed 
preferences or “Slutsky-Hicks” properties of any regular single demand (these are described 
below) and a set of indifference contours can be defined with all the properties of 
individual contours and which one can consider is being maximized by one agent. A 
number of researchers have questioned Samuelson’s view. Lundberg and Pollak (1997) say: 
“Samuelson was concerned not with explaining distribution within the family but with 
identifying the conditions under which consumer demand analysis could proceed without 
doing so” (p.77). Becker (1991) criticized some aspects of this theory by stating that the 
“deservingness of the consumption levels” of different members could be, as in his own 
model that will be reviewed below, included in the members’ preferences representation 
instead of just being interrelated through a common agreement among individuals. The 
author’s altruist model seeks to explain family behaviour by positing the existence of an 
altruist in households, who is defined as a person whose utility depends on the welfare of 
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their spouse. In a household with one altruist and one beneficiary, the consumption of 
either member will not be affected by income redistribution. Furthermore, a family utility 
function is maximized irrespective of how income is distributed in the family as the other 
members’ utilities decrease or increase in conjunction with the altruist’s utility.4 The author 
recognizes the importance of marriage markets in reinforcing the notion of altruism, as 
these markets will match altruists to beneficiaries. He also states that efficient marriage 
markets often result in positive assortative mating whereby high quality males form unions 
with high quality females and the reverse.5 According to Lundberg and Pollak (1996), both 
the models of Samuelson and Becker outlined above constitute the theoretical basis of 
what has been labelled the “unitary” approach. As stated in Alderman et al (1995), it is 
labelled as such because the household (or in other words all of the household members) 
are assumed to act as one. It has also been called the “common preference model” for 
reasons that will become clearer below. Economists that believe in the unitary approach 
have used different explanations to justify that the household may act as one entity. 
Consensus, altruism and dictatorship are among the possible scenarios that lead to a unitary 
model framework.  
In the labour supply literature, the ‘family utility-family budget constraint’ is an application 
of the unitary model. It was developed by Kosters (1966), cited in Killingsworth (1983), 
and stipulates that total family utility (which depends on the leisure times of all members 
and total consumption) is maximized subject to a family budget constraint. In this context, 
family members pool their earnings so that utility is maximized subject to a family budget 
constraint. Killingsworth (1983) refers to Hicks’ composite theorem to show that in this 
approach, family consumption and leisure can be treated as composite commodities and 
                                                 
4 Becker (1991) has also extended his “altruist” model to families with children through the Rotten Kid 
Theorem. 
5 For a more detailed discussion on marriage markets see Ermisch (2003) chapter 7 and Becker (1991) chapter 
4. 
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the analysis of the change in wages becomes similar to the one in the standard individual 
model (as shown below). Assuming leisure is a normal good, a rise in non-labour income 
will result in an increase in leisure, which is equivalent to a fall in earnings. The author 
shows that in this model, as mentioned by Ashenfelter and Heckman (1974) and Kosters 
(1966) among others, each household member’s behaviour represents two substitution 
effects; the own-substitution effect being the substitution effect of a member’s own wage 
on their labour supply, and the cross-substitution effect being the effect on an individual’s 
labour supply of a income-compensated rise in the wage of another household member. 
The sign of the cross-substitution effect depends on whether the leisure times of family 
members are complements or substitutes. However, the model stipulates that they will 
always be equal. It is important to note that the earlier empirical literature has tended to 
assume that cross-substitution is zero thus treating the rise of one member’s wage as a pure 
income effect on the labour supply of the other member.6 Based on Fortin and Lacroix 
(1997), the unitary model is specified in what follows. 
Consider a household with two working-age individuals denoted by the subscripts m  
(male) and f (female). Let hm  and h f  denote male and female hours of work respectively, 
xmand x f  denote their respective consumption of a private composite good, the price of 
which is set to 1; wm  and w f  denote male and female wages and ym  and y f  represent 
male and female non-labour income respectively. The household’s utility is defined as:  
U = ˜ U (xm,x f ,hm,h f )   [1.2.1] 
Its budget constraint is expressed as follows:  
wmh
m + w f h f + y m + y f ≥ x m + x f   [1.2.2] 
                                                 
6 See for example Cohen, Rea and Lerman (1970) cited in Killingsworth (1983).  
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The utility function U~  is strictly concave, twice differentiable in its arguments, increasing 
in xmand x f , and decreasing in hmand h f . Since individual consumptions of the composite 
good ( xmand x f ) are rarely observed and given that the price of xmand x f  is set to one, 
Hicks composite commodity theorem allows us to obtain a utility function which in turn 
can be used in the constrained maximization problem: 
  
max U
(x,h m ,h f )
= ) U (x,hm ,h f )   [1.2.3] 
Subject to: wmh
m + w f h f + ym + y f ≥ x  
Among the solutions to the programme above is a pair of unrestricted supply functions: 
hm (wm,w f ,ym,y f ) = H m (wm,w f , ym + y f ) 
  [1.2.4] 
h f (wm,w f ,ym,y f ) = H f (wm,w f , ym + y f )  
Fortin and Lacroix (1997) state, as implied by expression [1.2.4], that one of the restrictions 
of the unitary model is that the distribution of non-labour income among members does 
not determine individual labour supply. This restriction is expressed by the following two 
expressions: 
∂hm
∂ym =
∂hm
∂y f      and     f
f
m
f
y
h
y
h
∂
∂=∂
∂    [1.2.5] 
Equation [1.2.5] denotes what is commonly referred to as the income pooling restriction. 
Let y = ym + y f , the income pooling proposition implies that only the level of y  impacts 
on the labour supply of each individual. The labour supply equations are then: 
hm (wm,w f ,ym,y f ) = H m (wm,w f ,y) 
  [1.2.6] 
h f (wm,w f ,ym,y f ) = H f (wm,w f ,y)  
Income pooling is equivalent to assuming all sources of income are pooled in a household, 
which means that the household’s demand for goods and leisure will not be affected by 
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who receives income in the family except through the wage effect on the substitution of 
leisure and commodities (Hoddinott et al, 1997).  
A second set of restrictions implied by the unitary model concerns the usual Slutsky 
properties and in particular own and cross-substitution wage effects as well as income 
effects. In order to derive the latter, the income pooling restriction is assumed to hold. 
Following Fortin and Lacroix (1997), let ijS be the compensated (own or cross) wage 
effect, which is equal to 
∂hi
∂w j − h
j ∂hi
∂y  for i = m, f and j = m, f . The properties of the 
labour supply functions in the unitary framework are summarized by the following three 
equations: 
S mf = S fm   [1.2.7] 
Sii ≥0, i = m, f   [1.2.8] 
SmmS ff − S2mf ≥ 0   [1.2.9] 
Equation [1.2.7] represents symmetry of compensated cross wage effects and implies that 
the marginal compensated wage effects of the two spouses have the same impact on each 
other’s labour supply (Ashenfelter and Heckman, 1974). It can be re-written as: 
m
f
w
h
∂
∂  - mh
y
h f
∂
∂  = f
m
w
h
∂
∂  - fh
y
hm
∂
∂   [1.2.10] 
The second restriction, represented by equation [1.2.8], concerns the non-negativity of 
compensated own wage effects, which means that an income compensated increase in an 
individual’s wage will result in an increase in their hours of work; and finally, equation 
[1.2.9] represents non- negativity of the determinant of the Slutsky matrix (Ashenfelter and 
Heckman, 1974). 
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As in the individual labour supply framework, the model described above can be extended 
to include exogenous factors A  without any effect on its implications:7 
hm (wm,w f ,ym,y f ,A) = H m (wm ,w f ,ym + y f ,A) 
  [1.2.11] 
h f (wm,w f ,ym,y f ,A) = H f (wm ,w f ,ym + y f ,A)  
Before looking at the various criticisms that have been directed at this framework, it is 
important to mention that in a piece of research published at the time of writing, Browning 
et al (2006) argue that the term “unitary” has been used inappropriately in the literature and 
should only be used to describe models in which Slutsky conditions are satisfied. The 
authors claim that the rejection of income pooling does not mean that the “unitary” model 
should be rejected as income pooling is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the 
unitary model to hold. While this chapter acknowledges the contribution of the article 
mentioned above, as in most pieces of research to date, it uses the term “unitary” to refer 
to a model that satisfies both income pooling and Slutsky properties.           
Lundberg and Pollak (1996) state that both the theoretical assumptions and empirical 
implications of the unitary model have been subjected to mounting criticism. On the 
empirical front, restrictions imposed on labour supply equations, particularly regarding 
income pooling, have often been rejected by the data as will be shown in the empirical 
review. On the theoretical side, Chiappori (1992) states: “such models simply fall short of 
meeting the basic rules of neoclassical microeconomic analysis. Micro approaches are 
grounded on methodological individualism and the latter basically requires individuals to be 
characterized by their own preferences rather than be aggregated within the ad hoc fiction 
of a collective decision unit. Modelling a group (even reduced to two participants) as 
though it were a single individual can be seen only as a mere holistic deviation” (page 440). 
                                                 
7 This type of model stipulates continuity in the income, hours and wage variables, which is not strictly 
correct in most empirical applications. This point is ignored here as it is the case in most of the literature. 
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One further criticism of the unitary approach, related to the first two, is that it fails to 
address bargaining between spouses and the issue of power. This issue is discussed in 
Pollak (1994), who reviews the various types of criticism that traditional economic models 
have encountered, primarily but not exclusively by Marxists and feminists. The next section 
provides an overview of the various frameworks that have challenged the unitary model of 
household behaviour. 
2.2.2 Non-unitary models of the household 
Non-unitary models of the household are based on the theoretical premise that every 
individual in a household has their own set of preferences. However, they differ in the 
assumptions they make regarding interactions between household members. There are 
mainly two types of models of household behaviour in mainstream economics today: non-
cooperative models and co-operative ones.  
Non-cooperative models of household behaviour 
The “non-cooperative approaches” assume that individuals act like separate units within 
the household and are not necessarily bound by contracts. The only link between the 
partners is through transfers of income. In their decision-making, individuals choose their 
exclusive consumption of goods considering the level of net transfers and maximize their 
utility subject to the constraint that purchases are lower than the sum of own-income and 
net transfer. The difference between this type of model and a representation of two 
rational individuals with independent behaviours lies in the presence of joint consumption 
of public goods (Lundberg and Pollak, 1997). Non-cooperative behaviour could be 
equivalent to an “internal divorce” where the couple is linked through the household’s 
public goods but where transfers of money and time coordination are no longer in place 
(Lommerud, 1997).  
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Leuthold (1968) in what is, according to Chiappori and Donni (2006), probably the first 
non-unitary approach to household labour supply, uses a model in which she specifies an 
individual’s utility that is maximized subject to a family budget constraint. As stated by 
Killingsworth (1983), the implications of this model are different to those of the unitary 
one, as they do not incorporate cross-substitution effects. However, because earnings are 
pooled, individuals are subject to non-direct income effects. When the wage of an 
individual rises, the usual substitution and income effect occur, however, there is an 
additional effect due to the fact that they work more thus raising family income. Their 
spouse, on the other hand, will reduce their work hours if they consider leisure to be a 
normal good. Ashworth and Ulph (1981), cited in Killingsworth (1983) and Kooreman and 
Kapteyn (1990) are other applications of this model.8 Another set of models that provide a 
different framework of analysis of household behaviour is the co-operative approach.  
Co-operative models of household behaviour 
As in the unitary model, co-operative models stipulate that individuals will marry or 
cohabitate if the utility of doing so is higher than that of remaining single. The divergence 
between the two models occurs when one looks at how resources are allocated in the 
household (Alderman et al, 1995). Co-operative models assume a certain structure in the 
decision-making and household allocations are considered to reflect the outcome of a 
certain bargaining process. There are different types of co-operative models found in the 
literature. One set of models implies a divorce threat point such as in the Nash co-
operative bargaining models introduced separately by Manser and Brown (1980) and 
McElroy and Horney (1981).9 In this framework, the solution to the intra-household 
resource allocation problem is obtained by maximizing the product of the gains to 
                                                 
8 For a detailed review of non-cooperative approaches of household labour supply see Donni (2006). 
9 For a criticism of this model see Chiappori (1988). 
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cooperation subject to the constraint of expenditure equalling household income. Threat 
points, which are the maximal levels of utility that can be obtained by individuals outside 
marriage, depend on the prices of goods, non-wage and wage income and some external 
factors. Only credible threats are considered in this model as they guarantee the existence 
of a solution. A stronger threat point guarantees that the individual’s preferences will have 
a higher weight in household demands. In this setting, changes in demand equations within 
the household do not only occur due to shifts (or twists) of budget constraints, as changes 
in the objective function determined by changes in outside opportunities also affect 
demand. The bargaining framework introduces new factors into the analysis of household 
behaviour. In McElroy (1990) the notion of EEPs (extra household environmental 
parameters) is developed. The latter are threat-point shifters that do not impact on prices 
or non-wage income. They include among others, the size of marriage/remarriage market, 
wealth or permanent income or measures of employability (McElroy, 1997). They represent 
a spouse’s bargaining power and will be discussed further below. Another set of co-
operative models is where the threat point is a state of non-cooperation within marriage 
such as the separate-sphere bargaining model developed by Lundberg and Pollak (1997). 
The authors mention that there are two main differences between the divorce-threat 
bargaining model and the model they propose. First, in this setting, a new threat point is 
defined as a state of non-cooperative equilibrium within marriage in which each spouse 
considers their partner’s strategy as fixed, the latter depending on gender roles. Second, 
even if the non-cooperative outcome is not Pareto optimal, it might represent the final 
outcome due to high transaction costs. The two models imply different distributional 
effects. In a divorce threat model, policies that improve control of incomes by wives while 
married without any effect on incomes upon divorce will not be effective at redistributing 
income while it is stipulated in the separate-spheres bargaining that those policies will have 
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the required impact. In a series of papers, Chiappori (1988) and McElroy (1990), debate of 
the empirical tractability of the Nash-bargaining approach. In the context of labour supply 
analysis, the latter has been used as a theoretical basis for the empirical research of Del 
Boca (1997) and has been the subject of further modelling in Barmby (1996).  
Collective model of household behaviour 
One last set of models to be reviewed is the collective approach of household behaviour. 
According to Clark et al (2004), the latter is becoming an increasingly popular framework in 
which to analyse household labour supply. The general collective framework imposes less 
structure than co-operative models of household behaviour. Its main assumption is Pareto 
efficiency of household allocations. In other words, one family member cannot be made 
better off without another family member being made worse off. According to Browning 
and Chiappori (1998) this assumption “has a good deal of intuitive appeal” (p. 1243) as 
individuals in couples are likely to know their partners’ preferences well and thus the 
decision process can be viewed as a repeated game. In this framework, it is assumed that 
each of the spouses has their own preferences. Furthermore, efficiency can be considered 
as “the most natural generalization” (p.1243) of the standard welfare analysis to multiple 
agents. In the collective model, efficiency leads to the derivation of a function called the 
sharing rule as long as the preferences of spouses are not interdependent (egoistic 
preferences or caring preferences separable into private or public goods). Its intuitive 
meaning is as follows: in a household, individuals allocate non-labour income according to 
the sharing rule, the latter being dependent on prices and non-labour income. After that, 
each member maximizes his or her utility subject to the established budget constraint. In 
the context of labour supply analysis, under specific assumptions, testable restrictions of 
the collective model can be derived and the sharing rule, as well as the parameters for each 
member’s utility function, can all be recovered up to an additive constant (Bourguignon 
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and Chiappori, 1992). The original collective model as developed by Chiappori (1988, 
1992) relies on the assumption that goods consumed are private. This can be rather 
restrictive in some applications particularly in the context of “targeting”. Indeed, children 
can be considered as public goods as both parents probably derive utility from their 
presence. Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir (2005) expand the original model to allow the 
inclusion of public goods (namely children). Identification of the decision process is 
possible in two cases: first, if expenditures on public goods are separable from the 
individuals’ preferences over leisure and private consumption or alternatively, if a 
distribution factor is used in the analysis. Browning and Chiappori (1998) define 
‘distribution factors’ as variables that impact on household decisions but do not affect the 
household’s consumption set or individual preferences. They are similar to the EEPs 
mentioned earlier in the context of cooperative models. In the collective model, if a 
distribution factor is favourable to the wife, the “balance of power” will be shifted in her 
favour and a reduction in her labour supply will be observed (actually an increase in her 
non-market time) through an increase in her share of income as well as an increase in her 
spouse’s labour supply. In the original model, household work was not accounted for 
which means that a low level of labour supply was interpreted as a high amount of leisure. 
However, this might not be the case as a low level of hours of market work might mean a 
high level of household work. This distinction is crucial when it comes to welfare issues, 
which is why the original collective model was criticised for failing to include household 
production. Apps and Rees (1997) and Chiappori (1997) discuss the importance of taking 
into account domestic production in a collective model of household labour supply 
however empirical applications of collective models with domestic production are rare. 
Finally, the original collective model was developed to analyse labour supply behaviour of 
working couples. It did not account for labour market participation, which is rather 
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restrictive. However, recent work on labour market participation in the collective model 
has been published (see Blundell et al (2007)).  
All the models reviewed above are described by Woolley (1993) as “neoclassical models 
with rational, visible, women” (p.495). However, it is important to mention the existence of 
alternative views of household behaviour such as the transaction cost approach developed 
by Pollak (1985), the Marxist approach to the family or feminist views of the family.10  
In the light of the discussion above, one can address a further criticism of the unitary 
model, already mentioned earlier, which is its neglect of bargaining power. Since EEP (or 
distribution factors), which attempt to capture the woman’s bargaining power, feature 
explicitly in prominent models of household behaviour that challenge the unitary model, 
testing for the significance of the impact of these variables on the labour supply of couples 
provides an indirect test of the unitary model. It is important to highlight that it is beyond 
the scope of this thesis to explore each of the various models of household behaviour 
available. In this sense, this chapter investigates whether the early (and most popular) 
neoclassical approach (or unitary model) remains a valid tool for analysis today. The next 
section addresses the issue of measurement of bargaining power. 
2.3 Bargaining in households 
“Bargaining power is anything that allows a particular individual to influence household 
decisions. It is the relative amount of influence that one individual has compared to other 
individuals in the household” (Doss, 2003: p.44). Variables that can proxy bargaining 
power can be either quantifiable or intangible (Agarval, 1997). 
Before exploring the various dimensions of bargaining, it is important to mention that 
some of the earlier models of household behaviour did acknowledge its existence. Becker 
                                                 
10 See Blau et al (2006) for a summary of these alternative approaches.  
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(1991) rejects criticism that his model of the family has failed to sufficiently address the 
issue of bargaining within households and has exaggerated the importance of marriage 
markets. His main argument is that it is crucial to recognize that bargaining between 
spouses occurs within the wider context of marriage markets and that competition within 
these markets will contribute to reducing power imbalances in marriages. Furthermore, 
Becker’s work emphasizes the importance of marriage markets in determining the well 
being of individuals in families. According to the author, a person enters the marriage 
market if they expect their income in partnership to exceed their income as a single person. 
As will be discussed in the empirical section, the introduction of sex ratios to labour supply 
analysis attempts to capture these effects. Regarding individual quantitative variables, one 
expects income to affect a person’s influence in the decision process. One interpretation 
would be that the more income the person has, the bigger their say in the allocation of 
resources in the household (the main breadwinner for example). Another interpretation 
would be that if a person has sacrificed their potential income (a wife that gives up on her 
career to care for the children) they would have greater bargaining power. However, 
income has limitations as a proxy for bargaining power as it could affect household 
outcomes (expenditures or leisure) without necessarily revealing anything about bargaining 
strength. Another related measure of bargaining is wealth, measured as the value of assets 
or income from these assets. However, this measure also could pose problems, as 
individuals with more power will tend to be able to acquire more assets. There are also 
non-monetary quantitative measures of bargaining. These include, for example, education, 
as more human capital results in more opportunities in the labour market and more social 
status within society and the household more specifically. Regarding influences that are not 
individual or household specific, laws and social norms can also affect bargaining power. 
Laws regarding property rights, the labour market or marriage can contribute to improving 
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women’s choices thus giving them more power in the household. However, there is no 
spatial variation in legislation in the UK which thus limits the empirical use of such factors 
to analyse bargaining. Changing regulation might be not sufficient as social norms can also 
affect women’s status. Some jobs can be considered inappropriate for women even though 
there is no law preventing them from working in these positions. Social norms, could also 
affect women’s ability to acquire assets (Doss, 2003). These can be difficult to measure. As 
stated by Argaval (1997), norms can affect gender relations in the household in a number 
of ways. Norms delimit what can be bargained about as what is regarded as tradition might 
be indisputable. Furthermore, they determine the nature of the bargaining process (explicit 
or implicit, gentle or forceful). In most economic applications, social norms are considered 
exogenous but in reality, they are themselves subject to bargaining and can change. A 
change in social norms will have an impact not only on current marriages but potentially 
affect future marriage market equilibriums (Lundberg and Pollak, 1997). There are 
additional factors that determine bargaining power in households among which are: 
ownership of resources, an individual’s social capital and personal values and attitudes. 
Given the multitude of potential bargaining measures, Agarval (1997) pinpoints the 
importance of prioritizing the latter particularly for the purpose of policymaking. However, 
this can be quite difficult to implement in practice. 
One important caveat to the discussion above is that a spouse’s bargaining power might 
change during marriage. This is seldom addressed in studies of intrahousehold decisions, 
which are often set in a static context (Thomas et al, 1997). Indeed, the economic literature 
has been concerned with the effect of bargaining power on intrahousehold allocation and 
decision-making in the household but has not addressed the potential reverse causation of 
household dynamics influencing bargaining power. Indeed, acquiring bargaining power is a 
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long process and even changes in circumstances are unlikely to result in immediate results 
(Basu, 2006). 
As mentioned earlier, the notion of a spouse’s bargaining power is prominent in Nash 
bargaining models and the collective framework. In the former, McElroy (1997) 
emphasizes the role played by distribution factors (or EEPs) but states that “interpreting 
the coefficients associated with EEPs is often a delicate business” (p.58). The author does 
not, for example, conjecture on the direction of the impact of a distribution factor on 
labour supply. In the collective framework, predictions are more specific. Chiappori et al 
(2002) argue that if a distribution factor favours one spouse (the wife), she has greater 
bargaining strength and standard income effects predict she will enjoy more leisure (or in 
other words reduce her supply of hours in the labour market).  
2.4 Relevance of household models for policymaking 
Regarding the policy implications of the discussion above, Alderman et al (1995) ask 
whether distinguishing between different models is just important at the theoretical level or 
whether it has more practical consequences. In terms of policymaking, relying on the 
unitary model of household behaviour can have serious consequences. As stated by 
Alderman et al (1997), in many instances, the government assumes that in addressing the 
problem of household poverty, individual poverty will be alleviated or that the latter can be 
tackled without taking into account other household members. The authors identify certain 
aspects of policymaking that require careful scrutiny. First, the choice of the economic 
model on which a policy relies is a key determinant of the policy’s consequences. In 
collective models, the household’s consumption behaviour will be altered according to 
whom receives public transfers. In contrast, the unitary model predicts that the impact of 
public transfers does not depend on its recipient. Second, the reaction of other household 
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members to the transfer is also important, as it might be that resources will be diverted 
from them to compensate for the income receipt. Finally, some policies, which will not be 
considered in a unitary framework on the basis that they do not affect household 
preferences or production technology, might greatly impact on intra household allocations 
in other frameworks. One study by Lundberg et al (1997) used a policy change in the UK as 
a natural experiment to test whether the identity of the benefit’s recipient affects the 
household’s consumption’s patterns and showed that transferring children’s allowance 
from fathers to mothers increased spending on women and children clothing relative to 
men’s. As stated by Lundberg and Pollak (1997) the question remains of whether the 
individual receiving the benefits does determine how the money is to be spent. 
Although some have been critical of the types of policies mentioned above on the basis 
that they interfere in private matters within households, it must be recognized that even 
doing nothing will affect intrahousehold distribution (Doss, 2003). The objective of this 
chapter is to analyse the extent to which the unitary model represents an adequate 
framework to study household behaviour. As stated by Alderman et al (1995): “the guide to 
policymaking implied in the unitary model is simpler if it is correct, inefficient if it is not” 
(p.2). 
3 Empirical Review of  the Literature 
As shown in the theoretical section, this chapter relies on both the labour supply literature 
and the one that addresses intra-household resource allocation. It is beyond the scope of 
this chapter to analyse both literatures in their entirety, therefore, the review conducted 
below starts with a brief overview of labour supply estimates of British married men and 
women before analysing the various studies that have tested the unitary framework in the 
context of labour supply analysis. 
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3.1 Married women and men labour supply 
As stated in Pencavel (1986), there is a vast and old literature on the determinants of labour 
supply behaviour, and until recently the latter was mainly analysed in the context of a 
traditional neoclassical framework. A wide range of studies have analysed individual labour 
supply of men and women mostly in industrialized countries. “First generation models” 
that date from the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s used very simple methodologies 
but were considered to have pinpointed more problems than they solved. They estimated 
ad hoc labour supply functions and generally ignored the participation decision (corner 
solution). The range of elasticities found in these studies is very wide. In general, even 
though there is no real consensus regarding the magnitudes of elasticities for both genders, 
the findings were that female labour supply behaviour is more sensitive to changes in wages 
and income than men. Male uncompensated elasticities’ estimates ranged between 0.00 and 
-0.4 with some studies finding positive elasticities for men. Regarding women, most gross 
wage elasticities were found to be positive and rather large with a variation in values even 
larger than that of men. “Second generation models” differ in that they have used labour 
supply equations derived from specified utility functions and budget constraints. There are 
few studies of male labour supply but the literature reports it less elastic with respect to 
wage and income than female labour supply, as suggested by earlier studies. Male gross 
wage elasticities estimates found in these studies range from -0.2 to 0.14 while female ones 
are normally higher than 0.60 (Killingsworth, 1983). In Great Britain in particular, Pencavel 
(1986) reveals that most of the studies of male labour supply have been conducted in the 
context of taxation (i,e.; non-linear budget constraint). The following table provides a 
summary of the main results of studies of married male and female labour supply in the 
United Kingdom. Some of the estimates cited are based on non-linear budget constraints, 
others correct for selection bias. Studies of participation decisions are not reviewed, as they 
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are the subject of the next chapter. It is important to note that studies that model 
simultaneously household labour supply and commodity demands are not included in the 
table.11 
Table 1.1: A selection of British Studies of married males and females labour supply 
Study  Sample and procedure Own 
wage 
elasticity 
Spouse’s 
wage 
elasticity 
Non-labour 
income 
elasticity 
Female labour supply 
Layard et al (1980) Working wives only/ 
OLS/LBC  
0.08 -0.10 -0.003 
Greenhalgh (1980) Working wives only/ 
OLS/LBC 
0.717 ƒ -0.08 a 
Ashworth and Ulph 
(1981) † 
Family utility-family budget 
constraint model/working 
couples 
Individual utility-family budget 
constraint model/working 
couples 
-1.18 
 
 
-4.46 
 
 
1.73 
 
 
5.05 
-0.04 a 
 
 
0.56 a 
Arrufat and Zabalza 
(1986)  
Sample of married 
women/ML/NLBC 
0.62 -0.34 -0.06 
Main and Reilly 
(1994) 
Sample of married women/ 
Tobit/LBC 
1.39 -0.142 0.043 
Davies et al (2000) Sample of working 
couples/SR/LBC 
-0.053 ƒ 0.001 
Clark et al (2002) Sample of couples/IV/LBC 0.326 -0.136 -0.053 
 
Male labour supply 
Ashworth and Ulph 
(1981) † 
Family utility-family budget 
constraint model/working 
couples 
Individual utility-family budget 
constraint model/working 
couples 
-0.03 
 
 
-1 
-0.16 
 
 
0.87 
-2.21 a 
 
 
1.47 a 
Davies et al (2000) Sample of working 
couples/SR/LBC 
-0.122 ƒ -0.005 
Clark et al (2002) Sample of couples/IV/LBC NS -0.036 -0.007 
 
Notes: (†) reference taken from Killingsworth (1983) and (ƒ) not available 
 (a) denotes total income elasticity  
  
As is clear from table 1.1, studies of individual and household labour supply behaviour vary 
in the samples they use, the frameworks they are based on and the estimation procedures. 
In the context of the unitary model, different approaches have been used to model 
household labour supply (Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). The study by Wales and 
                                                 
11 See for example Blundell and Walker (1982).  
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Woodland (1976) is among the earlier ones to have analysed jointly the hours of work of 
household members. Kooreman and Kapteyn (1986) use the Almost Ideal Demand System 
to develop a model consistent with the unitary approach, which they use to analyse 
household labour supply in the Netherlands. Ransom (1987) develops a model of 
continuous hours with censoring to analyse the hours-of-work decisions of American 
families. Other studies investigate the impact of welfare programme participation on 
couples’ labour market behaviour (see Hoynes (1996)). A survey of these studies is not 
needed for the purposes of this chapter as they often rely on specific utility functions or 
budget constraints that are suited to address the research questions they pose. Therefore, 
the only models of household labour supply surveyed in depth are those that have been 
used to test the implications of the unitary model. These studies are reviewed in the next 
section.  
3.2 Testing the unitary model of household labour supply  
Before providing a review of studies that have tested the unitary model of household 
labour supply, it is important to note that many studies have tested the unitary framework 
using consumer demand analysis both in developing and developed countries.12 In the 
context of labour supply analysis, studies have tested each of the three aspects addressed in 
this chapter namely: income pooling, symmetry of Slutsky effects and the impact of 
distribution factors. 
Ashenfelter and Heckman (1974) derive the unitary model’s restrictions in a framework in 
which they can be easily tested. They use three-stage least squares to estimate a variant of 
husband and wife’s labour supply functions where the substitution effects are among the 
coefficients being estimated. They then use these coefficients and their standard errors to 
                                                 
12 See Hoddinott et al (1997) for a review. 
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test for the equality of substitution effects (or in other words symmetry) and find that they 
cannot reject equality of effects. They impose this equality restriction on the data and argue 
that this improves the precision of the parameters estimated. 
Lundberg (1988) investigates models of household behaviour using panel data from the 
financial control group of the Denver Income Maintenance Experiment, by estimating a 
dynamic simultaneous equations model of wife’s and husband’s hours of work. She starts 
with a general unrestrictive framework that nests within it a traditional model. The 
traditional model used is consistent with the unitary model and stipulates that the hours of 
work of men are independent of that of their wives and independent of her attributes as 
well, and for women, that their husband’s behaviour is exogenous to theirs. The author 
finds that in couples with young children, there are interactions in family labour supplies. 
This rejects the traditional model in which individual leisure is an argument of a single 
household utility function whereas children seem to be an important commodity for 
couples in the sample. 
Another paper that tests the ‘neoclassical model’ (as labelled by the author) is Schultz 
(1990). The author uses the 1981 socioeconomic Survey of Thailand and finds that family 
members do exhibit self-interest in distribution within the household. This is done in the 
context of estimating labour supply equations for men and women. Due to the fact that 
earnings are not an exogenous determinant of household demands, the author tests the 
effect of male and female unearned income on household behaviour. Two working 
assumptions are made, the first being that sources of unearned income of different 
members must be indistinguishable when it comes to what they can purchase in the market 
and produce in the household, and that unearned income is treated as exogenous. The 
estimation is done in multiple stages and different specifications are developed for 
robustness purposes. The first step is to estimate wage equations for males and females. 
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Only husbands and wives in couples where both earn a wage are analysed. After that, the 
author examines the impact of wife and husband transfers and non-property income on 
labour supply to test the equality restriction of the two effects implied by the neoclassical 
model. The results show that the different sources of non-labour income can be 
aggregated. Furthermore, there seems to be different effects on the woman’s labour supply 
of spouse-specific non-earned income. Moreover, an individual’s own non-labour income 
has a stronger negative impact on their labour supply than the income of their partner. This 
goes against the predictions of the unitary model of household behaviour. 
Kawagushi (1994) tests various models of household labour supply using Australian data 
from 1986. The author estimates a system of simultaneous labour supply functions for 
husbands and wives using Maximum Likelihood. Results reveal that for both husband and 
wife, the own wage effect is positive when the wage level is low and becomes negative as 
the wage rate increases. Non-labour income has a positive effect on wives and negative 
effect on husbands.  Regarding the implications of the “neoclassical model” (as labelled by 
the author), income pooling and Slutsky symmetry are investigated. Results show that the 
hypothesis of income pooling is rejected at the five percent significance level. In the case 
where income effects are not zero, the hypothesis that the Slutsky matrix is symmetric is 
rejected by the data. Kawagushi (1994) also investigates the impact of an EEP, the sex 
ratio, on the labour supply of husbands and wives but finds that the latter is not statistically 
significant.    
Using Canadian data from 1986, in the context of the collective framework, Fortin and 
Lacroix (1997) estimate a general model, which embodies both unitary and collective 
approaches to test restrictions imposed by the former using maximum likelihood 
techniques. They find that the pooling hypothesis is rejected in most cases but that the 
collective model is rejected in the case of young couples with pre-school children. They 
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also estimate female and male elasticities and find that own wage elasticities for both 
women and men are in line with the range of estimates obtained in the literature. They are 
slightly larger for women than men. Cross-wage elasticities are much lower but not 
precisely estimated.  
Winkler (1997) tests whether cohabitating individuals pool income and whether the type of 
income pooling depends on the kind of cohabitation, long term or short term and if the 
couple has children. The data used are from the 1993 Current Population Survey and the 
1987 National Survey of Families and Households. A Heckman two-step model of hours 
worked consisting of a probit model of labour force participation is used. Subsequently, a 
linear hours worked equation, corrected for sample selection, is estimated. Results show 
that non-labour income has a negative effect on female labour supply. The hypothesis of 
income pooling is rejected. 
Chiappori et al (2002) use a collective model augmented to include exogenous distribution 
factors. They use two types of measures. The first one is the sex ratio, computed by age, 
state of residence and race. The second is a Divorce Law Index. The latter is constructed 
based on four characteristics of divorce legislation and attempts to measure how favourable 
legislation is to women. Both are added to test the unitary framework where such variables 
are assumed not to affect labour supplies. The sample of 1618 households they use is 
drawn from wave 22 of the PSID (year 1988). They restrict the analysis to couples where 
both spouses work and do not take into account participation decisions. They find that 
both the sex-ratio and the Divorce Law Index have an effect on labour supply of husbands 
and wives and thus income transfers between spouses. A one percentage point increase in 
the sex ratio is found to decrease wives’ annual labour supply by 17.9 hours and increase 
their husbands’ by 45 hours. All the parameters of the sharing rule are found to be 
statistically significant. 
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Davies et al (2000) investigate the supply of both domestic and market hours of work using 
various models of household behaviour for a sample of British couples from the BHPS 
(year 1994). While the objectives of the study are different to those of this chapter, a brief 
overview of the latter is nevertheless informative. The analysis is restricted to couples with 
a working male. Three different types of households are identified depending on whether 
the wife is in full-time or part-time employment or not working. The authors use a 
switching regression approach to model hours of work, with a multinomial logit model for 
female labour force participation as a switching criterion. Both domestic and market hours 
are modelled for the three types of couples. Non-labour income is assumed to be non- 
pooled. The authors attempt to determine which type of approach, cooperative or non-
cooperative, best describes their behaviour. The authors state that the data “suggest a much 
greater degree of autonomy of the two partners in marriage than any of the commonly 
used theoretical models would imply” (p.241). The estimates of the full model are found to 
be poorly determined, therefore, the authors estimate a hybrid model where no cross-
effects are allowed in couples where the woman does not work or works part-time. For 
dual-earner couples, cross-income effects are allowed in the presence of dependent 
children. In the case where both partners are employed full-time, findings reveal that the 
hypothesis of zero correlation between the residuals of the four hours equations is not 
rejected at the 5% significance level. Regarding income and wage effects, the findings show 
significant but small own-wage effects for men and no own-wage effects for women. The 
authors attribute this result to the fact that the sample is split into full-time and part-time 
female workers and mention that if the equation is fitted to all women then female wages 
have a significant positive effect on their hours of work in the market. 
Clark et al (2002, 2004) use British data from wave seven of the BHPS to estimate a 
collective model of labour supply ‘a la Chiappori’ to derive robust estimates for the effects 
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of wages, income and other variables on hours of work, and also to analyse intra-household 
bargaining by estimating a sharing rule. The sample they use consists of couples where 
both members work, but the issue of selection bias that results from this choice is not 
addressed. The authors model male and female labour supply simultaneously. The 
estimation procedure used is GMM. The authors test for the exogeneity of wages and non-
labour income.  A number of bargaining measures are incorporated in the analysis. Marital 
status, the woman’s religious beliefs and the man’s political involvement (measures 
available in the BHPS) are used as distribution factors. A woman is found to have greater 
bargaining power if she is less interested in religion and if she is married, but has lower 
bargaining power if her husband is involved in politics. Sex ratios are also used but do not 
seem to affect the supply of labour and therefore are not retained in the specification. Male 
elasticities are found to be insignificant and the estimated uncompensated wage elasticities 
indicate that the substitution effect dominates the income effect. The female labour supply 
elasticity with respect to her own wage is 0.326 for all couples and 0.249 for couples 
without pre-school children. The elasticity with respect to her husband’s wage is found to 
be -0.136 for samples using all couples and not significant for couples without pre-school 
children. Moreover, both the income pooling hypothesis and the Slutsky symmetry 
hypothesis are rejected by the data. 
The studies reviewed above show that in most cases, apart for samples with pre-school 
children, the hypothesis of income pooling is rejected by the data. For symmetry, 
conflicting results are found. Furthermore, it is important to note that pooling has been 
more often tested than symmetry in the context of labour supply analysis. With respect to 
distribution factors, sex ratios are found to be statistically significant in some studies but 
not in others. In this chapter, two types of measures of sex ratio will be investigated as 
discussed below.  
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Few studies have used distribution factors that are couple-specific, probably due to 
endogeneity concerns. For this reason, a decision is made not to use religious attendance 
and political involvement in this study (they were considered as distribution factors by 
Clark et al (2002)). Clark et al (2002, 2004) also explore the role of parental socio-economic 
background and introduce a measure of gender-role attitudes to their model. In this thesis, 
this will be done in chapters two and three. One distribution factor, which is couple-
specific, and is not endogenous, the age difference between husband and wife, will be used 
in this study and is discussed below. The next section provides a detailed analysis of the 
data including a discussion of the variables to be employed in the present analysis.  
4 Data 
The aim of this thesis is to empirically test a number of propositions regarding a couple’s 
labour market behaviour in Great Britain. There are various British surveys that collect 
information on household behaviour such as the Family Expenditure Survey and the 
General Household Survey among others. In this thesis, the data are drawn from the 
British Household Panel Survey that is described in the next section. 
4.1 The British Household Panel Survey 
The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) is an annual survey designed to facilitate the 
investigation of social and economic conditions both at the individual and household level 
in Britain, and has been extensively used by the academic community. It covers topics such 
as household organization, wealth, socio-economic values and the labour market. It started 
in 1991 and comprises annual waves to the current date. It is conducted by the ESRC UK 
Longitudinal Studies Centre, with the Institute for Social and Economic Research at the 
University of Essex. The fieldwork generally takes place from September 1st to the end of 
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April of the following year. Adults aged over 16 are interviewed totalling more than 5,000 
households. It is a panel, which means that the same individuals are interviewed in 
consecutive years. If they leave their original household, they will still be interviewed as well 
as the members of the new household they integrate into. The survey has been regularly 
enhanced to better fit the needs of researchers. At wave nine, two additional samples in 
Scotland and Wales were added to increase the relatively small sample sizes of these two 
regions and to permit comparisons within the UK. The same was done for Northern 
Ireland in Wave 11 (Taylor et al, 2005).  
There are a number of surveys that can be employed for labour supply analysis in the UK. 
The Family Expenditure Survey has been extensively used in studies of labour supply in the 
UK. Another survey that includes rich information on labour supply behaviour and that 
has been used to model labour market behaviour is the Labour Force Survey. The General 
Household Survey is a third survey of British households that has been employed to 
analyse labour market behaviour. All these surveys are cross-sectional. They include similar 
questions to the BHPS. However, the latter has two further elements that make it a better 
choice for the present study. First, it is a panel, which means that variables from previous 
waves can be used in modelling. Second, it includes questions on gender roles. These also 
feature in other surveys such as the British Social Attitudes Survey; however the latter 
would not be suited for the present purpose as it does not have detailed labour income 
information. It is important to note that the BHPS is likely to suffer from attrition 
problems.13          
As stated in Clark et al (2004), the BHPS is distinctive as it includes information on various 
aspects of household behaviour and individual characteristics that can be used to unveil the 
complex mechanisms governing a couple’s behaviour inside and outside the household. 
                                                 
13 See Uhrig (2008) for a discussion of attrition and non-response in the BHPS.   
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The survey is thus well suited for the analysis conducted in this thesis. The data come from 
Wave 13 of the BHPS and correspond to the years 2003 and 2004. The sample and 
variables used in this chapter are described in the next section. 
4.2 Dataset construction 
A number of adjustments have been made to the raw data in order to obtain the final 
dataset to be used in this chapter. Three types of variables are needed for the analysis. First, 
individual and household characteristics need to be defined. 
Individual and household data  
The analysis in this thesis is restricted to the working age population; therefore men aged 
more than 64 and women aged more than 59 are dropped from the sample as these 
correspond to the employees’ retirement ages in the United Kingdom. A decision is made 
to restrict the analysis to Great Britain and exclude households in Northern Ireland, as the 
same specifications might not apply in that jurisdiction. As stated earlier, this chapter 
analyses the labour supply of couples. It is beyond the scope of this research to distinguish 
between married and cohabitating individuals.14 Individual and household characteristics 
are needed for the analysis. The individual’s age and education are key determinants of 
labour market behaviour. While the former is readily available, a choice has to be made 
regarding the most appropriate measure of an individual’s education as the BHPS includes 
a number of variables that can proxy human capital. They are: age at which the person 
finishes school, highest academic qualification and highest educational qualification. The 
latter is used and the variable for education is constructed as five dummy variables 
corresponding to the following categories: one category includes people who have a higher 
degree; the second is composed of people who have a first degree, the third corresponds to 
                                                 
14 See Winkler (1997) for an analysis of income pooling among cohabitating couples. 
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people who have teaching or nursing qualifications, apprenticeships or any other higher 
qualification, the fourth includes individuals who have A levels, O levels, a commercial 
qualification or CSE grade 2-5 or equivalent, and the last category is the one comprising 
individuals without any formal qualification. Regarding household specific data, region of 
residence and the number and age of children are all available. There are two different 
variables regarding the number of children: number of own children in the household and 
number of children in the household. There does not seem to be a notable difference 
between the two in the sample used here. With respect to the age of children, variables 
indicating the number of children between 0 and 2, 3 and 4, 5 and 11, 12 and 15 and finally 
16 and 18 are used to construct three dummy variables indicating the presence, in the 
household, of at least one child aged under 5, or between 6 and 11 or over 12. This 
distinction is important, as female employment rates are known to vary depending on the 
age of their children (this issue is discussed further in chapter two).15 
                                                 
15 Preliminary analysis revealed an expected high correlation between the number of children and the binary 
variables indicating the presence of children in the various age categories. Therefore, only the latter were 
retained in the analysis.  
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Table 1.2: Individual and household variables’ description and summary statistics 
Variable name Variable description  
 
Males Females 
educ0 Binary variable that equals 1 if the respondent has 
no qualification and 0 otherwise 
0.07 0.07 
educ1 Binary variable that equals 1 if the respondent has 
o levels, a levels, cse grade 2-5 or commercial 
qualification and 0 otherwise 
0.34 0.39 
educ2 Binary variable that equals 1 if the respondent has 
a nursing or teaching qualification, other higher 
qualification or apprenticeship 0 otherwise 
0.40 0.35 
educ3 Binary variable that equals 1 if the respondent has 
a first degree and 0 otherwise 
0.14 0.16 
educ4 Binary variable that equals 1 if the respondent has 
a higher degree and 0 otherwise 
0.04 0.03 
age Continuous variable representing the individual’s 
age in years 
41 39 
childlessthan5 Binary variable that is equal to 1 if there is at least 
one child aged between 0 and 4 in the household 
and 0 otherwise 
0.16 0.16 
child5to11 Binary variable that is equal to 1 if there is at least 
one child aged between 5 and 11 in the household 
and 0 otherwise 
0.27 0.27 
childolderthan
12 
Binary variable that is equal to 1 if there is at least 
one child aged between 12 and 18 in the 
household and 0 otherwise 
0.22 0.22 
 
london Binary variable that equals 1 if the household is in 
inner or outer London and 0 otherwise 
0.04 0.04 
eastanglia Binary variable that equals 1 if the household is in 
East Anglia and 0 otherwise 
0.03 0.03 
north Binary variable that equals 1 if the household is in 
and 0 otherwise 
0.19 0.19 
south Binary variable that equals 1 if the household is in 
the South East or the South West of England and 
0 otherwise 
0.21 0.21 
scotland Binary variable that equals 1 if the household is in 
Scotland and 0 otherwise 
0.22 0.22 
wales Binary variable that equals 1 if the household is in 
Wales and 0 otherwise 
0.17 0.17 
midland Binary variable that equals 1 if the household is in 
the east midlands, the west midlands conurbation 
or the region of west midlands and 0 otherwise 
0.13 0.13 
 Sample size 1415 1415
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Labour supply and income data  
In this chapter, labour supply is taken to mean the total number of hours worked on all 
jobs in a month.16 It is important to note a discrepancy in the hours’ variable pertaining to 
the main job and the one relative to the secondary job. In the first case, the number of 
hours reported is the “usual number of hours worked per week” whereas in the case of the 
secondary job, it is the “number of hours worked last month”. As stated in Borjas (1980), 
the “usual” number of hours is an appropriate measure, as it most likely does not take into 
account holidays and sick days. One cannot assume that the hours on the second job are 
constant throughout the year. However for the main job, one could assume that the usual 
hours were observed during the month before the interview. Therefore, the number of 
total monthly hours to be used in the analysis as the dependent variable is the sum of the 
usual weekly hours converted into a monthly figure by multiplying by the factor 4.33 to 
which are added hours on the second job last month. With respect to labour income, for 
the main job, the take home pay at the last payment as well as usual pay are reported. For 
the secondary job, only last month’s gross pay is available. Labour income for the month 
before the interview date is also available and is reported in gross terms. This is the variable 
that is used to construct the hourly wage measure in order to ensure consistency with the 
second job information reported. The hourly wage is defined as last month’s labour income 
divided by total number of hours worked last month. This measure can potentially be 
affected by what has been known in the literature as the “negative division bias”, in case 
the hours variable is measured with error, as hours appear on both sides of the equation 
(Borjas, 1980).  
                                                 
16 Second job holders constitute 7% of the sample of working couples.   
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In the survey, itself, the non-labour income is derived from four sources: benefit income, 
transfer income, pension income and investment income. Benefit income is equal to all 
state benefits payment. Investment income is the sum of all income from savings and 
investment, as well as proceeds from rents or borders and lodgers. Pension income is equal 
to the sum of all amounts received from non-state pensions. Finally, transfer income is the 
sum of all other receipts such as educational grants, payment from absent family members 
and others. Two types of income measures are available in the survey: yearly non-labour 
income (during the year from September in the year before the interview until September 
of the interview year) and last month’s non-labour income. A monthly income value is 
obtained by dividing the first measure by 12 as it is more likely to represent “permanent 
income” than the second. It is important to mention a potential problem with income 
variables. In some cases, the couple jointly receives payments. In order to obtain individual 
measures, joint receipt payments are divided by two. This poses a problem in the present 
study, as its aim is precisely to investigate how non-labour income is divided at the level of 
the household. However, the problem can be conveniently ignored as it concerns less than 
5% of couples in the case of investment income and less than 1% with respect to all other 
types of income. In addition, income variables include imputed values. It is important to 
note a cluster of zeros for non-labour income. This might result in a lack of variation of the 
income variable in regression models and thus yield imprecise estimates. Individuals who 
have missing information for any of the variables of interest are omitted from the sample. 
Finally, one should also be aware of other potential problems that might arise regarding 
some of the variables. As mentioned previously, regarding wage measurement, any error in 
labour supply values (hours) will also affect the wage measure, as it is the ratio of monthly 
earnings over monthly hours. A few problems also arise in the construction of the income 
variable. A number of sources of non-labour income are effectively work related such as 
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certain types of transfers, in which case they can no longer be considered exogenous. In 
this chapter, potential endogeneity concerns will be addressed using the Instrumental 
Variables (IV) procedure, as will be discussed later. Finally, one last point concerning 
income measurement is whether the monetary value of the services from housing, durables 
and others needs to be incorporated in the income measure (Killingsworth, 1983)? The 
inclusion provides an estimate of non-labour income, which is more consistent with a life-
cycle approach where approximating the value of durable assets is important. 
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Table 1.3: Labour market and income variables’ description and summary statistics 
Variable name Variable description  Males Females 
hours Ordinal variable. It is equal to the sum of hours on main 
and second jobs. (all jobs) 
172 
(32) 
129 
(45) 
male_wage Log of male hourly wage for all jobs (see main text for a 
detailed description) 
2.4 
(0.47) 
- 
 
female_wage Log of female hourly wage for all jobs (see main text for 
description) 
- 2.09 
(0.47) 
less6mths Binary variable that equals 1 if the individual has been in 
their current job for a period of less than six months and 
0 otherwise 
0.15 0.16 
7mths_1yr Binary variable that equals 1 if the individual has been in 
their current job for a period of of seven months to one 
year and 0 otherwise 
0.10 0.12 
1yr_3yr Binary variable that equals 1 if the individual has been in 
their current job for a period of one to three years and 0 
otherwise 
0.26 0.29 
3yr_5yr Binary variable that equals 1 if the individual has been in 
their current job for a period of three to five years and 0 
otherwise 
0.14 0.14 
5yr_10yr Binary variable that equals 1 if the individual has been in 
their current job for a period of five to ten years and 0 
otherwise 
0.18 0.15 
10yr_more Binary variable that equals 1 if the individual has been in 
their current job for more than ten years and 0 otherwise 
0.17 0.14 
 
 
male_income Continuous measure. Monthly male non-labour income 
obtained by dividing non-labour income in the year 
before the interview by 12. It includes transfer, benefit, 
pension and investment income 
81 
(250) 
- 
female_ 
income 
Continuous measure. Monthly female non-labour income 
obtained by dividing non-labour income in the year 
before the interview by 12. It includes transfer, benefit, 
pension and investment income 
- 116 
(186) 
couple_ 
income 
Continuous measure. Pooled monthly non-labour income 
that is equal to the sum of the male and female monthly 
non-labour incomes 
 
197 
(323) 
197 
(323) 
 Sample Size 1415 1415 
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Distribution factors 
As stated in Thomas et al (1997), even though there is an intuitive interpretation of power 
in the theoretical modelling of intra-household relations, it “has proven to be the Achilles 
heel of empirical work on household decision-making” (p.1). According to Quisumbing 
and Maluccio (1999), in addition to the fact that an appropriate distribution factor should 
be exogenous to bargaining between spouses, it is crucial that the latter also reflects cultural 
patterns that are likely to be relevant to within marriage bargaining. However, as stated by 
Phipps and Burton (1995), there is limited variation in social/institutional factors within 
one country, thus limiting the type of variables that can be used to proxy bargaining. 
Nevertheless, two broad types of distribution factors are used in this study and thus 
computed. These comprise internal and external factors to the household. The first 
distribution factor used in the analysis is the percentage age difference, which is 
constructed by subtracting the female age from the male age and dividing the result by the 
male’s age. According to Smith et al (2003), this gives more importance to that factor in 
younger couples. A related distribution factor that is also used is a dummy variable 
indicating whether the wife is older than her husband. In developing countries, studies have 
shown that women’s power was lower the older their husband (see Jejeebhoy, 1995). 
However, another interpretation is also possible. If the male is younger, his partner could 
feel that he has more options in the marriage/remarriage market than her. As stated by 
Becker (1991), separated or divorced women, even when young, tend to remarry slower 
than men as they often have custody of children which could discourage new partners. 
Quisumbing and Maluccio (1999) state the importance of social capital in determining a 
woman’s bargaining power. In the survey, there are a number of variables pertaining to 
membership of individuals to organizations such as women’s group, sports’ club, and social 
or community groups. This information is not used as it could be a result of bargaining 
 57 
 
strength as well as an indicator of it. For the same reason, attendance at religious services is 
also not employed despite the fact that it was used as a distribution factor in Clark et al 
(2002).  
Regarding variables outside the household, a sex-ratio, defined as the number of men per 
woman in a population, is constructed. In this study, two different measures of sex-ratios 
are used. The first sex-ratio measure is defined as the ratio of the number of males whose 
age falls in the age category of the husband over the number of females whose age falls in 
the category of the wife in a particular county. The second sex-ratio measure is defined as 
the ratio of the number of males whose age falls in the age category of the husband over 
the number of females whose age falls in that same age category. The data are obtained 
from the Office of National Statistics. They describe population estimates by age group, 
gender and local authority in 2003.17 The sex ratios are computed at the level of county. As 
the BHPS does not have this particular information, districts are used and assigned to 
relevant counties. There might be slight discrepancies in the geographical boundaries of the 
regions as a number of changes in districts occurred in 1996 and the survey do not take 
these into account. If there are more men than women in a region, then women are at an 
advantage as they have more “options” in case of divorce. The definitions of sex-ratio 
employed in this paper might seem ad-hoc. Indeed a number of questions can be raised 
regarding the measure likely to best reflect the marriage market. Should the measure reflect 
the state of the marriage or remarriage market? When an individual looks for a new partner, 
what is their “target” group?  
                                                 
17 See Office of National Statistics (2003). 
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It is important to note that a number of studies have analysed the impact of sex ratios on 
the behaviour of women in slightly different contexts to the current chapter. Angrist (2002) 
uses a migration episode in American history to study the effect of changing sex ratio on 
marital status, fertility and labour market outcomes. He finds that high sex ratios result in a 
positive effect on the likelihood of female marriage and a large negative effect on their 
labour force participation. Grossbard-Shetman and Neideffer (1997) use the 1990 census 
Public Use Microdata Sample to study the impact of marriage market on women’s labour 
supply. The hypothesis to be tested is that high sex ratios, which signal the presence of an 
excess of males in the marriage market, lead to women working less in the labour market 
and getting more income from spousal labour. A few considerations need to be addressed 
regarding the use of the sex ratio as a distribution factor. In certain regions, due to the 
presence of a certain type of industry or occupations, there might be a high presence of 
males and therefore a high sex ratio which might lead to a spurious correlation with hours 
worked. In the particular case of regional variation, if the latter does exist, differences in 
habits or other factors specific to the community can be alternative explanations 
(Hoddinott et al, 1997). However, it is important to also note that that using factors outside 
the household helps avoiding potential endogeneity problems (Chiappori et al, 2002). 
Another distribution factor that has been widely used in the literature is some measure of 
divorce legislation as the latter influences property rights in the event of a marriage 
breakdown. Gray (1998) uses changes in unilateral divorce laws, and more specifically their 
implications regarding property rights, in order to evaluate different models of household 
behaviour. The analysis is conducted using three samples: the Current Population Survey, 
the Census and PSID. Two years are used for each survey. One year prior divorce law 
changes and one year after half the states had adopted them. The results were the 
following: First, it was shown, as predicted by the Coase theorem, that a reassignment of 
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property rights did not increase the probability of divorce. Second, women that were 
positively affected by the legislation increased their labour supply while those that were 
disadvantaged reduced it. The author states that these findings are consistent with a 
bargaining model that usually predicts a reverse impact on labour supply due to a change in 
power only if non-market time is divided between leisure and non-market time and that 
they reject the standard unitary model. In Britain, there is no spatial variation in legislation 
as in the US. One could use the divorce rate to proxy divorce patterns in a certain district. 
However, the interpretation is not as clear as in the case of legislation. Indeed, if the 
divorce rate influences labour supply, this could have a bargaining interpretation but also a 
labour supply interpretation since higher divorce rates might mean more single women 
aiming to work and therefore impact aggregate labour supply/demand. The variable is 
therefore not included in the analysis. 
As explained above, in the collective model, an increase in a distribution factor that is 
considered to favour the wife’s bargaining power will lead to a reduction in her labour 
supply. In the case of sex ratios, it is expected that a greater number of men relative to 
women is equivalent to a greater female bargaining power and thus an increase in the sex 
ratio is expected to reduce female hours of work. The reverse should hold for men. With 
respect to age difference, most studies suggest that an increase in the age difference 
between a wife and her husband should reduce her bargaining power or in other words 
increase her labour supply. As mentioned previously, this interpretation does not take into 
account household production and should therefore be referred to cautiously. For this 
reason, it is important to note that other studies that have used distribution factors only 
look at the significance of distribution factors and not the direction of their impact. As 
mentioned by Phipps and Burton (1995): “whether an increase in bargaining power for 
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women will result in an increase or a decrease in labor-force participation presumably 
depends upon women's preferences with respect to paid employment.”(p.159).    
 
 
Table 1.4: Distribution factors description and summary statistics 
 Variable description Variable name Mean; 
standard 
deviation 
Range 
 
 
Couple specific 
 
    
Percentage age 
difference 
age_difference 0.0386 
(0.1145) 
[-0.63;+0.54] 
Whether the wife 
is older 
female_older 0.1618 Binary variable 
(0,1) 
 
 
Regional 
 
    
Sex ratio  
(definition 1)† 
sex_ratio 1.14 
(0.31) 
[0.4;3] 
Sex ratio  
(definition 2) †† 
sex_ratio2 0.99 
(0.07) 
[0.85;1.27] 
Notes: (†) Sex ratio definition 1: ratio of the number of males whose age falls in the age category of 
the husband over the number of females whose age falls in the ages fall in the category of the 
wife in a particular county. 
 (††) Sex-ratio definition 2: ratio of the number of males whose age falls in the age category of 
the husband over the number of females whose age falls in that same age category. 
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4.3 Description of the sample 
This chapter only considers dual-earner couples with a more in-depth analysis of all couples 
conducted in the next chapter. Descriptive statistics for the sample are reported in tables 
1.2 and 1.3 above. Regarding the educational level, a Pearson chi-square test of 
independence of educational levels of spouses in dual-earner couples reveals that the two 
are correlated. There do not seem to be important differences between married male and 
female employees in lower and higher levels of education. At intermediate levels, there is a 
higher proportion of males in apprenticeship, nursing and other higher qualifications than 
females. The mean age difference between couples is two years. Regarding the presence of 
children, the lowest proportion of dual-earners is the one of couples with at least one pre-
school aged child. This is expected as the presence of young children imposes important 
time constraints on parents as will be discussed in the next chapter. The regional sample 
statistics reveal a high proportion of dual-earner couples in Scotland and Wales. However, 
this is most likely due to the fact that the proportion of individuals in Scotland and Wales 
in the BHPS sample is higher than the national one as discussed earlier.  
In the present sample, married employed men work on average 43 more hours per month 
than their female counterparts. They also earn on average 30% more per hour than women 
employees, which is consistent with the raw gender pay gap in Britain during this period. 
With respect to non-labour income, women earn more benefit income than men and the 
average benefit income is lower among couples who are duals earners (see tables A1.1 
(appendix 1) and A2.3 (appendix 2)). This could be explained by the fact that these couples 
are probably less likely to get benefits than single parents, or couples where one spouse is 
unemployed or other similar cases. Men have higher pension income than women. As can 
be seen from table 1.4, the age difference in couples is equal to four percent on average and 
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the range of estimates is high. Finally, the sex ratio variables have similar means but the 
first definition has more variation and the cut off point of the range do seem to indicate 
the potential presence of outlier couples. The second sex ratio variable seems to have more 
plausible descriptive statistics although it suffers from a lower variation.  
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5 Econometric Methodology 
As outlined in the theoretical section, labour supply equations represent solutions to a 
utility maximization problem. The researcher can choose to start with a utility function and 
then derive the corresponding labour supply equations or the reverse. However, as stated 
in Pencavel (1986): “Although there have been a number of instances to the contrary, the 
general procedure has not been to specify a particular expression for the direct or indirect 
utility function and then to estimate the implied hours of work function. More often, an 
hours of work function convenient for estimation has been specified ab initio and the 
popular choice has been one that is linear in parameters” (p.52). The functional form 
chosen (direct utility, indirect utility, expenditure, labour supply) should be tractable. In the 
case where one starts with labour supply, it implies one should be able to integrate back to 
the utility function. In the case where one starts with a utility function, tractability implies it 
is possible to find a solution to the maximization problem (Stern, 1986). Normally a simple 
labour supply equation means a more complicated utility and vice versa. In general, one starts 
with one or other of the two.  
5.1 Issues in estimation 
When estimating a labour supply equation, several factors have to be considered. First, the 
functional form should be relatively easy to estimate and satisfy conventional theoretical 
considerations as well as be sufficiently flexible to allow extensions to the empirical 
specifications. Second, it should be consistent with utility theory. It should also be practical 
in real problem solving and flexible in the behavioural responses it allows (Stern, 1986). As 
stated earlier, all these issues represent only part of the challenges facing researchers in the 
study of labour supply. Another important issue is that of sample selection in labour supply 
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analysis, which arises when the sample is chosen according to a criterion that could 
potentially affect or be affected by labour supply decisions as the disturbances may not be a 
zero mean random variable in this context. This makes the use of Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) techniques inappropriate as they assume that errors have an expected value of zero 
on average. The regression line fitted to data from a sample of working individuals only 
could lead to inconsistent and statistically biased estimates of the structural labour supply 
behaviour if sample selection is an issue. It is thus important to analyse whether sample 
selection arises in any particular application and whether the magnitude of the bias is large 
enough to justify changing estimation techniques in order to take it into account 
(Killingsworth, 1983).    
As stated in Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), the log-linear (or semi-log) model is useful in 
cases of potential endogeneity issues and measurement problems. It has often been used in 
first generation studies but also in papers with an objective similar to the current one 
(Chiappori et al, 2002). In order to investigate the income pooling proposition, the equality 
of male and female non-labour income effects in both the male and female regression 
models needs to be tested. The labour supply equations are taken to be log- linear 
functions specified as follows: 
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The superscripts m  and f  indicate the equations for males and females with fn  and mn  
being the number of female and male sample observations respectively. Each female i  and 
male j , belong to a couple in the sample. For each couple, fihours represents a wife’s 
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supply of total monthly hours of work (denoted by fh in the theoretical section) and 
m
jhours represents a husband’s supply of total monthly hours of work (denoted by 
mh in 
the theoretical section), fifinc _ and 
f
iminc _  represent a wife’s own non-labour income 
and her husband’s one respectively while mjminc _ and 
m
jfinc _ represent a husband’s own 
non-labour income and his wife’s respectively (note that male and female non-labour 
incomes are represented by fy and my respectively in the theoretical section). fiwln and 
m
iwln represent the natural log of hourly wage for the ith female and her husband 
respectively (using both primary and secondary jobs) and mjwln and 
f
jwln represent the 
natural log of hourly wage for the jth male and his wife respectively (using both primary 
and secondary jobs). mjA and 
f
iA  are 1×k  vectors of male and female characteristics 
respectively and include age, region of residence and the presence of children aged less 
than 5, between 5 and 11 and older than 12 in the household. Finally, mβ and fβ are 1×k  
vectors of unknown parameters corresponding to these characteristics. 
A variant of the model includes the couple’s pooled income instead of male and female 
incomes being introduced separately. It is equivalent to imposing the following constraints:  
ff δγ = and mm δγ =  
It is important to mention that this particular restriction represents the “income-pooling” 
test to be described later.
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The male and female labour supply equations with pooled non-labour income are: 
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where fff δγψ == and mmm δγψ ==  
Let equations [1.4.1] and [1.4.2] constitute specification I (i.e., the specification that 
includes male and female non-labour income separately) and equations [1.4.3] and [1.4.4] 
constitute specification II (i.e., the specification that includes pooled non-labour income). 
In the second part of the analysis, distribution factors are introduced into the regression 
model. As mentioned in the data section, there are two alternative definitions of sex ratios 
used in this chapter. They are introduced in turn. Then, two other variables, age difference 
and whether the wife is older are also included, first to the original regression model and 
then together with the sex ratios. If distribution factors are found to be significant, this 
indicates that bargaining models provide a more appropriate framework than the unitary 
model. According to the collective model, an increase in the sex ratio (higher female 
bargaining power) should lead to a reduction in female labour supply and an increase in 
male labour supply. Similarly, an increase in the age difference (lower female bargaining) 
should lead to an increase in female labour supply and a decrease in male labour supply, 
although a higher age difference can possibly favour the wife as discussed previously. 
Finally, it is expected that an older woman will have a stronger bargaining position and 
therefore reduce her labour supply (although a different interpretation is also possible as an 
older woman might feel less secure in her marriage).  
Before estimating the various models mentioned above, a few issues need to be addressed.  
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The issue of potential endogeneity of the variables arises in most econometric applications. 
If one or more of the explanatory variables are correlated with the equation’s error term, 
then the regressors are considered endogenous. There are three main sources of 
endogeneity in econometrics. First, omitted variables are often a cause of endogeneity. This 
is a case in which one would like to control for a particular variable but lack of data 
prevents this. If one of the explanatory variables is related to this unobservable factor, then 
the latter will be endogenous as the effect of the unobservable will be captured in the 
disturbance term. Second, endogeneity can arise because of measurement error. The latter 
occurs if one can only observe an imperfect measure of the independent variable of 
interest. In such a case, a measurement error is introduced in the disturbance term. Finally, 
simultaneity is a third cause of endogeneity and appears if one of the explanatory variables 
and the dependent variable are determined simultaneously. In practice, one cannot easily 
disentangle the different sources of endogeneity and they need not be mutually exclusive 
and may also co-exist (Wooldridge, 2002). In the present study the two latter causes of 
endogeneity are probably present as wages and hours are likely to be determined 
simultaneously. Furthermore, the hourly wage variable is obtained by dividing monthly 
hours by monthly pay and both variables are thus subject to a potential measurement error. 
In labour supply models, wages, non-labour income and the number of children are often 
treated as endogenous. The latter is treated as exogenous in this study as an explicit analysis 
of fertility is not the subject of study of this chapter. With respect to non-labour income, a 
decision is made to use a measure from the year before the interview. The latter is 
undoubtedly less endogenous than a current measure of non-labour income, however, due 
to high persistence in income, it might be potentially endogenous to labour market 
behaviour. Unfortunately, there do not seem to be enough instruments in the data to 
identify a model where both wage and non-labour income are treated as endogenous. 
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Therefore, in this chapter, a decision is made to treat the wage as the only potentially 
endogenous variable. There is then a need to find good instruments for the latter. The 
search for appropriate instruments for wages is conducted separately for men and women. 
When there are potential endogenous variables in the model to be estimated, OLS will yield 
biased and inconsistent estimates (Bound et al, 1995). Methods to estimate in this case are 
the Instrumental Variables (IV) technique, the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
and Full Information Maximum Likelihood Estimation (FIML). The latter does not seem 
appropriate as it is sensitive to distributional assumptions and does not perform well with 
the type of sample size available to us here. While many studies have used GMM for this 
type of analysis (see Chiappori et al (2002) and Clark et al (2002, 2004)), in this chapter the 
Instrumental Variables (IV) method is used. GMM is seen as a solution to 
heterescedasticity of unknown form but it can potentially have poor power in small 
samples as one could add more moments conditions without gaining more information. 
Furthermore, most statistical software packages allow for a correction for 
heteroscedasticity in the context of instrumental variables estimation, thus “additional gains 
from using GMM may be small” (Wooldridge, 2001, p.93) in cross section applications. In 
his paper, Wooldridge (2001) compares results from IV and GMM and shows that the 
results from both methods are very similar showing that heteroscedasticity is probably not 
a significant issue. There are two ways of considering the results of this experiment. On the 
one hand, one could consider that there are no benefits from using GMM compared to 
two-stage least squares. On the other hand, it could be argued that there is no loss in using 
GMM in any case. One should note that OLS and IV are both particular applications of 
the GMM estimator. Before providing a description of the IV procedure, two further issues 
need to be addressed.  
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First, one might expect husbands and wives to jointly determine their labour supply 
behaviour. In the latter case, a system of equations would have to be used. It is then 
necessary to test whether the “unobservables” affecting male and female labour supplies 
are correlated. The first step consists in estimating the female labour supply equation using 
the appropriate model (as identified by the IV procedure to be described below) and then 
estimate male labour supply equations. The final step is subsequently to test whether the 
correlation between male and female residuals obtained from the two equations is equal to 
zero using a Spearman rank order test.  
Second, there is a need to describe the procedure used to test whether the two propositions 
of the unitary model hold. Income pooling is equivalent to considering that the distribution 
of non-labour income between the male and the female does not matter for individual 
labour supplies and that only the level of pooled household non-labour income does. This 
can be tested by investigating whether there is equality in the regression coefficients on 
female and male non-labour income (Fortin and Lacroix, 1997). Using equations [1.4.1] and 
[1.4.2] for females and males respectively, this is done using two Wald tests (one for each 
gender) with equality of income effect as the null hypothesis. These are expressed as 
follows: 
Income pooling test for females:  
ffH δγ =:0     versus   ffAH δγ ≠:   [1.4.5] 
Income pooling test for males:  
mmH δγ =:0    versus   mmAH δγ ≠:   [1.4.6] 
Empirically, the implementation of this test presents a number of problems. First, the 
validity of the test is closely related to the precision of the estimated coefficients of non-
labour income. In addition, measurement error, which is likely to be present in the case of 
income variables, can also hamper the test’s reliability (Del Boca, 1997). Finally, as 
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mentioned by Hoddinott et al (1997), rejecting pooling does not say anything about other 
models of household behaviour and just provides evidence against the unitary model of 
household behaviour. Following this line of thought, this chapter’s objectives are to 
investigate if the unitary model is an appropriate simplification of household behaviour and 
not to suggest potential alternatives. 
Regarding the Slutsky symmetry test, assuming that the household pools non-labour 
income and using the expression derived in the theoretical section, the symmetry test 
amounts to a test of the null hypothesis: 
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In a log-linear model, this is equivalent to testing the following: 
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Using specification II (equations [1.4.3] and [1.4.4] above) this is re-expressed as: 
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Where fw , mw ,correspond to female and male mean wage respectively and fh , mh  are 
female and male mean hours respectively. 
The t statistic with the null proposition imposed is given by: 
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The covariance is zero given non-overlapping samples (i.e., separate samples by gender 
group).   
According to Schultz (1990), this test is less robust to misspecification than the pooling test 
suggested above. Furthermore, the test becomes more complicated if it is found that male 
and female non-labour income do not have the same impact on the labour supply of each 
member.  
5.2 Instrumental variables procedure 
As stated above, one way to estimate an equation in the presence of one (or more) 
endogenous regressor(s) is the method of Instrumental Variables (IV). The latter consists 
in estimating two equations. In the “first-stage regression”, a reduced form equation is 
estimated by expressing any potential endogenous variable as a linear combination of all 
exogenous variables in the model. Among the latter are variables that are instrumental 
variable candidates or “instruments” for the endogenous regressors; which will be 
discussed later. The fitted values are obtained from this regression model. The second step 
consists in regressing the dependent variable of interest on all the exogenous variables and 
the fitted values from the first equation. This regression is called the “second-stage 
regression”. The model can be estimated using two-stage least squares.  
The suitability of the IV framework relies heavily on the choice of instruments in the 
model. First, the relationship between the number of instruments and the number of 
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endogenous explanatory variables is crucial. In the case where the number of instruments is 
the same as the number of endogenous variables, the regression parameters are said to be 
exactly identified. If the number of instruments is larger than that of the regressors, then 
the regression parameters are said to be over-identified. Finally, in the opposite situation, 
the parameters are under-identified. It is only in the first two cases that estimation using IV 
yields something meaningful. Another concern in the process of identification is the 
appropriateness of instruments. Before providing a review of the various issues to consider 
when choosing instruments, it is important to mention that the model needs to be checked 
for heteroscedasticity prior to any testing. Indeed, the latter affects the standard errors 
estimated in the first-stage regression model and renders testing unreliable. As in the case 
of OLS, within the IV estimation framework, there are a number of tests available to detect 
the presence of heteroscedasticity. Breusch-Pagan (1979), Godfrey (1978) and Cook and 
Weisberg (1983), all cited in Baum et al (2002), independently derived a test of whether 
there exists a relationship between the disturbances and certain indicator variables. White 
(1980) and Koenker (1981) derived a statistic based on a similar reasoning except that their 
tests did not assume normality. These tests of heteroscedasticity are suitable if the latter is a 
problem in the IV regression and not elsewhere in the system. Pagan and Hall (1983) 
derived a statistic that does not require this assumption and is therefore used in this 
chapter. The statistic follows a chi-square distribution with number of degrees of freedom 
equal to the number of explanatory or predictor variables in the original regression. Since 
first stage regression results are used to draw inferences on the validity of instruments, one 
should also perform a test for heteroscedasticity on the first-stage regressions. This is done 
using a White-Kroenker test which uses a statistic distributed as a Chi-square and equal to 
2nR  where 2R is the R-squared from a regression where the squared residuals of the 
original regression are regressed on the variables from the original equation. The results of 
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the tests mentioned above indicate whether an Eicker-Huber-White “sandwich" robust 
variance-covariance matrix (see Baum et al (2002), for more details) should be used in 
subsequent estimation. Once the appropriate type of variance/covariance matrix is 
identified, parametric tests can be performed on the model. The next section describes the 
methodology used to investigate the suitability of the instruments. 
Instrument validity tests  
There are two conditions for a variable to be a good instrument. First, it should be highly 
correlated with the relevant endogenous variable and, second, it should be orthogonal to 
the error process of the structural equation, in other words, it should not affect the 
dependent variable in the latter (see Wooldridge (2002) and Baum et al (2002)). According 
to Wooldridge (2002), both of these requirements are crucial for the process of 
identification. However, unlike the first condition, the second one cannot be readily tested 
as it concerns unobservable disturbances. However, if the model is over-identified, one can 
perform a test of over-identifying restrictions which consists in investigating whether 
additional instruments are independent from the error term in the main regression model.18 
There are a number of variations of this test. One of these developed by Sargan (1958), 
cited in Baum et al (2002), consists in estimating an auxiliary regression model in which the 
dependent variable are the IV residuals from the main regression model, regressed on 
exogenous variables and identifying instruments. The Sargan statistic has a 2nR  form. 
Basmann (1960) cited in Baum et al (2002), developed a similar test in which the auxiliary 
regression does not impose the over-identification restrictions. Both tests are not valid if 
heteroscedasticity is present in the system. A Hansen J statistic can be used in this case. For 
a detailed description of the derivation of the latter see Hansen (1982). The Hansen J 
statistic is an extension of the Sargan test described above. It is distributed as a χ2 random 
                                                 
18 See Wooldridge (2002) chapter 6 for a detailed discussion of this test. 
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variable with degrees of freedom equal to the difference between the total number of 
independent variables and the number of instruments. This test cannot be used to test 
subsets of instruments, which can be useful in some cases.  For this purpose, researchers 
can use a “difference-in-Sargan” or C statistic. It is obtained by taking the difference 
between the Sargan statistic of the restricted fully efficient regression and the Sargan 
statistic of the unrestricted but consistent regression. The C test has the null hypothesis 
that the chosen variables are adequate instruments. It follows a χ2 distribution with degrees 
of freedom equal to the number of over-identifying instruments used. The C statistic can 
be used to test the exogeneity of instruments that can be either included or excluded 
exogenous variables. In the case where excluded exogenous variables are being tested, these 
are not in the restricted equation. If included exogenous variables are being tested, they are 
taken as endogenous variables in the restricted equation. Regarding the issue of instrument 
relevance, when there is one endogenous variable, an indicator of the latter is the R2 from 
the first stage regression (see Bound et al, 1995). It has also been argued that an F statistic 
of no less than 10 also indicates relevance (see Staiger and Stock, 1997).19 Once the 
appropriate instruments are determined, one can test for the exogeneity of the regressors. 
If they are found to be exogenous, then the use of OLS leads to a more efficient estimator 
(Wooldridge, 2002). 
Testing exogeneity of regressors 
There are a number of ways to test for exogeneity of regressors. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
test is probably the most common approach. Originally the statistic involved burdensome 
calculations. However, a more tractable regression- based test was devised. The test 
consists in comparing the estimators obtained using 2SLS to those obtained via OLS. 
There exist different versions of this test and the inferences provided may differ in finite 
                                                 
19 See Shea (1997) for a discussion of models with more than one endogenous regressor. 
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samples. Take cβˆ and eβˆ to be the estimators that are consistent under the null hypothesis 
of and the alternative and consistent if the null only is true respectively. The Hausman 
(1978) statistic is computed as follows: 
H= )ˆˆ()ˆˆ( 1 ecec Dn ββββ −′− − where the matrix D can take various forms depending on 
the version of the test being used (Baum et al, 2002).  
In the presence of heteroscedasticity, the computation of the Hausman test in Stata might 
generate negative statistics and wrong degrees of freedom. Therefore, Baum et al (2002) 
recommend using the C statistic described earlier to test for the exogeneity of regressors if 
heteroscedasticity is a problem.  
It is important to mention the disadvantages of 2SLS. First, Wooldridge (2002) states that 
IV estimators can be inconsistent if the instruments are weak (meaning if instruments are 
correlated to the error term of the structural equation). Since one cannot observe the latter, 
there is no real indication of the magnitude of the inconsistency. One should be cautious in 
the case where there is little correlation between instruments and endogenous regressors. 
Furthermore, if the instruments used are weakly correlated with the endogenous variable, 
then the standard errors are likely to be very large and the IV estimators will not converge 
on a normal distribution. According to Bound et al (1995), one should be wary of adding 
instruments even in the case of large cross-sections. Adding instruments that are not (or 
only slightly) relevant will lead to inconsistent IV estimates (Shea, 1997). Second, 
Wooldridge (2002) notes, that in the presence of an endogenous variable, IV methods 
cannot be unbiased as under the usual distributional assumptions one cannot find the 
expected value of the 2SLS estimator. The author adds that another pitfall with 2SLS is that 
the standard errors in this framework are much larger than in regular OLS. The extent of 
the problem depends on the quality of instruments among other things. In the presence of 
 76 
 
instrument irrelevance, the finite sample distribution of the instrumental variable estimator 
moves away from normality posing difficulties for inference.  
6 Empirical results 
This section starts by describing briefly the preliminary work conducted in order to 
determine an appropriate model of hours of work before investigating the two restrictions 
of the unitary model (income pooling and Slutsky symmetry) and looking at the potential 
impact of distribution factors.  
Modelling hours of work 
As mentioned in the methodology section, the model needs to be interrogated for 
heteroscedasticity before any further testing is conducted. Results reported in table A1.2 
(Appendix 1) show that the hypothesis that disturbances are homoscedastic is rejected in all 
first and second stage regressions. Therefore, the computation of variances in all regression 
models is done using the Eicker/Huber/White/sandwich estimator.  
 A series of preliminary regression models for males and females are used to investigate the 
suitability of various instruments for wages that have been used in the literature. These 
include: highest educational level attained, years of schooling, tenure, region, a quadratic in 
age, mother’s and/or father’s education. In addition, various interaction terms can also be 
used as instruments such as interaction between age and tenure and/or education. The final 
set of instruments for the male and female wages were found to be tenure on the present 
job and education. First stage regression results are displayed in tables A1.3 and A1.4 
(Appendix 1). Results do not vary much between the specification with pooled non-labour 
income and the one where male and female non-labour incomes are introduced separately. 
All the F statistics show that the instruments chosen are highly correlated with the wage, as 
they are well above the rule of thumb of 10 discussed in the methodology section. Both F 
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and Shea statistics are higher for women perhaps indicating better instrument relevance 
than for men. Regarding instrument orthogonality, the J-Hansen statistics reported indicate 
that the null hypothesis of instruments being valid jointly is not rejected at a conventional 
level of statistical significance for both women and men. Examining the individual 
orthogonality test for identifying instruments (on the basis of the C statistic), it can be seen 
that tenure on the job is orthogonal to both male and female hours, with the results for 
females being marginal at the 10% level of significance. Education is also found to be 
orthogonal to hours of work, with the results for males being marginal at the 10% level of 
significance. In many studies such as Chiappori et al (2002), education is included as an 
explanatory variable in the structural equation however a decision is made not to include it 
in this study first as its inclusion washes out the wage effects, and second in order to keep 
male and female specifications comparable to ensure that results of further tests are not 
due to different specifications. Once the appropriate set of instruments are found, one can 
test for own wage exogeneity for both male and female equations. As shown in the last row 
of table A1.3, the male wage is found to be exogenous to labour supply behaviour while 
the female wage is endogenous. This result is not sensitive to the definition of non-labour 
income used. The male equation can thus be estimated using OLS while the female 
equation will be estimated using IV with tenure on the present job and education as 
instruments for the wage. Regarding independence of the two equations, the Spearman 
correlation coefficient between “unobservables” in the male and female equations is found 
to be equal to -0.028 and the test of independence of errors leads to a non-rejection of the 
independence hypothesis. Therefore, male and female regression models can be estimated 
separately. Two sets of model estimates are reported in the first instance: one with non-
pooled income and the other with pooled income. Results are reported in tables 1.5 and 1.6 
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below. While the preferred estimation procedures seem to be OLS for males and IV for 
females, both are reported here.  
Table 1.5(a): Hours-of-work regression model estimates with non-pooled non-labour 
income for males and females 
Dependent variable: monthly hours of work 
   
Independent 
Variables 
 
OLS 
Males 
IV 
Males 
OLS 
Females 
IV 
Females 
male_wage -13.8289*** 
(2.5646) 
-13.8784*** 
(5.3806) 
-11.6123*** 
(2.7972) 
-15.7391*** 
(3.5464) 
female_wage 1.8880 
(2.0106) 
1.9039 
(2.4377) 
19.3931*** 
(3.0525) 
32.4343*** 
(5.8288) 
male_income -0.0130*** 
(0.0053) 
-0.0130*** 
(0.0052) 
-0.0048 
(0.0056) 
-0.0057 
(0.0059) 
female_income -0.0057 
(0.0061) 
-0.0057 
(0.0061) 
-0.0212*   
(0.0117) 
-0.0202* 
(0.0121) 
childlessthan5 0.9651 
(2.2140) 
0.9667 
(2.1965) 
-35.3435*** 
(3.6036) 
-35.7038*** 
(3.6046) 
child5to11 5.7286*** 
(2.0937) 
5.7343*** 
(2.0321) 
-19.8369*** 
(2.9570) 
-19.1116*** 
(2.9293) 
childolderthan12 4.7732** 
(2.2416) 
4.7765**  
(2.2925) 
0.1381 
(2.9491) 
1.6676 
(2.9349) 
age 0.1131 
(0.0959) 
0.1133 
(0.0961) 
-0.9332*** 
(0.1140) 
-0.9259*** 
(0.1168) 
london 3.2075 
(4.2028) 
3.2136 
(4.1351) 
-10.5462**  
(5.2246) 
-11.8699** 
(5.2567) 
south 1.5176 
(2.3072) 
1.5226 
(2.2809) 
0.7359 
(3.3324) 
0.6939 
(3.3602) 
eastanglia 5.7733 
(3.9246) 
5.7796 
(3.8779) 
7.8159 
(6.6063) 
9.0723 
(6.5946) 
midland 3.6472 
(3.2039) 
3.6497 
(3.1698) 
-3.9400 
(3.6055) 
-3.2328 
(3.6265) 
north 0.5687 
(2.8326) 
0.569 
(2.8149) 
-0.4655 
(3.230) 
-0.3796 
(3.2640) 
wales -2.1737 
(2.7587) 
-2.1747 
(2.7483) 
1.8934 
(3.3385) 
2.7681 
(3.3345) 
Constant 194.7660*** 
(7.1814) 
194.8403*** 
(10.6563) 
166.7425*** 
(9.1732) 
148.3789*** 
(11.4610) 
 
R-squared 0.0612 0.0557 0.2019 0.1861 
Sample size 1415 1415 1415 1415 
Notes: (***) denotes significance at the 1% level 
 (**)  denotes significance at the 5% level 
 (*) denotes significance at the 10% level 
 (ƒ) denotes a variable that has been omitted from the regression model 
 Base category for regional dummy: Scotland 
               Hansen J statistics for males and females respectively (pooled income): 10.6 and 12.4  
 Hansen J statistics for males and females respectively (non-pooled income): 10.4 and 12.2  
 Exogeneity test (chi-square test with one degree of freedom) for male and female own wage 
in male and female regression models respectively: 0.186 and 6.435 (non-pooled income)  
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Table 1.5(b): Hours-of-work regression model estimates with pooled non-labour income for 
males and females 
 
Dependent variable: monthly hours of work 
   
Independent 
Variables 
 
OLS 
Males 
IV 
Males 
OLS 
Females 
IV 
Females 
male_wage -13.8341*** 
(2.5736) 
-13.7887*** 
(5.4025) 
-11.5856*** 
(2.7836) 
-15.7225*** 
(3.5239) 
female_wage 1.7837 
(2.0062) 
1.7691 
(2.4471) 
19.6172*** 
(3.0711) 
32.6542*** 
(5.8109) 
couple_income -0.0105*** 
(0.0041) 
-0.0105*** 
(0.0041) 
-0.0103*   
(0.0061) 
-0.0106* 
(0.0064) 
childlessthan5 1.4195 
(2.1821) 
1.418 
(2.1614) 
-36.4114*** 
(3.4405) 
-36.6480*** 
(3.4350) 
child5to11 6.2430*** 
(2.1086) 
6.2378*** 
(2.0257) 
-21.0125*** 
(2.8354) 
-20.1490*** 
(2.8492) 
childolderthan12 5.3177** 
(2.1953) 
5.3147**  
(2.2370) 
-1.087 
(2.8635) 
0.5878 
(2.9088) 
age 0.1028 
(0.0971) 
0.1026 
(0.0977) 
-0.9171*** 
(0.1154) 
-0.9116*** 
(0.1182) 
london 3.0983 
(4.2086) 
3.0926 
(4.1421) 
-10.2838**  
(5.2391) 
-11.6404** 
(5.2676) 
south 1.5710 
(2.3134) 
1.5665 
(2.2842) 
0.6141 
(3.3238) 
0.5865 
(3.3570) 
eastanglia 5.6908 
(3.9063) 
5.6849 
(3.8621) 
8.0122 
(6.5396) 
9.2464 
(6.5401) 
midland 3.5717 
(3.1952) 
3.5694 
(3.1633) 
-3.7694 
(3.6197) 
-3.0818 
(3.6364) 
north 0.6142 
(2.8270) 
0.6140 
(2.8104) 
-0.5732 
(3.2240) 
-0.4745 
(3.2613) 
wales -2.2341 
(2.7658) 
-2.2332 
(2.7560) 
2.0231 
(3.3538) 
2.8832 
(3.3502) 
Constant 195.4482*** 
(7.1998) 
195.3799*** 
(10.6143) 
165.5110*** 
(9.3435) 
147.2601*** 
(11.5177) 
R-squared 0.0605 0.0548 0.1995 0.1837 
Sample size 1415 1415 1415 1415 
Notes: (***) denotes significance at the 1% level 
 (**)  denotes significance at the 5% level 
 (*) denotes significance at the 10% level 
 (ƒ) denotes a variable that has been omitted from the regression model 
 Base category for regional dummy: Scotland 
               Hansen J statistics for males and females respectively (pooled income): 10.6 and 12.4  
 Hansen J statistics for males and females respectively (non-pooled income): 10.4 and 12.2  
 Exogeneity test (chi-square test with one degree of freedom) for male and female own wage 
in male and female regression models respectively: 0.198 and 6.45 (pooled income). 
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Table 1.5 and 1.6 above report the male and female regression models using both the IV 
procedure and OLS with non-pooled and pooled income respectively. There are no 
differences between the two procedures for males confirming that the use of OLS is 
appropriate. For females, the impact of their own wage (and to a lesser extent their 
spouse’s one) is sensitive to the estimation procedure selected, which probably indicates 
that the female wage is endogenous to female hours.  
The regression models reported above seem to fit female data better than male data as 
shown by the respective female and male R squared of 0.18 (IV procedure) and 0.06 (OLS 
procedure). The austerity of the specification for both gender groups and a possible lack of 
variation of male hours could partially explain why the independent variables in the model 
fail to account for more than 20% of the variation in female hours and account for less 
than 10% of the variation in male hours. However, the estimates are generally consistent 
with the literature findings as will be shown below. Indeed, results reveal that whether 
income is pooled or not pooled, the effect of a change in female wage on female hours is 
always positive and significant at the 1% significance level. For instance, a 1% increase in 
the female wage will increase female total monthly hours by 0.33 on average and ceteris 
paribus. The effect on female hours of the male wage is always negative and significant at 
the 1% significance level, a 1% increase in the male wage will decrease female total monthly 
hours by 0.14 on average and ceteris paribus. The wife’s labour supply is clearly sensitive to 
both her own and her husband’s wage. Regarding elasticities, the uncompensated elasticity 
for female is computed to be equal to +0.25 and her cross wage elasticity with respect to 
her husband’s wage is found to be -0.12. These estimates are close to those reported by 
Clark et al (2002). Husbands are not sensitive to their wives’ wages but respond negatively 
to an increase in their own wage. A 1% increase in the male wage will decrease male total 
monthly hours by 0.14 ceteris paribus. For males, the own wage elasticity is of -0.08 which 
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confirms the general view in the literature that men’s labour supply’s response to a change 
in the wage is more inelastic than that of their wives. Clark et al (2002) had found the male 
wage elasticity not to be statistically significant. Potential reasons for the divergence 
between the estimates of Clark et al (2002) and those of the present analysis will be 
discussed below. The man’s income elasticity with respect to his own income is -0.006 and 
the female’s income elasticity with respect to her own income is -0.02; which again is in line 
with estimates by Clark et al (2002). With respect to regional effects, only the London 
dummy seems to affect female labour supply at the 5% significance level as a woman living 
in the capital is likely to work 12 hours less per month than a woman living in Scotland on 
average and ceteris paribus. A woman’s age impacts negatively on her supply of hours as a 
year increase in her age leads to a reduction of 0.9 in the number of monthly worked. Age 
is not a significant predictor of male hours of work. The presence of a pre-school child 
does not affect male hours of work but has a significant and important impact on female 
hours. Indeed, the presence of a child aged less than five reduces a woman’s monthly 
labour supply by 36 hours on average and ceteris paribus. The presence of a child aged 
between five and 11 also has a strong negative impact of female hours as it reduces female 
labour supply by 20 hours on average and ceteris paribus. This result is common in the 
literature and attributed to the fact that it is mainly women that are responsible for 
childcare (see chapter two). For males, the presence of a child aged between five and 11 
increases male labour supply by six hours per month. Finally, the presence of a child older 
than 12 does not affect female labour supply but does increase male monthly hours by five. 
This suggests an asymmetric effect of children with men increasing their hours to respond 
to the extra financial demands of children. The proposition of income pooling needs to be 
tested in order to determine which specification is more appropriate. 
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Testing income pooling 
In the male regression model, male non-labour income is found to be statistically 
significant at the 5% significance level while the impact on female non-labour income on 
male labour supply is found not to be statistically different from zero. This suggests that 
income is not pooled even though the Wald test on equality of coefficients of male and 
female non-labour income yields a statistic of less than unity, which means that the 
hypothesis of equality of effects cannot be rejected. The Wald test of equality of 
coefficients on male and female non-labour incomes in the female regression model yields 
a chi-square statistic of 1.57 which, at one degree of freedom, implies not rejecting the null 
hypothesis of equality of effects. However, only female non-labour income has a significant 
impact on female labour supply, revealing that couples do not pool non-labour income. 
Both the results of female and male regression models show the potential weakness of 
statistical tests if the estimated effects are not well determined. Indeed, it makes little sense 
to test the proposition if one effect is equal to zero and the other is not equal to zero. The 
definition of non-labour income used in the model can also potentially affect the results of 
the different tests conducted. As pointed out by Schultz (1990), non-labour income 
comprises many different components and it is important to test whether these elements 
can be treated as an aggregate. In order to further explore this issue, male and female 
regression models that include separately the different components of non-labour income 
are estimated (see table A1.5 in Appendix 1). Different types of non-labour income impact 
differently on male and female labour supply, which as discussed above, undermines the 
use of the pooling test. Finally, as mentioned in the data section, for 5% of couples 
investment income is reported for the couple and an individual measure is obtained by 
dividing the measure by two. It is important to explore the income pooling test with a 
measure of income that does not include investment income. Results of a regression model 
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with this measure of income are reported in table A1.6 of Appendix 1. Unlike the other 
regression models, both the male and female non-labour incomes (without investment) are 
significant in both male and female regression models. However contradictory results are 
found for both gender groups as the hypothesis of income pooling is upheld for males (F 
statistic of 0.16) and rejected for females (F statistic of 4). 
Testing symmetry  
Before conducting the symmetry test, it is important to mention that the results obtained in 
the previous section reveal that overall, it is better to use a disaggregated measure of non-
labour income to analyse household behaviour, however, assuming a pooled measure of 
non-labour income (which is not far fetched as a number of surveys do not have detailed 
information of recipients and sources of non-labour income) it is important to test whether 
Slutsky symmetry holds. The t-statistic of 0.15 is lower than the critical value of 1.96 at 5% 
significance, which means that the hypothesis of symmetry is upheld. In other words, the 
effect of an income compensated change in the male wage on his wife’s hours of work is 
equal to the effect of an income compensated change in the female wage on her husband’s 
hours. This result is in contradiction with that of Clark et al (2002), but provides a strong 
argument in favour of a crucial assumption of the neoclassical framework in general.  
Symmetry is a consequence of rational choice, which is at the core of consumer behaviour 
theory. Without symmetry, inconsistent choices are made (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). 
Therefore, the data seem to support an important assumption of neoclassical analysis. 
There are a number of elements that could explain the discrepancy between the empirical 
results in this chapter and those of Clark et al (2002). First, Clark et al (2002) use data from 
another wave of the BHPS. Second, they employ a different specification as they estimate 
male and female labour supply equations in a simultaneous model allowing for a correlation 
in disturbances. Finally, as mentioned in the empirical review, Clark et al (2002) use a 
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slightly different specification as they incorporate a number of measures that are not 
included in the present analysis (gender role, religious attendance).  
 
Incorporating distribution factors to the model  
If a distribution factor is found to have an impact on labour supply, this provides indirect 
support for bargaining approaches. One would expect distribution factors to affect male 
and female labour supply in opposite directions. The regression models for males and 
females are estimated using both IV and OLS procedures. Results are displayed in tables 
A1.7 to A1.10 in Appendix 1. After checking that IV and OLS remain the appropriate 
estimation procedures for males and females respectively, distribution factors are 
introduced into the labour supply regression models. Before looking at the impact of the 
various distribution factors on labour supply behaviour, it is important to mention that 
both OLS and IV procedures yield similar results for distribution factors. The only impact 
that seems sensitive to the estimation procedure selected is the impact of the female wage 
on female hours (and to a lesser extent the impact of the male wage on female hours). 
Table 1.6(a) and (b) below display the results.  
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Table 1.6 (a): Hours-of-work regression model estimates with distribution factors 
Dependent variable: monthly hours of work 
 
Independent 
Variables 
 
OLS 
Males 
 
IV 
Females 
OLS 
Males 
IV 
Females 
male_wage -13.8324*** 
(2.5674) 
-15.7859*** 
(3.5552) 
-13.8107*** 
(2.5664) 
-15.7818*** 
(3.5529) 
female_wage 1.9334 
(2.0530) 
32.5968*** 
(5.9012) 
1.7504 
(2.0247) 
32.7182*** 
(5.8808) 
male_income -0.0129*** 
(0.0053) 
-0.0057 
(0.0059) 
-0.0130** 
(0.0053) 
-0.0057 
(0.0058) 
female_income -0.0057 
(0.0061) 
-0.0202* 
(0.0121) 
-0.0056 
(0.0061) 
-0.0203* 
(0.0121) 
childlessthan5 0.9799 
(2.2153) 
-35.6163*** 
(3.6457) 
0.7943 
(2.2154) 
-35.3561*** 
(3.6158) 
child5to11 5.7653*** 
(2.1332) 
-19.0241*** 
(2.950) 
5.6172*** 
(2.0954) 
-18.8880*** 
(2.9337) 
childolderthan12 4.7993** 
(2.2399) 
1.7045 
(2.9342) 
4.6602** 
(2.2429) 
1.8978 
(2.9443) 
age 0.1081 
(0.0982) 
-0.9253*** 
(0.1169) 
0.1249 
(0.0971) 
-0.9472*** 
(0.1186) 
london 3.1991 
(4.2084) 
-11.8977** 
(5.2575) 
3.3673 
(4.2148) 
-12.2075** 
(5.2758) 
south 1.4686 
(2.3332) 
0.6133 
(3.3994) 
1.9134 
(2.3160) 
-0.1050 
(3.3926) 
eastanglia 5.7225 
(3.9447) 
8.9699 
(6.6112) 
5.9226 
(3.9210) 
8.7255 
(6.6210) 
midland 3.6017 
(3.2081) 
-3.3184 
(3.6328) 
3.7858 
(3.2068) 
-3.5319 
(3.6237) 
north 0.5654 
(2.8344) 
-0.3801 
(3.2631) 
0.7249 
(2.8372) 
-0.6956 
(3.2552) 
wales -2.1963 
(2.7702) 
2.7177 
(3.3396) 
-2.3883 
(2.7717) 
3.1882 
(3.3736) 
sex_ratio (1)† 0.6628 
(2.7759) 
1.1425 
(3.6758) 
ƒ ƒ 
sex_ratio (2) †† ƒ ƒ -10.6425 
(10.0854) 
21.4771 
(16.7304) 
constant 194.1349*** 
(7.6858) 
146.8207*** 
(13.1813) 
205.0477*** 
(12.2210) 
127.4981*** 
(21.518) 
 
R-squared 
 
0.0605 
 
0.1857 
 
0.0562 
 
0.1864 
 
Sample size 
 
1415 
 
1415 
 
1415 
 
1415 
Notes: (***) denotes significance at the 1% level 
(**)  denotes significance at the 5% level  
(*) denotes significance at the 10% level 
(ƒ) denotes a variable that has been omitted from the regression model 
(†)   ratio of the number of males whose age falls in the age category of the husband over  
the number of females whose age falls in the ages fall in the category of the wife in a particular county. 
(††)ratio of the number of males whose age falls in the age category of the husband over the number of females whose age 
falls in that same age category.  
Variable definitions are found in table 1.2 
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Table 1.6 (b): Hours-of-work regression model estimates with distribution factors 
Dependent variable: monthly hours of work 
 
  
Independent 
Variables 
OLS 
Males 
 
IV 
Females 
OLS 
Males 
IV 
Females 
male_wage -13.7911*** 
(2.5657) 
-15.7038*** 
(3.5474) 
-13.8884*** 
(2.5673) 
-15.7285*** 
(3.5507) 
female_wage 2.0892 
(2.0298) 
32.6914*** 
(5.8468) 
2.0161 
(2.0569) 
33.0385*** 
(5.8954) 
male_income -0.0132** 
(0.0053) 
-0.0051 
(0.0059) 
-0.0132*** 
(0.0053) 
-0.0048 
(0.0058) 
female_income -0.0057 
(0.0061) 
-0.0205* 
(0.0122) 
-0.0057 
(0.0061) 
-0.0206* 
(0.0122) 
childlessthan5 0.6592 
(2.1937) 
-35.5955*** 
(3.6024) 
0.5402 
(2.1919) 
-35.2175*** 
(3.6552) 
child5to11 5.6320*** 
(2.0958) 
-19.1845*** 
(2.9230) 
5.5266*** 
(2.1658) 
-18.8419*** 
(2.9514) 
childolderthan12 4.9719** 
(2.2623) 
1.7388 
(2.9401) 
4.9496** 
(2.2562) 
1.8244 
(2.9380) 
age 0.0986   
(0.0958) 
-0.9520*** 
(0.1200) 
0.1054 
(0.0971) 
-0.9757*** 
(0.1209) 
london 3.2714 
(4.2162) 
-11.4725** 
(5.2527) 
3.2804 
(4.2184) 
-11.5210 ** 
(5.2580) 
south 1.5061 
(2.3120) 
0.8648 
(3.3547) 
1.6077 
(2.3417) 
0.5354 
(3.4115) 
eastanglia 5.7352 
(3.9257) 
9.4733 
(6.6062) 
5.8223 
(3.9444) 
9.1913 
(6.5802) 
midland 3.5608 
(3.1979) 
-3.1536 
(3.6310) 
3.6459 
(3.2123) 
-3.4233 
(3.6410) 
north 0.5691 
(2.8298) 
-0.2752 
(3.2509) 
0.5686 
(2.8304) 
-0.2723 
(3.2489) 
wales -2.0908 
(2.7592) 
2.7785 
(3.3357) 
-2.0266 
(2.7775) 
2.5786 
(3.3475) 
sex_ratio† ƒ ƒ -1.5406 
(3.4150) 
5.0202 
(4.666) 
age_difference 15.4061* 
(8.6821) 
4.6811 
(13.4718) 
17.6875* 
(9.9533) 
-3.6110 
(15.9872) 
female_older 3.2783 
(2.6733) 
8.3125** 
(4.0104) 
3.3798 
(2.6871) 
7.9768** 
(4.0303) 
constant 194.6462*** 
(7.2364) 
147.1208*** 
(11.8035) 
195.5321*** 
(8.0310) 
142.0094*** 
(13.3840) 
 
R-squared  
 
0.0570 
 
0.1892 
 
0.0570 
 
0.1888 
 
Sample size 
 
1415 
 
1415 
 
1415 
 
1415 
 
Notes: (***) denotes significance at the 1% level 
(**)  denotes significance at the 5% level  
(*) denotes significance at the 10% level 
(ƒ) denotes a variable that has been omitted from the regression model 
(†)   ratio of the number of males whose age falls in the age category of the husband over  
the number of females whose age falls in the ages fall in the category of the wife in a particular county. 
Variable definitions are found in table 1.2 
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The impact of the various variables does not seem to vary much when distribution factors 
are introduced compared to when they are not. This shows that wage and income effects 
are not sensitive to the specification chosen. As shown in table 1.6 (a), both measures of 
the sex ratio, introduced in turn, are found not to have an impact on the labour supply of 
husbands or wives, thus confirming the previous result of Clark et al (2002; 2004). It is 
difficult to establish however, whether this is due to the fact that sex ratios represent 
bargaining power, but that the latter has no influence on labour supply or whether there is 
not enough variation in sex ratios in the UK to allow their impact on labour supply to be 
determined. Age difference seems to have a marginal impact on male labour supply with an 
increase in the difference increasing the supply of male hours. Age difference does not 
seem to influence female labour supply behaviour. However, if the wife is older, her labour 
supply increases by 7 hours per month ceteris paribus. This impact is consistent with the 
notion that older women might have lower bargaining power and therefore increase their 
labour supply. However, since the model does not account for household production, this 
result needs to be interpreted cautiously. The question of whether the age difference 
variable and female older dummy can be considered as distribution factors if they only 
impact on one spouse arises? Surely, the notion of bargaining should involve effects on 
both agents. In other words, one would expect measures of bargaining to impact on labour 
supply of both spouses. Nevertheless, the introduction of these variables does show that 
the early neoclassical approach needs to be expanded to include variables other than own 
attributes and exogenous factors. 
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7 Concluding Comments 
The first part of this chapter attempted to summarize the theoretical debate on the 
formulation of labour supply models for couples. For a long time, the family was treated as 
a single entity and the welfare of its members was considered as one. Strong assumptions 
such as Slutsky properties and income pooling were held in order to analyse behaviour. As 
shown in the theoretical review, a number of promising approaches have been developed 
in recent decades with the aim to look more closely at interactions among members.  
However, empirically, researchers face a number of hurdles as shown by the current 
chapter. The issue of identification of wage and non-labour income effects remains a 
challenge. This chapter has relied on the IV procedure to identify wage effects for females. 
However, as stated in Blundell et al (1998): “instrumental variables based on arbitrary 
exclusion restrictions (…) may provide no solution since these variables are probably 
correlated with tastes for work” (p. 827). The authors use tax policy reforms in the UK to 
identify wage and income responses. A survey of other studies that have used policy 
reforms to analyse labour supply behaviour is found in Blundell and MaCurdy (1999). This 
methodology is referred to as a “natural experiment approach” in the literature. Blundell 
and MaCurdy (1999) argue that the latter is becoming increasingly popular in labour supply 
analysis. It relies on simple estimation procedures and consists in comparing (at least) two 
groups with similar characteristics: one of which was affected by a certain event (a policy 
for example) and one which was not. The panel nature of the BHPS could provide data for 
this type of experiment, analysing, for example, the impact of the Working Family Tax 
Credit on a couple’s labour market behaviour.20 
                                                 
20 See Blundell (2000). 
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As discussed earlier, the testing of the income-pooling proposition does not always yield 
meaningful results as income effects are often not well determined and the result of the test 
is found to be dependent on the definition of non-labour income used. This undermines 
the finding that the assumption of Slutsky symmetry is verified by the data as it relies on 
the existence of a single measure of non-labour income. Nevertheless, the fact that the data 
seem to satisfy the assumption of symmetry does constitute important evidence in favour 
of neoclassical theory.   
Introducing the concept of bargaining power in the analysis of household labour supply 
has undoubtedly enriched economic modelling and broadened its scope. However, models 
that rely on this notion presuppose that measures of bargaining can be readily developed 
from empirical data. As was demonstrated in this chapter, it is challenging to find measures 
that are exogenous to household behaviour but influence male and female labour supply in 
a way that can be interpreted as “bargaining”.  
As in the case of labour supply responses, another way to analyse income pooling and 
bargaining would have been to rely on a natural experiment. Lundberg and Pollak (1996) 
argue that non-labour income might be correlated to past and present household behaviour 
and is also likely to be correlated with determinants of household consumption. Therefore, 
they question the outcome of pooling tests that rely on non-labour income. The authors 
state that “the ideal test of the pooling hypothesis would be based on an experiment in 
which some husbands and some wives were randomly selected to receive an exogenous 
income change” (p.145). As mentioned previously, this approach was followed by 
Lundberg et al (1997). However, it presupposes that detailed household expenditure data is 
available; and the data used in this thesis do not seem suitable for this purpose. 
Can policy-makers rely on the unitary model to analyse a couple’s hours of work? Based on 
the discussion above, it looks sensible to assert that couples do not seem to consider both 
 90 
 
male and female non-labour income as one measure. On the other hand, as discussed 
earlier, wage effects do not seem sensitive to the definition of non-labour income used 
which might indicate that the unitary model is suitable to evaluate wage responses 
(assuming rather unrealistically that the budget constraint faced by the household is linear). 
However, in order to allocate benefits and other non-labour income, governments should 
be able to judge who, in the household, is most vulnerable. This presupposes that 
interactions among members can be modelled. Most of the models that provide 
alternatives to the earlier form of the neoclassical framework (also known as unitary model) 
rely on the concept of bargaining; the empirical modelling of which is far from easy.  
Finally, this chapter only addresses these issues for dual-earner couples. The analysis is 
therefore subject to potential selection bias. The next chapter investigates propositions 
from the unitary model and the introduction of concepts that are not normally considered 
in a neoclassical framework on all couples.   
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Chapter 2   
A study of  the labour market 
participation behaviour of  British 
couples 
1 Introduction 
The first chapter analysed the labour supply behaviour of couples where both spouses 
work. However, by doing so, it did not explicitly address the issue of labour market 
participation. Female labour market participation has significantly increased over the last 
decades in the European Union and in the United Kingdom more specifically. However, 
promoting married women’s participation in the labour market remains a target set in the 
European Commission’s Employment Guidelines. The latter stress the need to encourage 
the return of married women to employment, address gender gaps and assist women 
achieve a balance between work and family life (Prieto-Rodriguez and Rodriguez-Gutierrez, 
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2003). The need to establish an appropriate framework for the analysis of participation is 
thus crucial for policymakers.  
This chapter has three different aims. First, a regression model for a couple’s participation 
in the labour market is estimated. As will be shown in the literature review, this type of 
model has not been widely used before. Second, two tests conducted on hours-of-work 
equations in the first chapter, namely income pooling and the impact of distribution 
factors, are replicated here in the context of a model of labour market participation of 
couples as done in Del Boca (1997). Finally, the working status of the husband’s mother 
when the husband was a teenager is introduced into the model. This variable, which is not 
normally considered in the traditional neoclassical model of labour supply, provides a 
proxy for the type of environment a husband grew up in and is likely to reflect “cultural” 
considerations. It has not, to our knowledge, been used in previous models of married 
women participation in the United Kingdom.  
2 Background 
The sexual division of labour in the household and married women’s participation in the 
labour market are strongly interlinked. According to Becker (1991), women are considered 
to have a comparative advantage in the household while men are argued to possess that 
advantage in the market. Indeed, historically, men have been the providers of food and 
shelter while women have stayed at home to care for their progeny. This is partly due to 
the fact that women are biologically more implicated in the rearing and feeding of children 
than men, whose role somewhat becomes less important when the egg is fertilized; and 
partly due to differences in returns to investment in human capital between men and 
women. However, comparative advantage is not the only criteria used to explain the 
division of labour in households. Complementarities also play a role as both gender groups 
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are needed to produce certain commodities. This reduces the strict division of labour in 
time and investment. Becker (1991) argues that the fact that women have traditionally 
devoted themselves to household work, demonstrates that comparative advantage has 
played a greater role than complementarities in the division of labour in the household. 
However, the author concedes that “complementarities cannot be unimportant, especially 
in modern times; women are becoming less specialized in household activities, and men are 
spending more time at household activities” (p.40).     
For a long time, motherhood and employment were not considered compatible. Mothers 
did not work when their children were of school age and when they did, they mostly had 
part-time jobs with lower wages. Childless women had higher lifetime earnings as they 
benefited from more labour market experience in often higher paid jobs. Married women’s 
intermittent work patterns during their childrearing years partly explain why employment 
rates of women in the United Kingdom have been consistently lower than men’s. 
However, the gap between the male and female employment rates is at an all time low as 
the labour force participation of married women, and more specifically women with pre-
school children, has been rising throughout the second half of the twentieth century while 
opposite trends have been found regarding male participation (Robinson, 2003).  
A number of factors have lead to the increase in the labour market participation of married 
women among which the increase in real earnings of women (or in other words, the 
opportunity cost of being a housewife) and decreased fertility (Becker, 1991). Other factors 
include the introduction of the contraceptive pill, the increased availability of consumer 
durables that facilitated and shortened the time needed for housework, as well as a growing 
service sector. A further factor that can also explain the increase in the labour force 
participation of women is the change in attitudes regarding women’s role in society 
(Fernandez, 2007). Indeed, more egalitarian views regarding women’s participation in the 
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labour market have emerged mainly in the mid-1970s, although this evolution may have 
started to slow down in the early 1980s (Thornton et al, 1983). The link between gender-
role attitudes and labour market participation is investigated in chapter three.  
This increase in female participation, even if studies have found that it was mainly in part-
time work, is one of the factors behind the decline of the “male breadwinner family” in 
Britain and has helped increase women’s freedom (Creighton, 1999). Although it was never 
universal, the male breadwinner model of family behaviour has, in many social classes and 
for a long time, been the model that best described the way families were organised (Lewis, 
2001). In this context, women’s earnings were seen as “pin money” and not as vital to their 
family’s welfare whereas male earnings were considered as the main source of income for 
the household. However, the increase in participation of women in the labour market, the 
decrease in male employment and wages of the less-skilled as well as a reduction in the 
wage gap have all contributed to increase the share of women’s participation in total family 
income (Harkness et al, 1997). Nowadays, the “male-breadwinner” household has become 
less common and alternative working arrangements are generally found in families. 
However, the move from a male-earner to a dual-earner model of the family or, 
equivalently, the weakening of the former, is not really clear cut and today the social reality 
is probably closer to a one-and-a-half earner model as women often earn lower wages and 
work fewer hours than men (Lewis, 2001).  
The different issues mentioned above show that policymakers have had to adapt to a 
changing social environment through a number of reforms and the introduction of new 
legislation. Government policies themselves have also contributed to some of these 
changes both directly and indirectly. While no specific policy is being investigated in this 
chapter, a brief overview of British policy with respect to gender in the labour market in 
the last decades is in order.  
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In the 1970s, a number of policies were designed to improve the status of women in the 
labour market. The Equal Pay Act was introduced to prevent employers from paying 
different wages to men and women for the same job and the Sex Discrimination Act made 
it illegal for employers to discriminate on the grounds of gender when recruiting. At the 
household level, welfare policies have been based on male-breadwinner families for a long 
time. The latter implied full employment of the male household head while the wife cared 
for both the children and the elderly, and depended financially on her husband. Nowadays, 
governments are assuming the existence of an adult rather than a male breadwinner model 
(Lewis, 2001). During the last decade, the labour government committed to design policies 
that “make work pay” thus addressing the issues of “worklessness” for both women and 
men and trying to curb the incidence of child poverty. An important tool used to this effect 
has been the Working Family Tax Credit (WFTC), launched in 1999, which replaced the 
Family Credit scheme that was introduced in 1988. The latter was paid by the Benefits 
Agency to the main carer in the family. In contrast, the WFTC is administered by the 
Inland Revenue and has a higher earnings threshold. It is mostly administered through the 
wage packet and also includes a childcare credit available to all claimants. The provision of 
formal childcare is another way to encourage participation of women in the labour market. 
However, in that area, the United Kingdom has lagged behind in comparison to other 
European countries. The National Childcare Strategy was thus developed by the New 
Labour government to address this issue (Rake, 2001). Other policy instruments that 
encourage mothers to remain in employment are Maternity leave, introduced in 1976, and 
Maternity pay. Both have been modified a number of times increasing the duration of leave 
allowed and reducing the conditions necessary to be eligible for them. Finally, some 
policies indirectly affect married women’s participation although they are not specifically 
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targeting them. Unemployment benefits, for example, can discourage a woman from 
employment in the case her husband becomes unemployed.21  
The paragraph above reveals the importance of selecting an appropriate framework to 
study the labour market behaviour of couples. The different issues to consider as well as a 
review of the main work conducted in this area are outlined in the next section. 
3 Theoretical and Empirical Review 
Before reviewing studies that have analysed a couple’s labour market participation, an 
overview of the main theoretical issues to consider is conducted.  
3.1 Modelling a couple’s labour market participation 
When analysing labour supply behaviour, one can either model hours of work or 
participation in the labour market or both. In the neoclassical framework, the analysis of 
individual participation is based on the existence of a reservation wage. An individual will 
not participate in the labour market if the wage offered for a particular job is lower than 
their reservation wage. The reservation wage is a function of a number of variables 
including income, assets, number and age of children, and tastes (Deaton and Muellbauer, 
1980). When the analysis is extended to the couple, complications arise and the modelling 
is less straightforward (Blundell et al, 2007). Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) demonstrate how 
to derive the likelihood functions and first-order conditions for two of the four potential 
regimes followed by the household under the assumption that the household maximizes a 
single utility function. A detailed discussion of these computations is not done here as it 
does not serve the purpose of this chapter which is mainly empirical. The authors also state 
that in the unitary model:  
                                                 
21 See Kell and Wright (1990). 
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corner solution conditions (which) state that if one individual is at a corner 
solution, it is the reservation wage of that individual rather than the market 
wage that affects the labour supply decision of the partner. As in the case of the 
income pooling assumption, this is far from innocuous, implying as it does that 
the ‘outside option’ value of paid work for a non-participant does not influence 
the allocation of consumption and leisure within the household. (p.1661) 
Unlike the case of hours-of-work, in which a number of pieces of research have questioned 
the unitary model, the research on this aspect of labour market participation is much 
sparser. This is probably due to the fact that modelling a couple’s decision-making in the 
context of participation has proved to be more challenging than in the hours-of-work 
framework. According to Duguet and Simmonet (2007), the main problems encountered in 
modelling couples’ participation are first, that it is likely that characteristics that determine 
labour market participation also affect marriage formation. Second, econometrically, the 
restrictive coherency condition necessitates that the parameter associated with the working 
status of one individual is set to zero in their spouse’s labour force participation equation 
which according to the authors amounts to “eliminating the true simultaneity of the 
couple’s decision” (p.160). This issue is discussed further in the methodology section. 
Some research has modelled a couple’s participation using strong assumptions in order to 
avoid the problem of coherency mentioned above. Van Soest (1995) uses a structural 
model that he labels “an extension of the single individual labour supply model” (p.63) in 
which the set of hours of work individuals choose from is made discreet. One extension of 
his model allows for tax policy simulations. Bjorn and Vuong (1997) develop a model of a 
couple’s participation in the labour market based on a Stackelberg game in which each 
spouse maximizes their own utility and the husband (who is the leader) knows his wife’s 
reactions. They allow the decision of the wife to enter into the determination of the 
husband’s reservation wage and explore the conditions under which identification is 
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feasible. Their model is based on strong theoretical assumptions which result in 
complicated computations. The authors acknowledge this but justify their approach by 
stating that it yields highly plausible results. Kooreman (1994) compares the implications of 
five models (Nash, Stackelberg (male leader), Stackelberg (female leader), Pareto-optimal 
and mixed) in the context of a couple’s labour market participation decisions. The author 
finds that all models apart from the one assuming only Pareto optimality yield sensible 
estimates. The empirical results of the articles mentioned above will be reviewed later in the 
section. They all have in common a reliance on a strong theoretical framework. It is 
important to note that these papers constitute an important contribution to the emerging 
literature on game theory and econometric modelling. However, it is beyond the scope of 
this thesis to analyse in depth the behaviour of couples using a game theory approach. In 
this chapter, a decision is made to adopt an ad hoc approach for the empirical analysis. No 
specific theoretical model is taken as a benchmark to avoid imposing constraints on the 
modelling. The chapter is mainly an empirical exercise. The model used to conduct the 
analysis is described in the econometric methodology section. The tests conducted on 
hours-of-work equations in the first chapter are applied to participation equations as done 
in Del Boca (1997). There are two sets of tests conducted. First, the income pooling test 
that amounts to testing whether male and female non-labour incomes have equal effects on 
the probability of participating in the labour market. Considering they do would imply that 
all non-labour income can be aggregated into one measure. The second set of tests 
attempts to check whether distribution factors (defined in the first chapter) impact on 
labour force participation. The first distribution factor used is the sex ratio. Two different 
economic models, the collective model and Grossbard’s demand and supply model, 
stipulate that there exists a negative relationship between labour force participation rates 
and sex ratios. The first step in decision-making is described differently in the two models. 
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It is during this phase that access to income is determined. In Grossbard’s demand and 
supply model, household production is crucial to the analysis. The couple defines terms of 
trade between housework and access to income (equivalent to a quasi-wage). The collective 
model recognizes the importance of household production but does not necessarily include 
it in the modelling of the decision-making. The second step in decision-making is similar in 
both models whereby each individual in the couple maximizes their utility taking into 
account the constraint of a pre-defined access to non-labour income (Grossbard and 
Amuedo-Durantes, 2007). Education can affect the predictions of the model. As 
mentioned by Grossbard (1984, 1993), cited in Grossbard and Amuedo-Dorantes (2007), 
educated individuals might not seek material compensation in the first step or may enjoy 
more egalitarian marriages whereby housework is performed by a third party. This means 
that they have lower quasi-wages and less access to income in the second phase. This 
would lead to a smaller relationship between employment decisions and sex ratios (in other 
words marriage market conditions). The other distribution factors, age difference and 
whether the wife is older, which were used in the first chapter, are also included in the 
analysis. It is important to note that these variables do not exclusively have a “bargaining” 
interpretation. Indeed, it could be that as the age difference widens, the man might retire 
earlier and the woman is left working.  
As in the case for hours of work, employment decisions of husbands and wives are likely to 
be interlinked and strongly correlated. If the husband becomes unemployed, two different 
effects come into play. The “added worker effect” is when the wife seeks work due to the 
loss of income that resulted from her husband losing his job (income effect) and to the fact 
that the husband can now spend his time in the household (substitution effect). As stated 
in Bingley and Walker (2001), it is the ability of households to counter the husband’s loss 
of employment through ways other than an increase in the wife’s labour supply that 
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determine the magnitude of these effects. The second effect to come into play is the 
“discouraged worker” effect which represents the fact that as the husband becomes 
unemployed, the wife anticipates that she won’t find a job either. Furthermore, she might 
consider that if she starts a new job, her husband may lose his entitlement to benefits 
depending on the type of welfare system in place. In the literature, a number of studies 
have looked at the added worker effect by exploring the impact of a husband’s 
unemployment on his wife’s working status. In this piece of research, the added worker 
effect cannot be studied directly as the husband’s working status is not included in the 
participation decision (see below). The added worker effect has also been studied indirectly 
through the mother-in-law working status as done in Del Boca et al (2000). The authors 
argue that the fact that the mother-in-law was working when she was the same age as the 
wife’s shows that the household approves women’s work in the labour market and 
therefore, in the case where the husband loses his job, he will not discourage his wife from 
trying to work to compensate for the loss of income. On the other hand, the case where 
the mother-in-law was not working might be an indication that the household’s approach 
to women’s work is rather conservative and therefore will not approve of the wife taking a 
job even if the husband becomes unemployed. Rather than taking the view that the 
mother-in-law work status proxies for an added-worker effect, this chapter adopts the view 
that it mainly corresponds to a “cultural” factor. 
3.2 Introducing a novel dimension to the model of a couple’s labour 
market participation  
The notion that the work status of a male’s mother when he was a teenager can impact on 
his wife’s current labour force status does not feature in standard models of female labour 
force participation. However, different social science literatures can provide potential 
reasons why such a relationship might exist between the two variables. Fernandez et al 
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(2004) mention the work of Freud who claims that individuals choose spouses that 
resemble their opposite-sex parent. They also refer to the transmission of preferences 
between parents and their children (which will be discussed in chapter three). The authors 
develop a model in which there are two channels that can explain why the wife of a man 
whose mother worked is more likely to work herself. The technology/endowments channel 
and the preference channel. Both lead to similar results. The first amounts to a husband 
being productive in housework and the second describes a situation whereby having a 
working mother has impacted on the husband’s tastes and attitudes making him therefore 
more likely to have a working wife. Indeed, the parents’ behaviour and the environment in 
which an individual is raised both determine his/her gender role socialization from 
childhood (Thornton et al, 1983). Analysing the effect of mother-in-law on a woman’s work 
behaviour shows that “cultural” considerations can impact on labour market participation 
and this is not acknowledged in the neoclassical context. The fact that daughters-in-law 
behave like their husbands’ mother can be due to assortative mating considerations. As 
defined by Becker (1973) positive assortative mating refers to a “positive correlation 
between the values of the traits of husbands and wives” (p.100) and is assumed to be fairly 
common. These traits can be intelligence, race, religion, social status or education among 
others. Indeed, regarding the latter, it is widely acknowledged that in the majority of 
couples, years of schooling of spouses are positively correlated (Pencavel, 1998). For some 
psychological attributes however, such as the tendency to dominate or aggressiveness, 
correlation can be negative. Positive assortative mating can help explain the polarization 
process whereby there has been an increase in dual-earner households and in the number 
of households where nobody works (Del Boca et al, 2000). Finally, it is important to note 
that the effect of mothers-in-law on their sons’ wives also has a temporal dimension. The 
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increasing presence of working women in one generation changes the expectations of the 
next generation and pushes younger women to invest more in human capital.22  
The different subjects mentioned above have all been analysed in the literature on married 
women participation. An overview of this literature, mainly for the United Kingdom, is 
provided in the next section 
3.3 A review of the literature  
The subject of labour market participation has been analysed for different purposes and 
with various methodologies. This review attempts to highlight the main concerns and 
findings of the literature with an emphasis on studies whose aims are close to the ones of 
this chapter. 
3.3.1 Married women’s labour market participation 
As in the case of hours of work, it is more common in the literature to model married 
women and male participation separately treating the partner’s participation as exogenous. 
While the participation decision of men has not attracted much interest (probably because 
participation rates for men tend to be high and do not vary much); a number of studies on 
British data have explored the participation decisions of working women. Greenlagh (1980) 
finds that an increase in the female predicted wage increases the likelihood of participation. 
The elasticity of participation with respect to wage is found to be 0.355. An increase in the 
number of children aged less than 10 years of age reduces the probability of participation. 
Income effects on participation are negative and significant. The elasticity of participation 
with respect to the couple’s income if the wife was not in employment is found to be equal 
to -0.452. 
                                                 
22 This is analysed in Fernandez et al (2004) where authors investigate the impact of World War II on the 
behaviour of two generations of women. 
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Layard, Barton and Zabalza (1980) use the 1974 General Household Survey to estimate a 
logit model for married women’s participation. They find an elasticity of participation of 
0.5 with respect to the woman’s own wage and -0.3 with respect to her husband’s wage. 
The responsiveness to changes in income is not found to be very large (elasticity of -0.04). 
They also find that the age of the youngest child is an important determinant of 
participation. Finally, they establish that a woman married to an unemployed man is 31 
percentage points less likely to be working herself. Joshi (1986) analyses female 
participation using the Women and Employment Survey conducted in 1980. Three 
different specifications modelling three different measures of participation in the labour 
market are used. These are: (i) the probability of women working full-time, (ii) the 
probability of women working and (iii) the probability of women being in the labour force 
(working or seeking work). The models are estimated using OLS. Wages for non-workers 
are estimated using an earnings function including work experience and occupation. The 
elasticities of female economic activity rate, work and full-time work with respect to wages 
are found to be equal to 0.19, 0.32 and 1 respectively. The three main determinants of 
female participation are found to be: earnings capacity, unearned or non-labour income and 
the presence of dependent children.  
Main and Reilly (1994) use data from the 1986 Social Change and Economic Life Initiative 
to estimate a logit model of married women’s participation for Great Britain. The own 
wage elasticity of participation for women is found to be equal to 0.704 whereas income 
effects are found to be poorly determined. The husband’s wage is found to negatively 
impact on his wife’s participation.   
Another branch of the literature analyses changes in the female labour force participation. 
While this is not the objective of the current chapter, a review of the work undertaken in 
this area will be informative. Gomulka and Stern (1990) use a time series of cross sectional 
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data from the Family Expenditure Survey to analyse the change in female participation in 
the United Kingdom between 1970 and 1983. They use growth accounting to analyse 
whether the change in participation was due to a change in behaviour or a change in 
characteristics of the female population. They estimate a series of reduced form probits and 
find that family structure has the biggest impact on participation. The husband’s net 
earnings negatively affect participation. A decrease of 10 percent in the latter increases the 
probability of participation by half a percentage point. Other studies have concentrated on 
the analysis of joint participation at the level of the household in order to analyse whether 
the macroeconomic trends of an increased participation of men and a decreased 
participation of women also holds at the level of the household.  
Booth et al (1999) use the BHPS panel data from 1991 to 1995 to analyse the difference in 
participation rates between men and women, however they do not limit themselves to 
married individuals. They use the method of Gomulka and Stern (1990) noted above to 
disentangle the sources of differences. A reduced form model is estimated. The authors 
find that the presence of children negatively affects both gender groups but the impact of 
children on women is much greater than that on men. The authors conclude that family 
responsibilities still largely impact on the work behaviour of women but not that of men. 
In order to proxy labour market conditions, the authors use the U-V (unemployment to 
vacancy) ratio. They find that lower unemployment leads to higher participation for both 
men and women. Income from savings and investment is found to increase the probability 
of work for men.   
Gutierrez-Domenech and Bell (2004) use the labour force survey Spring quarter from 1984 
to 2002 to study the participation of women in the labour market as well as analyse the 
change in participation. They estimate a series of structural/ reduced form probits. They 
find that age and region affect participation as well as higher levels of education which 
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increases the likelihood of participation. Furthermore, the number and age of children are 
important determinants of participation. 
The research of Neumark and Postlewaite (1998) is of interest as it has a similar objective 
to that of this chapter in the sense that it attempts to include variables that are not normally 
included in the neoclassical framework. The authors attempt to explain the rise in the 
labour force participation rate of women in the United States in the twentieth century. 
Their paper examines the role of the relative income of other women in the household in 
explaining the rise in participation of women in the labour market. They assume that every 
couple considers its position compared to a particular couple that serves as a benchmark. If 
one woman in the household engages in paid work, the reservation wage of the other 
woman in the household determined by the difference in utilities between staying at home 
or working, will most likely decrease as they might not share childcare as they used to or 
socializing might become more expensive. The introduction of the work status of the 
sister-in-law to the labour participation equation shows that women with sisters-in-law that 
are working are seven percentage points more likely to be in employment. Furthermore, 
the probability of being employed for women whose sisters are not employed increases by 
16 to 25 percentage points (depending on the specification) if their sister’s husband’s 
income is higher than that of their husband.  
Finally, the added worker effect in the United Kingdom has been analysed in various 
studies. Bingley and Walker (2001) estimate married women labour supply functions 
integrating unemployment spells of spouses in their model. They use data from 15 pooled 
cross-sections from the Family Expenditure Survey from 1978 to 1992 and apply a 
multinomial probit random utility framework to model the decision to work part-time, full-
time or not participate (voluntarily) in the labour market. They estimate wage regressions 
for part-time and full-time work and predict incomes. They find that children render it less 
 106 
 
likely for a woman to engage in full-time work with the age of the youngest child having 
the strongest impact. The effect of the husband’s employment status varies depending on 
whether he has been unemployed for a short or a long period. They choose a 
representative family to simulate changes in some variables. The regional monthly 
unemployment rate lowers the probability of participation for women with a one 
percentage point increase decreasing employment by 0.8%.  
The different studies reviewed above provide an overview of the main research conducted 
in the subject of married women participation in the labour market mainly in the United 
Kingdom. This chapter attempts to analyse married men and women participation 
decisions simultaneously, which researchers have been reluctant to do for the reasons 
outlined in the theoretical section. 
3.3.2 Couples’ labour market participation 
Bjorn and Vuong (1997) use a Stackelberg game framework to model a couple’s 
participation decision. Expressions for the reservation wages are explicitly derived. The 
model itself is complex, therefore only the main results are considered here. The study is 
conducted on American couples in 1982. A husband is found to have a lower reservation 
wage when his wife works. On the other hand, a wife will have a higher reservation wage 
when her husband works. Younger children increase a wife’s reservation wage. With 
respect to age, women are found to be more likely to work at 32 rather than earlier or later 
in life.  
Kooreman (1994) uses Dutch data from 1985 to model a couple’s participation decision. 
For men, the decision is between part-time and full-time work. Non-labour income is 
found to be non-significant for both males and females. After preliminary tests, a decision 
is made to constrain the correlation between male and female decisions to zero. The female 
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wage is found not to impact on male decisions while the male wage is found to affect the 
wife’s preferences for work. Furthermore, results show that ceteris paribus, a husband is 
more likely to work part-time if his wife works whereas a wife is more likely to work if her 
husband does as well. Kooreman (1994) notes that differences between the various 
theoretical models are small and that cross-wage effects explain most of the 
interdependence of participation decisions. 
Duguet and Simmonet (2007) use French data to analyse the joint participation decisions 
among couples. Their objective is to determine whether an individual takes into account 
their spouse’s utility from work in their decision to participate in the labour market. They 
develop a model where the utility of work, not the decision itself, is taken into account into 
the decision process in order to “bypass the problem of coherency restriction” (p.161). 
They estimate a reduced form model where they introduce four sets of explanatory 
variables. Individual characteristics among which are included age, education, health status, 
spouse characteristics (the same as those included for the individual), children, and finally 
variables representing labour market conditions. They find that when spouse participation 
is treated as endogenous, the probability that the husband will participate in the labour 
market increases when his spouse works as well but the reverse is not true as they find no 
effect of the husband’s employment status on the wife’s participation. With respect to local 
labour market conditions, women do not seem sensitive either to the unemployment rate 
or to the job creation rate while male participation is negatively affected by the first but not 
the second. The presence of children decreases the probability that a wife will participate in 
the labour market. The husband’s participation is also found to be affected by the father-
in-law’s occupation. People from outside Europe are found to have a lower probability of 
participation and the wife’s education is found not to impact on male participation while 
husband’s education is. 
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Del Boca (1997) tests the income pooling hypothesis using two samples of married couples 
from the 1993 Bank of Italy Survey’s of Household Income and Wealth. The first sample 
includes all families and the second only families that have children aged less than six. She 
estimates participation equations and allows income effects to change according to the 
identity of the additional income’s recipient. The equality of non- labour income effects on 
participation is rejected for the total sample but not for the sample of couples with 
preschool aged children. A second test that is conducted is whether extra-household 
factors influence labour supply decisions. The variables used to this effect are the number 
of subsidized childcare places in a particular region and the population sex ratio. Both are 
found to be significant in the wife’s equation but not in the husband’s.  
Del Boca (1997) models the joint decisions of husbands and wives to work using a 
bivariate probit model. She tests for income pooling and introduces two distribution 
factors, the number of subsidized childcare places and the population sex ratio, into the 
analysis. She finds that the correlation coefficient between the two equations representing 
male and female participation is significant and positive indicating complementarities in 
behaviour. She obtains different results for families with children under five and the sample 
of all families. For the whole sample, income pooling is rejected but not for the sample of 
families with pre-school children. The woman’s non-labour income does not affect male 
participation in the sample of all families but has a significant negative effect using families 
with pre-school children.  
A further paper that looks at the effect of distribution factors is Grossbard and Amuedo-
Dorantes (2007). The authors use the American Current Population Surveys from 1965 to 
2005 at five year intervals to study the impact of sex ratios on female labour force 
participation. They find that there is a negative relationship between the two variables. An 
increase in the ratio from 1 to 1.10 reduces the labour force participation rate of married 
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women by 2.5 percentage points. They also use interactions between sex ratios and 
education levels to check whether the effect of the sex ratio varies according to the 
education level of women. They find that in two regions, education contributes to 
decreasing the impact of sex ratios on participation probably for the reasons explained 
earlier. 
This chapter follows Del Boca (1997) and uses a bivariate probit framework to analyse a 
British couple’s participation in the labour market. A further aspect that has not been 
analysed for the United Kingdom before, is also explored, which is the role of the mother-
in-law in explaining the labour market behaviour of her son’s wife. 
3.3.3 Female labour market participation and mother-in-law work 
status 
A number of studies have analysed the impact the work status of the mother-in-law on the 
working behaviour of their son’s wife. It is important to note that most studies introduce 
the variable in a model of female participation (not a couple’s one). 
Del Boca et al (2000) use the Bank of Italy Survey from 1995 to investigate the 
determinants of wives’ participation decisions which include the labour status of mothers 
and mothers-in-law when they were the wife’s age. They consider their effect on 
participation and argue that it can proxy for an added-worker effect. They estimate four 
specifications of a probit model of female participation. Male participation is not explicitly 
modelled. An analysis of education differences/similarities within couples indicates the 
prevalence of assortative mating. The fact that the mother or mother-in-law worked when 
they were the woman’s age has a significant and positive effect on her participation in the 
labour market. The husband’s unemployment status does not impact on his wife’s 
participation apart from the specification where the latter is interacted with mother and 
mother-in -law work behaviour.  
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Two other papers that investigate the impact of mother-in-laws’ working behaviour are 
Fernandez et al (2002, 2004). The first study investigates a number of aspects relating the 
mother-in- law’s behaviour and education to the behaviour of the wife. This is done using 
American data from the General Social Survey. In the first paper, a simple probit is used 
where the dependent variable is the wife’s work status. In all specifications, the working 
behaviour of the mother-in-law is found to positively impact on the probability that a wife 
works. In the specification with all the controls included, it is found that having a working 
mother-in-law increases the probability that the woman works by 32 percentage points. 
They also examine whether the mother-in-law’s education is a good predictor of the wife’s 
education and find that a more educated mother-in-law increases the level of education of 
the wife. The second paper uses the same data and, in addition, the “Female Labor Force 
Participation and Marital Instability” dataset. The first part of the paper is very similar to 
the previous one. In the second part, the second dataset is used to model the impact of 
mother-in-law working on the wife’s participation which results in a finding that having a 
working mother-in-law increases the probability that the wife works by 24 percentage 
points. Finally, the impact of World War II is used as an external shock to provide 
exogenous variation in the number of men raised by working mothers.  
Kawaguchi and Miyazaki (2009) study the impact of the working status of a man’s mother 
when he was an adolescent on the labour market participation of his wife. They use 
Japanese data from a series of cross-sections. They find that the wife of a man whose 
mother was working part-time or was self-employed when he was an adolescent is less 
likely to work than the wife of a man whose mother was a housewife. Results reveal that 
men whose mothers worked full-time when they were 15 are four percentage points more 
likely to have full-time working wives than other men. However, the estimated effects are 
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not always significant. The authors also analyse the impact of a mother’s working status on 
her son’s gender roles.  
4 Data  
The first chapter only considered couples where both spouses work. The study was thus 
subject to selection bias. In this chapter, the analysis is extended to all heterosexual couples 
that are married or cohabitating. The construction of the new sample is detailed in the next 
section. 
4.1 Dataset construction 
In order to model participation, the dependent variable needs to be defined. This is 
constructed as a binary variable that equals 1 if the individual has been working as an 
employee or self-employed, part-time or full-time, in the week before the interview. It is 
also equal to 1 for respondents who have a job although they did not work in the week in 
question. One relevant caveat is that people looking for work are normally considered in 
the labour force but for the purposes of this study are considered not to be working. The 
decision to participate in the labour market is influenced by wage offers. Only the wages of 
those who work are known but the participation decision concerns all individuals. 
Therefore, it is important to estimate wage offers for the entire sample. In order to do this, 
a two-step Heckman procedure is used. The first stage probit equation is estimated for all 
men and women of working age irrespective of marital status. Variables included in this 
regression are the following: age, health status, parents’ work status, ethnicity, regions, 
education, house ownership, male unemployment rate for men and women, marital status, 
cohabitation status, number and ages of children, annual household non-labour income. 
Results are displayed in Table A2.1 (Appendix 2). The inverse Mills ratio is constructed 
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from this regression and included in the wage regression. In the latter only variables that 
are available for all observations are considered. Job tenure, occupation and industry could 
have been useful predictors of wages but are not available for people who do not work and 
are therefore excluded from the analysis. The final set of variables retained for the wage 
regression analysis comprise: age and its quadratic, education and regions. Predicted wage 
offers are then obtained from this regression. An overview of the results from the 
Heckman procedure is provided in the empirical section.   
The same variables that were used to predict hours of work in the first chapter are now 
used to predict participation and include apart from the predicted wage, male and female 
non-labour income, the presence of at least one child aged less than 5 years-old, between 5 
and 11 years- old or more than 12 years-old, the unemployment rate (to proxy for local 
labour market conditions), and age (see tables 2.1 (a) and (b) below). 
The distribution factors are the same as those described in chapter one but are now 
computed for all couples (see tables 2.1(a) and (b) below). Finally, the variable representing 
the mother-in-law’s work status is constructed using the answers to the question of 
whether a man’s mother was working when he was 14. Three dummy variables are 
constructed. The first is equal to 1 if the husband’s mother was working, the second is 
equal to one if the individual does not know whether his mother was working, or if his 
mother was deceased or did not live in the household. The last variable is equal to 1 if she 
was not working. The latter two categories cannot be merged into one. It is important to 
note that this variable captures a different effect from one indicating whether the mother-
in-law worked at the time of the survey. If the mother-in-law was working at the time of 
the survey, this might have meant that the wife would have benefited from less help with 
childcare (if she was depending on the family to provide it) and would have discouraged 
participation. The impact of the working status of the mother when the husband was aged 
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14 is exogenous to participation today and is intended to capture preferences. The base 
category for estimation is chosen to be having a mother that was not working when the 
husband was aged 14, since the miscellaneous category cannot be used for this purpose.   
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Table 2.1(a): Variables’ definition  
 Variable name 
 
Variable description  
Individual 
working status 
 
 
 
 male_working Binary variable that is equal to 1 if the husband 
worked during the week preceding the interview 
or in the case he did not, if he has a job and 0 
otherwise 
 female_working Binary variable that is equal to 1 if the wife 
worked during the week preceding the interview 
or in the case she did not, if she has a job and 0 
otherwise 
Wage 
 
  
 male_wage Predicted male hourly wage in natural log 
  
 female_wage 
 
Predicted female hourly wage in natural log 
Non-labour 
income 
  
 male_income Continuous measure. Monthly male non-labour 
income obtained by dividing the yearly non-
labour income of the previous wave by 12. It 
includes transfer, benefit, pension and 
investment income 
 female_income Continuous measure. Monthly female non-labour 
income obtained by dividing the yearly non-
labour income of the previous wave by 12. It 
includes transfer, benefit, pension and 
investment income 
 couple_income Continuous measure. Sum of male and female 
non-labour incomes 
Children 
 
  
 childlessthan5 Binary variable that is equal to 1 if there is at least 
one child aged between 0 and 4 in the household 
and 0 otherwise 
 child5to11 
 
Binary variable that is equal to 1 if there is at least 
one child aged between 5 and 11 in the 
household and 0 otherwise 
 childolderthan12 Binary variable that is equal to 1 if there is at least 
one child aged between 12 and 18 in the 
household and 0 otherwise 
Age    
 
 age18_24_m Binary variable that is equal to 1 if the husband’s 
age is between 18 and 24 years and 0 otherwise 
 age25_34_m Binary variable that is equal to 1 if the husband’s 
age is between 25 and 34 years and 0 otherwise   
 age35_44_m Binary variable that is equal to 1 if the husband’s 
age is between 35 and 44 years and 0 otherwise  
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 Variable name 
 
Variable description  
   
 age45more_m Binary variable that is equal to 1 if the husband’s 
age is higher than 45 and 0 otherwise 
 age18_24_f Binary variable that is equal to 1 if the wife’s age 
is between 18 and 24 years and 0 otherwise 
 age25_34_f Binary variable that is equal to 1 if the wife’s age 
is between 25 and 34 years and 0 otherwise   
 age35_44_f Binary variable that is equal to 1 if the wife’s age 
is between 35 and 44 years and 0 otherwise  
 age45more_f Binary variable that is equal to 1 if the wife’s age 
is higher than 45 and 0 otherwise  
 
Unemployment 
rate 
  
 male_unemployment 
 
Male unemployment rate. Continuous variable. 
Constructed at the county level or unitary 
authority level.23 
 female_unemployment 
 
Female unemployment rate. Continuous variable. 
Constructed at the county level or unitary 
authority level.24 
Distribution 
factors 
  
 sex_ratio Continuous variable. It is equal to the number of 
males whose age falls in the age category of the 
husband over the number of females whose age 
falls in the category of the wife in a particular 
county 
 age_difference Continuous variable (percentage). It is equal to 
the subtraction of the female age from the male 
age and the division of the result by the male’s 
age 
 female_older 
 
Binary variable that is equal to 1 if the wife is 
older than her husband 
  
 
 
Mother-in-law 
working status 
motherinlaw_work Binary variable that is equal to 1 if the husband’s 
mother was working when he was 14 years old 
and 0 otherwise 
 motherinlaw_not_work Binary variable that is equal to 1 if the husband’s 
mother was not working when he was 14 years 
old and 0 otherwise 
 motherinlaw_misc Binary variable that is equal to 1 if the husband’s 
mother was deceased, not living in the household 
or if the husband does not know and 0 otherwise
 
                                                 
23 Source: Office of National Statistics (2004a)  
24 Source: Office of National Statistics (2004b) 
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4.2 Descriptive statistics 
An analysis of all couples of working age in the sample reveals that 70% of all the 
households considered in this chapter are dual-earner households in which both spouses 
are working. It is more than twice as common to have a female not working rather than a 
male in a household as 17% of households in the sample are male breadwinner households 
and 6% female. Finally, in 7% of households in the sample both spouses are unemployed. 
The proportion of married men working in the sample (0.88) is found to be higher than 
that of married women (0.76). Males have higher predicted wages in all households. 
Furthermore, predicted wages for both males and females are the lowest in households 
where neither the husband nor the wife is working. They are the highest in dual-earner 
households.25 Female non-labour income is on average higher than male non-labour 
income. However, this result does not hold in all types of household. Male non-labour 
income is higher in female-breadwinner and non-earner households. In both cases, men 
have higher benefit and pension incomes (see appendix 2, table A2.3). In dual-earner 
households and male-earner ones, benefit income is higher for females. Even though the 
measure of benefit income is from the past year, there is bound to be a strong link between 
benefit income and participation in the labour market as benefits tend to be administered 
(or not) based on work status. With respect to the unemployment rate, the sample 
estimates are similar to the ones computed by the office of national statistics of 5.5% for 
males and 4.3% for females in April-June 2003. Household working patterns vary with the 
education level of spouses. Indeed, the only type of household in which the wife is, on 
average, more educated than her husband, is the female-earner household. The 
qualification difference is the smallest in dual-earner couples. Finally, male-earner 
                                                 
2525 See Jacobsen and Rayack (1996) for a discussion of single-earner male wage premium. 
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households have the highest qualifications’ difference. This might suggest that the 
individual with the comparative advantage in the labour market (in other words with the 
highest education level) will engage in paid labour.   
The highest number of pre-school children and children aged between 5 and 11 years-old is 
concentrated in male-breadwinner households while female-breadwinner households are 
the opposite. This confirms the common result in the literature that women are still the 
ones largely responsible for childcare and therefore less likely to work if they have young 
children. Both the male unemployment rate and the sex ratio are higher in female earner 
and zero earner households suggesting that men’s employment is sensitive to regional 
macroeconomic conditions and demographic composition. The correlation between the 
two variables is negative and weak suggesting they are not capturing the same effects. The 
female unemployment rate is invariant across household types. With respect to age 
difference, men are on average older in female earner or no earner households, this can be 
indicative of the fact that men can retire while their spouse is still working for the former 
or that women care for their partners for the latter and is also confirmed by the fact that 
the average ages for these two types of households are higher. In addition, the highest 
proportion of men in female-breadwinner households is older than 45 years of age, which 
could suggest that men might retire early while their wives continue working.  
Finally, regarding the mother-in-law’s work status, the lowest proportion of households 
where the mother-in-law was working when the respondent was aged 14, is the zero earner 
ones, while the highest one is in the dual-earner households suggesting that work behaviour 
might be transmitted inter-generationally. It is important to note that the high proportion 
of individuals in the miscellaneous category is due to the fact that a number of respondents 
did not reply to this question because it was not administered in the particular wave in 
which they became part of the sample.   
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Table 2.1(b): Descriptive statistics   
 
 
All 
households
Dual-
earner 
households
Male earner 
households 
Female 
earner 
households 
Zero-
earner 
households
male_working 0.8758     
female_working 0.7592     
male_wage 2.43  
(0.24) 
2.45 
(0.23) 
2.42  
(0.24) 
2.36  
(0.27) 
2.29  
(0.21) 
female_wage 
 
2.15 
(0.26) 
2.18 
(0.25) 
2.09 
(0.24) 
2.12 
(0.26) 
1.98 
(0.24) 
age18_24_m 0.0337 0.0324 0.0347 0.0392 0.04 
age25_34_m 0.2189 0.2333 0.2343 0.1046 0.1257 
age35_44_m 0.3173 0.3445 0.3189 0.1569 0.1657 
age45more_m 0.4301 0.3898 0.4121 0.6993 0.6686 
age18_24_f 0.0606 0.0551 0.0651 0.0588 0.1086 
age25_34_f 0.2480 0.2635 0.2625 0.1503 0.1314 
age35_44_f 0.3287 0.3483 0.3449 0.2418 0.1543 
age45more_f 0.3620 0.3321 0.3275 0.5490 0.6057 
male_unemployment 0.0650 
(0.03) 
0.0638 
(0.03) 
0.0651 
(0.02) 
0.0727 
(0.02) 
0.0711 
(0.03) 
female_unemployment 0.0439 
(0.01) 
0.0434 
(0.01) 
0.0439 
(0.01) 
0.0471 
(0.01) 
0.0464 
(0.01) 
male_income 169 
(411) 
98 
(348) 
139 
(338) 
521 
(568) 
675 
(500) 
female_income 173 
(266) 
127 
(214) 
276 
(314) 
137 
(201) 
439 
(419) 
couple_income 342 
(510) 
226 
(428) 
413 
(457) 
662 
(603) 
1116 
(543) 
childlessthan5 0.1867 0.1598 0.3471 0.0719 0.1486 
child5to11 0.2840 0.2792 0.3861 0.1373 0.1943 
childolderthan12 0.2207 0.2257 0.2213 0.2092 0.1771 
sex ratio (1) † 1.1566 
(0.3035) 
1.1402 
(0.3015)   
1.1556 
(0.2919) 
1.2303 
(0.2466) 
1.2686 
(0.3635) 
sex ratio (2) †† 0.9920 
(0.0734) 
0.9914 
(0.0725) 
0.9892 
(0.0703) 
0.9914 
(0.0700) 
1.0060 
(0.0906) 
age_difference 0.0452 0.0404 0.0478 0.0737 0.0643 
female_older 0.1533 0.1609 0.1584 0.1046 0.1029 
motherinlaw_work 0.5267 0.5621    0.4707 0.5033     0.32 
motherinlaw_not_work 0.3851 0.3553 0.4360 0.4052    0.5486    
motherinlaw_misc 0.0882 0.0826    0.0933 0.0915 0.1314 
Sample size 2641 1852 461 153 175 
Notes: (†)   ratio of the number of males whose age falls in the age category of the husband over  
the number of females whose age falls in the ages fall in the category of the wife in a particular county. 
(††)ratio of the number of males whose age falls in the age category of the husband over the number of females whose age 
falls in that same age category  
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5 Econometric methodology 
In this section, the bivariate probit framework, which is used to model a couple’s labour 
market participation is described. 
5.1 Bivariate Probit model  
As explained in the theoretical section, this chapter is mainly empirical in nature and 
follows the work of Del Boca (1997). In order to model the couples’ participation decision, 
a bivariate probit is used. The latter consists of two probit equations estimated as a system 
that allows for correlation in unobservables between the two equations. In this model, 
there are four mutually exclusive possible outcomes in relation to couples work behaviour. 
Either both partners work, or the husband works and the wife does not, or the wife works 
and the husband does not, or both partners do not work. Each household is allocated to 
one of the four outcomes.  
The two equation model is specified as follows:  
 
mmmm Xy εβ += '*  
1=my  if 0* >my , 
0=my  if 0* ≤my  
 
ffff Xy εβ += '*  
1=fy  if 0* >fy , 
0=fy  if 0* ≤fy  
fm εε , ~ ),1,1,0,0( ρBVN  
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Where my *  and fy *  are latent variables for labour supply, mX '  and fX ' are the male and 
female vectors of explanatory variables, and BVN (…;.) denotes “bivariate normally 
distributed”. 
Let 00011011 ,,, PPPP be the probabilities associated with the four outcomes. 
),|1,1( fmfm XXyyP == = ),','( ρββ ffmm XXF  
),|0,1( fmfm XXyyP == = ),','( ρββ −− ffmm XXF  
),|1,0( fmfm XXyyP == = ),','( ρββ −− ffmm XXF  
),|0,0( fmfm XXyyP == = ),','( ρββ ffmm XXF −−  
 
Where F is the bivariate normal cumulative distribution function operator and ρ is the 
correlation coefficient between the unobservables in the two equations. The likelihood 
function for this model is the following:  
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If the correlation coefficient is equal to zero, it implies that the participation decisions of 
the spouses are not interlinked and two separate univariate probits can be estimated 
instead. A likelihood ratio test can be performed to test whether the correlation coefficient 
is equal to zero. The test statistic, distributed as a chi-squared with one degree of freedom, 
is computed as follows: 
)]ln(ln[ln2 21 LLLBIVARIATELR +−=λ  
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Where BIVARIATEL , 1L and 2L  are the likelihood functions of the bivariate probit and the 
two univariate probits respectively; with )'(]1[1 mmm xyprobL βΦ===  and 
)'(]1[2 fff xyprobL βΦ=== . However, this can also be conducted using the Wald test 
on the correlation coefficient. 
Before estimating the model, the issue of identification needs to be addressed. In other 
words, one has to establish whether it is possible to uniquely identify, using the available 
sample data, all the parameters estimated. If more than one set of parameters is consistent 
with the model, the latter is said to be under-identified. There are a number of ways to 
address this issue. In this context, a useful one could be exclusion restrictions. The male 
unemployment rate is included in the male regression (but not in the female one) and the 
female unemployment rate in the female regression (but not in the male one). Furthermore, 
an individual’s own age is included in each regression model. Furthermore, according to 
Wilde (2000), in the recursive bivariate probit model (of which the present model is a 
special case), exclusion restrictions are not necessary if there is enough variation in the data. 
In other words, enough of the variables used are continuous. This is clearly the case in the 
current application. 
It could be argued that either husbands’ or wives’ work status need to be introduced in 
their partners’ labour force participation equations. However, due to a coherency 
restriction, the coefficient on the husband’s (or wives) status in the wives’ (or husbands’) 
regression is imposed to be equal to zero. As mentioned in the review section, it has been 
argued that constraining the coefficient of the spouse’s employment to zero implies that 
simultaneity of decision-making regarding participation in the labour market is not properly 
accounted for. However, in this chapter, we take the view that allowing for correlation in 
the unobservables reduces substantially this particular problem. Furthermore, the impact of 
the employment status of one spouse on the participation of the other is likely to be partly 
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taken into account through the inclusion of the wage and non-labour income of the spouse 
in the individual’s participation decision. It is important to note that identification is less 
feasible if a spouse’s employment status is introduced in the individual’s regression model. 
For all the reasons outlined above, following Del Boca (1997), the bivariate probit 
framework chosen here is not recursive. Not taking into account the effect of the 
husband’s employment on his wife’s participation implies the added worker effect cannot 
be readily examined. The impact of the male unemployment rate on female participation 
could have approximated the latter but this was not found to be statistically significant. The 
system of equations to be estimated is as follows: 
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The coherency restriction mentioned previously imposes the constraint that 0=fs , which 
we impose in this particular case.   
In order to evaluate the goodness of fit of the model Mc Fadden R-squared can be 
computed. The latter is equal to: 
)mod(
)mod(1
elrestrictedL
elfullL−  where the full model is 
represented by equations [6.1] and [6.2] above and the restricted model is represented by 
equation [6.2] and the following equation: mmm ay ε+=* for males and equation [6.1] 
and the following equation: fff ay ε+=*  for females.  
The income pooling test consists in using a Wald test to establish whether the following 
parametric equalities hold in the model above: 
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Male equation: :0H mm ed =    versus  mm ed ≠  [6.3] 
Female equation: :0H ff ed =  versus  mm ed ≠  [6.4] 
In the second phase, distribution factors are introduced in equations [6.1] and [6.2] above 
in turn starting with the sex ratio, then age difference and the female older dummy (see 
table 2.4). In the last phase, the mother-in-law working status is introduced to the basic 
model above (see table 2.5).    
5.2 Marginal effects 
The coefficients obtained in the bivariate probit indicate whether the impact of an effect is 
significant and whether it increases or decreases the probability of observing the outcome 
of interest. In order to compute the quantitative effect of variables on the outcomes of 
interest, marginal effects can be derived. Conditional and marginal probabilities are used in 
this chapter to compute the relevant marginal and impact effects. The marginal effect on 
the conditional probability gives the marginal effect of a change in an explanatory variable 
on the probability that an individual is working conditional on their spouse working as well. 
The marginal effect on the marginal probability gives the marginal effect of a change in an 
explanatory variable on the probability that an individual is working irrespective of the 
work status of their spouse. Greene (1996, 2000) and Christofides et al (2001, 2002) show 
how to obtain marginal effects in the context of a bivariate probit (See Appendix 2 for 
derivations of marginal effects). Standard errors for these effects are computed using the 
delta method.   
 124 
 
5.3 Computing elasticities  
The wage elasticity of participation is equal to the percentage change in participation over 
the percentage change in the wage. Let wiΕ be the male (or female) wage elasticity of 
participation:  
ii
i
wi PW
P
E 1*
ln∂
∂=   for fmi ,=  [6.5] 
Where iP  is the sample proportion of males (females), iW is the male (female) wage and 
i
i
W
P
ln∂
∂
represents the marginal effect of the log wage on the probability of participation.  
The income elasticity of participation is equal to the percentage change in participation 
over the percentage change in income. There are three income elasticities to compute.  The 
male and female income elasticity of participation for males and females are respectively 
equal to: 
f
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∂=   [6.6] 
Where fP  is the sample proportion of females and my  is the male non-labour income. 
m
f
y
P
∂
∂
represents the marginal effect of male non-labour income on the probability of female 
participation  
f
f
f
f
yf P
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P
E *∂
∂=   [6.7] 
Where fP  is the sample proportion of females and fy  is the sample mean female non-
labour income. 
f
f
y
P
∂
∂
represents the marginal effect of female non-labour income on the 
probability of female participation  
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The pooled income elasticity of participation for males is equal to:  
m
mf
mf
m
ym P
y
y
PE *∂
∂=    [6.8] 
Where mP  is the sample proportion of males and mfy  is the pooled non-labour income. 
mf
m
y
P
∂
∂
 represents the marginal effect of pooled non-labour income on the probability of 
male participation. 
6 Results 
Before looking at the results of the bivariate probit model, a quick review of the findings 
from the two-step Heckman procedure is provided. Both the selection equation and the 
wage regression estimates are displayed in tables A.2.1 and A.2.2 of Appendix 2. The probit 
regression model for labour market participation of all males and females in the working 
age population yields results that are broadly consistent with economic theory. The 
probability of working increases with education for both gender groups. Being other than 
white reduces the probability of participation. Marital status only impacts on male 
participation while being disabled reduces the probability of participation for males and 
females. Home ownership (either outright or with a mortgage) increases the probability of 
working for both males and females. The presence of children reduces female participation 
in the labour market. With respect to the wage equations, the inverse of the Mills ratio is 
found to be statistically significant for both males and females, which indicates the 
presence of selection bias. Furthermore, the coefficient on the Inverse Mills ratio is found 
to be negative. While this can be seen to be counter-intuitive as it indicates that 
unobservables that positively influence the wage will negatively influence participation, the 
result is nevertheless plausible (see Ermisch and Wright (1994)) and common.   
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The bivariate probit results, reported in tables 2.2 and 2.3, show that effects are well 
determined overall. Furthermore, the model converged after thirty iterations. This indicates 
that identification did not seem to pose a problem in the model. Results reveal that 
spouses’ participation decisions at the level of the household are related in all 
specifications. Unobservable factors that determine male and female participation are 
positively correlated as the likelihood ratio test on the correlation coefficient being zero is 
rejected in all specifications. This result contradicts the finding of Kooreman (1994) using 
Dutch data but is consistent with Del Boca (1997) for Italian data. It is difficult to assess 
whether this is due to the nature of the data (different countries) or to differences in 
modelling. The positive sign on the correlation coefficient might be an indication of 
assortative mating (which was discussed in the theoretical section). Unobservable factors 
other than wages, non-labour income, age and the number of children affect male and 
female participation in the same way. These could be related to traits of character such as 
ambition or similar attitudes to work. Assortative mating is discussed in detail in Becker 
(1973). The author argues that men tend to marry women with similar traits (race, height, 
intelligence). Therefore, if an individual has a trait that encourages participation in the 
labour market, and that is not controlled for in the model, it is likely that their spouse has 
the same trait. Exceptions occur for wage rates or traits that are complementary in 
household production.  
Table 2.2 below shows the results of the bivariate model with male and female non-labour 
income introduced separately. The income pooling test, described in equations [6.3] for 
males and [6.4] for females in the preceding section, yields t-ratios of 0.05 and 43.94 for 
males and females respectively. The hypothesis of equality of income effect is thus rejected 
for females but not for males. In other words, husbands seem to pool non-labour income 
but wives do not. This shows that the unitary model’s assumption of income pooling holds 
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for males but not for females. This result is not implausible. One of its interpretations 
could be that women tend to consider the non-labour income they receive as theirs (for 
their own consumption or their children’s) while men tend to consider the non-labour 
income they receive as a household one. Maybe men still act as breadwinners even if their 
wives do not seem to have similar views. Unlike in the first chapter, income effects are 
well-determined. Therefore, the preferred specification is one where income is pooled in 
the male equation but not in the female. In the male regression model (equation [6.1]), the 
constraint mm ed =  is imposed on the data. 
.  
 128 
 
Table 2.2: Bivariate probit results (income pooling test) 
 Bivariate probit 
 
 Male 
 
Female 
male_wage 1.2567***    
(0.1371) 
-0.1799   
(0.1149) 
female_wage 0.3925***    
(0.1332) 
1.3644***   
(0.1194) 
male_income -0.6333*** 
(0.0681) 
-0.2703***   
(0.0672) 
female_income -0.6641*** 
(0.1255) 
-1.1501 
(0.1131) 
age25_34_m -0.2023    
(0.2074) 
† 
                        age35_44_m -0.3302 
(0.2151) 
† 
age45more_m -0.6281***   
(0.2002) 
† 
age25_34_f † -0.1472    
(0.1408) 
age35_44_f † -0.3967***  
(0.1477) 
age45more_f † -0.5742***   
(0.1393) 
male_unemployment -4.7027*** 
(1.4173) 
† 
female_unemployment † -1.0795  
(2.5133) 
childlessthan5 0.2442** 
(0.1235) 
-0.4893***  
(0.0823) 
child5to11 0.2895*** 
(0.1040) 
-0.0662    
(0.0730) 
childolderthan12 0.1652* 
(0.1007) 
0.1561**   
(0.0782) 
Constant -1.4173*** 
(0.3406) 
-0.7195***   
(0.2853) 
Correlation coefficient 0.3114*** 
(0.0497) 
Likelihood ratio test 35.3881 
(0.0000) 
Log likelihood -1860.264 
MacFadden R squared 0.1403 0.1237 
Sample size 2641 
 Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1% level 
 ** denotes significance at the 5% level 
 * denotes significance at the 10% level 
 † indicates the variable is omitted from the regression;  
 Base categories for the age for males and females are age18_24_m and age18_24_f 
respectively 
 The t ratios for the test of equality of male and female non-labour income effects are equal to 
0.05 for males and 44 for females 
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The results for the constrained model are reported in table 2.3 below. As in the case of 
hours of work (see chapter one), the specification with pooled non-labour income and the 
one with non-pooled income yield very similar results. The Mac Fadden R squared values 
computed for male and female regressions respectively equal 0.1403 and 0.1237 which 
shows that the set of explanatory variables included in the model provide a satisfactory fit 
for the data in the current application. The effect of most variables is well-determined and 
generally consistent with predictions from economic theory. 
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Table 2.3: Bivariate probit estimates and corresponding marginal effects 
 Bivariate probit  
(equations 6.1 and 6.2) 
Marginal effects+ 
(equations 6.1 and 6.2) 
 Male  Female  Marg(m) Marg(f) Cond(m) Cond(f) 
male_wage 1.2556***   
(0.1370) 
-0.1803   
(0.1149) 
0.1704***     
(0.0199) 
-0.0515      
(0.0328) 
0.1422***   
(0.0174) 
-0.0794***   
(0.0319) 
female_wage 0.3964***   
(0.1321) 
1.3649***   
(0.1194) 
0.0538***     
(0.0178) 
0.3898***     
(0.0338) 
0.0204*     
(0.0155) 
0.3680*** 
(0.0327) 
male_income f -0.2718***   
(0.0669) 
f -0.0776***    
(0.0191) 
0.0047***   
(0.0014) 
-0.0751***   
(0.0185) 
female_income f -1.1469***   
(0.1122) 
f -0.3276***    
(0.0326) 
0.0197***   
(0.0038) 
-0.3171***   
(0.0317) 
couple_income -0.6401***   
(0.0607) 
f -0.0869***    
(0.0092) 
f -0.0709***   
(0.0082) 
0.0151***    
(0.0032) 
age25_34_m -0.2022   
(0.2073) 
f -0.0298      
(0.0332) 
f -0.0246 
(0.0278) 
0.0050 
(0.0055) 
age35_44_m -0.3296   
(0.2150) 
f -0.0490      
(0.0351) 
f -0.0405 
(0.0296) 
0.0082 
(0.0059) 
age45more_m -0.6259***   
(0.2000) 
f -0.0920***    
(0.0323) 
f -0.0763***   
(0.0276) 
0.0154***    
(0.0058) 
age25_34_f f -0.1471    
(0.1408) 
f -0.0433     
(0.0426) 
0.0026      
(0.0025) 
-0.0420      
(0.0414) 
age35_44_f f -0.3965***  
(0.1477) 
f -0.1191***      
(0.0463) 
0.0069**      
(0.0029) 
-0.1158***    
(0.0452) 
age45more_f f -0.5738***   
(0.1393) 
f -0.1732***      
(0.0437) 
0.0100      
(0.0030) 
-0.1601***    
(0.0433) 
male_unemployment -4.6979***   
(1.4865) 
f -0.6376***     
(0.2005) 
f -0.5205***   
(0.1648) 
0.1106*** 
(0.0404) 
female_unemployment f -1.07911  
(2.5133) 
f -0.3082      
(0.7178) 
0.0186      
(0.0433) 
-0.2983      
(0.6948) 
childlessthan5 0.2415**   
(0.1228) 
-0.4895***  
(0.0823) 
0.0293**     
(0.0132) 
-0.1558***      
(0.0283) 
0.0304***    
(0.0097) 
-0.1584***    
(0.0279) 
child5to11 0.2860***   
(0.1027) 
-0.0666    
(0.0730) 
0.0355***      
(0.0117) 
-0.0192*      
(0.0213) 
0.0297***    
(0.0093) 
-0.0251      
(0.0207) 
childolderthan12 0.1611*   
(0.0989) 
0.1556**   
(0.0782) 
0.0205*      
(0.0118) 
0.0429**     
(0.0207) 
0.0143      
(0.0097) 
0.0380* 
(0.0200) 
Constant -1.4251***   
(0.3387) 
-0.5671   
(0.3513) 
 
 
(+) marg(m) is the marginal probability of male 
participation,  
marg(f) is the probability of female participation,  
cond(m) is the marginal probability of male 
participation given female participation,  
cond(f) is the probability of female participation 
given male participation 
 
Correlation coefficient 0.3117*** 
(0.0496) 
Likelihood ratio test  35.4947 
(0.0000) 
Log likelihood -1860.2878 
MacFadden R squared 0.1403 
Sample size 2641  
Notes: Constraint mm ed =  is imposed in specification I; 
 *** denotes significance at the 1% level 
 ** denotes significance at the 5% level 
 * denotes significance at the 10% level 
 f indicates the variable is omitted from the regression; Base categories for the age for males   
and females are age18_24_m and age18_24_f respectively 
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In the regression model presented in table 2.3, male labour market participation is sensitive 
to the own wage and to that of their partner while a female’s participation only depends on 
her own wage. Although it is important to note that the effect of the male wage on female 
participation is close to the margin of being statistically significant. For men, an increase in 
either wage has a significant and positive impact on the probability of working on average 
and ceteris paribus. In the male equation, the test of whether the difference between the two 
wage effects is equal to zero yields a chi-square value of 14.22. Therefore, the difference 
between the effects of male and female wages on male participation is statistically 
significant. The marginal effects show that a 10% increase in the male wage results in a 1.7 
percentage point increase in the probability that a male works whereas the same increase in 
the female wage results in an increase of 0.5 of a percentage point. The male elasticity of 
participation with respect to the male wage is equal to 0.19 which is highly inelastic. For 
women, a 10% increase in their own wage increases the probability of participation by 3.9 
percentage points on average and ceteris paribus. The female elasticity of participation with 
respect to her own wage is equal to 0.51 which is again inelastic. This estimate is 
comparable to that computed by Layard et al (1980), Greenlagh (1980) and Main and Reilly 
(1996). This might suggest that female elasticities of participation with respect to their own 
wage have remained relatively stable over the last two decades. Finally, a test of the 
hypothesis that the impact of the male wage on male participation is equal to the impact of 
the female wage on female participation yields a chi square statistic of 0.33 which means 
that the hypothesis cannot be rejected. This means that own wage effects are similar across 
gender groups. Regarding cross wage effects; as noted earlier, there exists an asymmetry of 
response as male participation depends on female wages but the reverse effect is 
statistically not different from zero.   
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Income effects are well determined for both males and females. An increase in male or 
female non-labour income decreases the probability of a female working on average and 
ceteris paribus. A hundred pounds increase in male non-labour income reduces the 
probability of working for females by 0.7 percentage points while the same level of increase 
in female non-labour market income reduces the probability of working by 3.3 percentage 
points on average and ceteris paribus. The elasticity of female participation with respect to 
male and female non-labour income is equal to -0.02 and -0.08 respectively. The estimate is 
different to that of Greenlagh (1980) but comparable to that reported by Layard et al 
(1980). 
An increase of a hundred pounds in pooled income reduces the probability that a man 
works by 0.9 percentage points on average and ceteris paribus. The elasticity of male 
participation with respect to pooled income is equal to -0.05. An individual’s age also 
impacts on participation. For men, being older than 45 reduces the probability of 
participation by 9.2 percentage points compared to being aged between 18 and 24. This 
effect is much larger for women as being older than 45 reduces the probability of female 
employment by 17.3 percentage points. This could perhaps indicate a cohort effect as older 
generations of women are less likely to be employed. 
The presence of a child aged less than 5 reduces the conditional and marginal probabilities 
of female participation by 16 percentage points. This result confirms the empirical finding 
usually detected in the literature namely that employment rates for women with preschool 
children are lower than those of all other women. Having a child aged between 5 and 
eleven also reduces conditional and marginal probabilities of female participation but by a 
smaller amount of 1.9 percentage points. However, the presence of a child aged more than 
12 does not affect female participation. The reverse is observed for men as their probability 
of participation increases with the presence of children of all ages.  
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The local level female unemployment rate does not seem to impact on married women 
employment whereas the male unemployment rate does negatively affect male participation 
in the labour market. A one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate reduces 
participation by 0.64 of one percentage points. The negative impact of male unemployment 
on the probability of a male working is larger than on the probability of a male working 
given his wife is working. This is attributable to the fact that a wife in employment might 
provide her husband with a network of opportunities in the labour market, though this is 
fairly conjectural.  
A comparison of marginal and conditional probabilities for most of the other variables 
reveal, for both gender groups, that they have a similar impact on the probability that an 
individual is working and the probability that an individual is working given their partner is. 
A notable exception is the impact of the female wage on the probability of male 
participation which is halved in the case of conditional participation given the wage could 
proxy for employment status.  
Before looking at the impact of distribution factors in the model, a recursive model of a 
couple’s labour market participation is estimated. Results are reported in Appendix 2 (table 
A2.5). A quick overview of the finding is done here. However, conclusions should not be 
drawn as it is unclear whether identification is possible in this framework. In the model 
where male employment status is included in the female participation equation, the own 
wage effect does not seem to be affected but the impact of the male wage on female 
participation becomes better determined. Controlling for male employment status, an 
increase in the male wage reduces the probability of female participation in the labour 
market. If the male is employed, this increases the probability that his wife will work as 
well. Interestingly, the correlation coefficient is now negative. In other words, the 
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unobservables that affect male and female participation are negatively correlated once male 
participation is taken into account.  
Table 2.4(a): Bivariate Probit Estimates (with distribution factors)  
Dependent variables: male_working and female_working 
 Male Female Male Female Male Female 
male_wage 1.2679*** 
(0.1374) 
-0.1627 
(0.1153) 
1.2571*** 
(0.1371) 
-0.2849* 
(0.1544) 
1.2650*** 
(0.1379) 
-0.1697  
(0.1155) 
female_wage 0.3484*** 
(0.1337) 
1.3480*** 
(0.1196) 
0.3969*** 
(0.1321) 
1.3480*** 
(0.1507) 
0.3463*** 
(0.1337) 
1.3505***  
(0.1199) 
male_income f -0.2615*** 
(0.0672) 
f -0.2717*** 
(0.0669) 
f -0.2668***   
(0.0673) 
female_income f -1.1545*** 
(0.1127) 
f -1.1446*** 
(0.1123) 
f -1.1493***   
(0.1124) 
couple_income -0.6467*** 
(0.0608) 
f -0.6398*** 
(0.0697) 
f -0.9311***   
(0.0553) 
f 
age25_34_m -0.1319 
(0.2123) 
f -0.1566 
(0.1412) 
f -0.1391 
(0.2092) 
f 
age35_44_m -0.2998 
(0.2176) 
f -0.4045*** 
(0.1480) 
f -0.2425 
(0.2181) 
f 
age45more_m -0.5220*** 
(0.2075) 
f -0.5716*** 
(0.1394) 
f -0.5214*** 
(0.2031) 
f 
age25_34_f f -0.2882*   
(0.1559) 
f -0.1566 
(0.1412) 
f -0.1546   
(0.1422) 
age35_44_f f  -0.5292**   
(0.1605) 
f -0.4045*** 
(0.1480) 
f -0.4130*   
(0.1509) 
age45more_f f -0.6950***   
(0.1522) 
f -0.5716*** 
(0.1394) 
f -0.5954***   
(0.1453) 
male_ 
unemployment 
-4.9543***  
(1.4935) 
f -6.5100*** 
(1.4397) 
f -4.8234***  
(1.4913) 
f 
Female_ 
unemployment 
f -1.4670   
(2.5203) 
f -1.6752 
(2.5822) 
f -1.0969  
(2.5151) 
childlessthan5 0.2623** 
(0.1244) 
-0.6690***   
(0.0815) 
0.2237* 
(0.1174) 
-0.4913*** 
(0.0823) 
0.2914**   
(0.1245) 
-0.4899***   
(0.0825) 
child5to11 0.2844*** 
(0.1033) 
-0.1346*   
(0.0715) 
0.3573*** 
(0.0991) 
-0.0709 
(0.0732) 
0.2970***   
(0.1034) 
-0.0685*   
(0.0731) 
childolderthan1
2 
0.1686* 
(0.0993) 
0.1140   
(0.0770) 
0.1084 
(0.0954) 
0.1549** 
(0.0783) 
0.1621*   
(0.0995) 
0.1564**   
(0.0783) 
sex ratio (1) † 
 
sex ratio (2) †† 
 
-0.3383***   
(0.1255) 
f  
-0.2811***   
(0.1112) 
f 
f  
 
-0.1009 
(0.4822) 
f  
 
-0.2159 
(0.4976) 
f  
 
f  
f  
 
f  
age_difference 
 
f f f f -1.0272***  
(0.4229) 
-0.3281 
(0.3489) 
female_older f f f f 0.0018 
(0.1447) 
-0.0118 
(0.1073) 
Constant -1.0131**   
(0.3698) 
-0.2550***   
(0.3442) 
-1.2872** 
(0.6542) 
 
-1.2063** 
(0.6043) 
 
-1.3781***   
(0.3411) 
-0.6832**   
(0.2898) 
Correlation 
 coefficient 
  
0.3157*** 
(0.0551) 
0.3217*** 
(0.0550) 
0.3114*** 
(0.0497) 
 135 
 
Likelihood  
ratio test  
33.7113 
(0.0000) 
35.2934 
(0.0000) 
35.3127 
(0.0000) 
Log likelihood -1854.1713 -1859.6918 -1855.2605 
McFadden R 
squared 
0.1424 0.1251 0.1404 0.1240 0.1426 0.1238
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1% level; 
 ** denotes significance at the 5% level 
 * denotes significance at the 10% level 
 f indicates the variable is omitted from the regression 
 Base categories for the age for males and females are age18_24_m and age18_24_f 
respectively 
              (†)   ratio of the number of males whose age falls in the age category of the husband over  
 the number of females whose age falls in the ages fall in the category of the wife in a 
particular county. 
                 (††)ratio of the number of males whose age falls in the age category of the husband 
                over the number of females whose age falls in that same age category.  
 The marginal effects for the regressions models displayed in table 2.4(a) are reported in table 
A2.4 (appendix 2) 
 
The next phase of the analysis consists in introducing distribution factors to the bivariate 
model discussed above. The results are reported in table 2.4 above. First, the Mac Fadden 
R squared computed for the male and female regressions with the sex ratio are found to be 
equal to 0.1424 and 0.1251 and thus broadly similar to the ones reported for the basic 
specification. Adding the sex ratio to the male regression model does not alter the impact 
of other variables. The coefficient on the dummy for a woman aged between 25 and 44 
becomes better determined and shows that being in this age category reduces the 
probability of being in employment compared to women aged between 18 and 24. The 
impact of the presence of a child aged less than 5 increases in magnitude. The sex ratio is 
significant in both male and female regressions. While this could again question the 
legitimacy of the early neoclassical model as the latter does not recognize the role of 
outside variables on labour market participation, the estimated signs on the variable do not 
seem to provide evidence that it is a good distribution factor as it impacts negatively on 
both male and female participation. This means that as the number of males relative to 
females increases in a certain age category, male and female probabilities of participation in 
the labour market both decrease. With respect to females, the direction of the impact is 
consistent with a bargaining interpretation. If there are more men relative to women, 
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women have more power and more access to resources, which leads to an income effect 
that reduces participation in the labour market. This is not the case for men. Given the sex 
ratio is assumed indicative of some measure of power, it should have affected men 
positively. Sex ratios are likely to reflect competition in both the labour and marriage 
markets for a particular age category. However, the unemployment rate is taken into 
account in the regression so the result is unlikely to suggest evidence in favour of the 
existence of a discouraged worker effect. The second measure of sex ratio is found not to 
be significant in the regression model. This shows the sensitivity of results to the definition 
of variables. Introducing the age difference to the basic model does not impact on 
estimates (apart from the coefficient on the dummy for women aged between 25 and 44 
which becomes better determined). The age difference is found to have a negative impact 
on the husband’s probability of working and no impact on the wife’s. The older the 
husband compared to his wife the less likely he is to participate in the labour market. 
Again, this impact could be consistent with a bargaining interpretation as older men can be 
considered to have greater bargaining power and thus lower labour market participation. 
However, the fact that it does not affect the wife questions this interpretation since 
bargaining measures (as discussed in the first chapter) are expected to have opposite and 
significant effects on both spouses. An alternative explanation is that this effect might also 
capture the effects of early retirement for men or accumulation of income that allows them 
to retire or the fact that for health reasons, they stop working while their wives have to 
continue to do so. Unlike in the first chapter where it was found to affect female hours of 
work, the binary variable indicating if a wife is older than her husband is found not to have 
an impact on male and female participation decisions. The next table (2.4b) reports the 
results of a model with the two significant distribution factors, age difference and sex ratio, 
introduced collectively. 
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Table 2.4(b): Bivariate Probit Estimates (with distribution factors)  
    
Dependent variables: male_working and female_working  
     
 Male 
 
Female Marg(m)
 
Marg(f) Cond(m) 
 
cond(f)
male_wage 1.2683*** 
(0.1379) 
-0.1655
(0.1156) 
0.1690***
(0.0198) 
-0.0472
(0.0329) 
0.1408*** 
(0.0173) 
-0.0748**
(0.0321) 
female_wage 0.3326*** 
(0.1342) 
1.3511***
(0.1200) 
0.0443***
(0.0178) 
0.3852***
(0.0340) 
0.0137 
(0.0155) 
0.3656***
(0.0328) 
male_income f -0.2644***
(0.0674) 
f -0.0754***
(0.0192) 
0.0044*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.0730***   
(0.0186) 
female_income f -1.1517***
(0.1128) 
f -0.3284***
(0.0327) 
0.0192*** 
(0.0038) 
-0.3182***   
(0.0318) 
couple_income -0.6526*** 
(0.0609) 
f -0.0869***
(0.0091) 
f -0.0710*** 
(0.0081) 
0.0149***    
(0.0032) 
age25_34_m -0.1247 
(0.2116) 
f -0.0118
(0.0313) 
f -0.0144 
(0.0259) 
0.0030      
(0.0052) 
age35_44_m -0.2506 
(0.2184) 
f -0.0362
(0.0337) 
f -0.0295 
(0.0280) 
0.0060      
(0.0056) 
age45more_m -0.4988** 
(0.2070) 
f -0.0704**
(0.0317) 
f -0.0585** 
(0.0267) 
0.0118**    
(0.0055) 
age25_34_f f -0.2959*
(0.1574) 
f -0.0893*
(0.0499) 
0.0050* 
(0.0028) 
-0.0869*     
(0.0488) 
age35_44_f f -0.5279***
(0.1606) 
f -0.1606***
(0.0513) 
0.0090*** 
(0.0031) 
-0.1565***   
(0.0504) 
age45more_f f -0.6887***
(0.1525) 
f -0.2093***
(0.0483) 
0.0117*** 
(0.0032) 
-0.2042***   
(0.0475) 
male_ 
unemployment 
-4.9357*** 
(1.4947) 
f -0.6588***
(0.1978) 
f -0.5372*** 
(0.1629) 
0.1129***    
(0.0401) 
female_ 
unemployment 
f -1.4858
(2.5207) 
f -0.4236
(0.7187) 
0.0248 
(0.0422) 
-0.4105      
(0.6963) 
childlessthan5 0.2889** 
(0.1250) 
-0.5081***
(0.0831) 
0.0336***
(0.0126) 
-0.1620***
(0.0287) 
0.0336*** 
(0.0092) 
-0.1655***   
(0.0283) 
child5to11 0.2919*** 
(0.1036) 
-0.0775
(0.0733) 
0.0355***
(0.0115) 
-0.0224
(0.0214) 
0.0298 
(0.0092) 
-0.0281      
(0.0209) 
childolderthan12 0.1652* 
(0.0996) 
0.1613**
(0.0784) 
0.0206*
(0.0116) 
0.0443**
(0.0207) 
0.0144 
(0.0095) 
0.0394      
(0.0199) 
sex_ratio (1)† 
 
age_difference 
-0.1805 
(0.1514) 
-0.7664* 
(0.4028) 
-0.3016**
(0.1319) 
0.0895 
(0.3157) 
-0.0249
(0.0205) 
-0.1021* 
(0.0536) 
-0.0860**
(0.0376) 
0.0255 
(0.0900) 
-0.0146 
(0.0165) 
-0.0849** 
(0.0436) 
-0.0792**    
(0.0362) 
0.04223     
(0.0867) 
 
Constant -1.1604*** 
(0.3789)    
-0.2353   
(0.3522)     
  
Correlation 
 coefficient  
0.3080*** 
(0.0500) 
  
Likelihood  
ratio test  
34.2296 
(0.0000) 
  
Log likelihood -1852.2106   
McFadden R 
squared 
0.1432      0.1253     
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1% level 
 ** denotes significance at the 5% level 
 * denotes significance at the 10% level; 
 f  indicates that the variable is omitted from the regression 
Base categories for the age for males and females are age18_24_m and age18_24_f respectively 
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When the sex ratio and the age difference, each significant when introduced on their own 
in the male regression model, are both introduced in the latter, the sex ratio is no longer 
statistically significant and the negative impact of the age difference reduces in magnitude. 
A closer examination of the data reveals that there is a positive correlation (0.52) between 
the sex ratio and the age difference variable. This is not surprising as the sex ratio is defined 
as the number of males whose age falls within the age category of the husband over the 
number of females whose age falls within the category of the wife. For females, only the 
sex ratio remains significant and does not change in magnitude compared to when it is 
introduced on its own, which might indicate that the sex ratio represents an impact that is 
different from the one it has on men.   
The last variable to be introduced in the model is the mother-in-law’s working status. On 
the whole, the impact of other variables remains unchanged in either the male or female 
regression models, although the impact of the male wage on female participation is now 
significant at the ten percent significance level. A 10% increase in the male wage, reduces 
the probability of a wife working by 0.5 percentage points with a larger impact of 0.8 
percentage points conditional on her husband working. A test of equality of cross-wage 
effects, which was not conducted earlier as all of the effects were not statistically 
significant, reveals that the hypothesis of effects of partner’s wage being equal and opposite 
in sign cannot be rejected (chi-square value of 1.60 at one degree of freedom).  
Regarding the introduction of the mother-in-law’s work status, it is found that a woman 
whose husband’s mother worked when he was aged 14 is more likely to be in employment 
herself compared to women who have a mother-in-law who was not working. Having a 
mother-in-law that was working when her husband was aged 14 increases the probability 
that a woman is working by 7 percentage points on average and ceteris paribus. The impact is 
much smaller than the one obtained by Fernandez et al (2004) on US data but larger than 
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the one obtained by Kawagushi and Miyazaki (2009) using Japanese data. However, the 
variable does not seem to have an impact on male participation. As mentioned previously, 
male preferences can be one of the explanations underlying this result. Indeed, men who 
grew up with a working mother might have a greater propensity to accept women’s 
employment. Furthermore, assortative mating stipulates that spouses are likely to share 
similar views and preferences. Freud (1927) cited in Fernandez et al (2004) predicts that 
men will probably marry women that are similar to their mothers. One possibility that is 
not mentioned by Fernandez et al (2004) is that men might have suffered from the fact that 
their mother was working and will therefore discourage their wife from doing. This 
hypothesis is not supported by the data. Finally, one last explanation for the impact of a 
mother-in-law’s work behaviour on her daughter-in-law’s labour supply can be that men 
with working mothers are used to housework and that this productivity makes it easier for 
their wives to join the labour market.  
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Table 2.5: Bivariate Probit Estimates (with mother-in-law working status) 
 
 
Male Female Marg(m) Marg(f) Cond(m) Cond(f) 
male_wage 1.2508***   
(0.1373) 
-0.1892*   
(0.1162) 
0.1696*** 
(0.0199) 
-0.0537*     
(0.0330) 
0.1422***    
(0.0174) 
-0.0809***    
(0.0321) 
female_wage 0.3903***   
(0.1326) 
1.3531***   
(0.1199) 
0.0529*** 
(0.0179) 
0.3806***    
(0.0428) 
0.0204      
(0.0156) 
0.3630***    
(0.0327) 
male_income f -0.2650*** 
(0.0675) 
f -0.0753***    
(0.0192) 
0.0071***    
(0.0016) 
-0.0729***    
(0.0186) 
female_income f -1.1451***   
(0.1125) 
f -0.3253***    
(0.0325) 
0.0251***    
(0.0043) 
-0.3148***    
(0.0316) 
couple_income -0.6390***   
(0.0607) 
f -0.0866***    
(0.0092) 
f -0.1062***    
(0.0090) 
0.0148***    
(0.0032) 
age25_34_m -0.2271    
(0.2123) 
f -0.0338      
(0.0346) 
f -0.0281     
(0.0292) 
-0.0056      
(0.0056) 
age35_44_m -0.3558   
(0.2210) 
f -0.0532      
(0.0366) 
f -0.0443      
(0.0310) 
0.0088      
(0.006) 
age45more_m -0.6517***   
(0.2075) 
f -0.0961***    
(0.0337) 
f -0.0801***    
(0.0290) 
0.0158***    
(0.0059) 
age25_34_f f -0.1631   
(0.1425) 
f -0.0133      
(0.0410) 
0.0028      
(0.0025) 
-0.0464      
(0.0420) 
age35_44_f f -0.3983***    
(0.1498) 
f -0.1191***    
(0.0467) 
0.0069**     
(0.0029) 
-0.1158***    
(0.0456) 
age45more_f f -0.5515*** 
(0.1422) 
f -0.1654***    
(0.0444) 
0.0095***    
(0.0030) 
-0.1610***    
(0.0434) 
male_ 
unemploymenr
-4.7193***   
(1.4880) 
f -0.6399***    
(0.2005) 
f -0.5247***    
(0.1655) 
0.1090***    
(0.0399) 
female_ 
unemployment 
f -1.9737  
(2.4704) 
f -0.2272      
(0.7162) 
0.0372      
(0.0468) 
-0.5462      
(0.6836) 
childlessthan5 0.2382**   
(0.1229) 
-0.5025***   
(0.0826) 
0.0290**     
(0.0133) 
-0.1596***    
(0.0284) 
0.0331***    
(0.0095) 
-0.1619***    
(0.0280) 
child5to11 0.2837***   
(0.1013) 
-0.0782   
(0.0733) 
0.0352***    
(0.0117) 
-0.0225      
(0.0214) 
0.0382***    
(0.0090) 
-0.0281      
(0.0208) 
childolderthan
12 
0.1640*   
(0.0991) 
0.1675**   
(0.0785) 
0.0208*      
(0.0118) 
0.0457**     
(0.0206) 
0.0136      
(0.0428) 
0.0407**     
(0.0198) 
motherinlaw_ 
work 
0.0424   
(0.0806) 
0.2680***   
(0.0627) 
0.0058      
(0.0110) 
0.0765***    
(0.0179) 
0.0001      
(0.0090) 
0.0731***    
(0.0172) 
motherinlaw_
misc 
-0.0675   
(0.1365) 
0.0646   
(0.1098) 
-0.0095      
(0.0201) 
0.0180      
(0.0298) 
-0.0090      
(0.0167) 
0.0189      
(0.0284) 
Constant -1.3911***  
(0.3515) 
-0.8307*   
(0.2948) 
    
Correlation 
 coefficient ` 
0.3185*** 
(0.0554) 
   
Likelihood  
ratio test  
34.0872 
(0.0000) 
   
Log likelihood -1850.6218    
Mcfadden R 0.1413 0.1282     
Notes *** denotes significance at the 1% level 
 ** denotes significance at the 5% level 
 * denotes significance at the 10% level 
 f indicates the variable is omitted from the regression 
 Base categories for the age for males and females are age18_24_m and age18_24_f 
respectively, for the mother-in-law work status, the base category is: motherinlaw_not_work 
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7 Concluding Comments 
This chapter has used a bivariate probit framework to model the labour market 
participation decisions of spouses in a couple adding further evidence to a relatively small 
research literature. Indeed, a number of methodological and theoretical issues complicate 
the modelling of participation decisions of couples. This chapter has purposefully 
overlooked the latter and focused on the estimation of an empirical specification. The latter 
has revealed interesting results. First, it is found that the labour market participation 
decisions of spouses are interlinked, whereas their hours of work do not seem to be (see 
chapter one). The traditional determinants of labour supply namely own wage and non-
labour income remain important determinants of employment decisions for both gender 
groups. This framework allows for a testing of the equality of wage effects. The difference 
in the impacts of male and female wages on male and female participation is not statistically 
different from zero. As in the case of hours of work, wage effects do not seem to depend 
on the definition of non-labour income used. However, the unitary model does not seem 
to provide a fully satisfactory framework of analysis for labour market participation as one 
of its restrictions (income pooling) does not hold for females. In contrast to the findings in 
chapter one, the sex ratio is found to have an impact on male and female participation 
when introduced on its own. However, it is not clear whether the latter can be interpreted 
as a proxy for bargaining as it impacts on both male and female participation in the same 
way. Age difference is found to impact on male participation, however, as in the case of sex 
ratios, it needs to impact on both labour supplies to be considered an appropriate 
distribution factor.  
In the second part of the analysis, one further variable, the mother-in-law working status 
when the husband was aged 14 is introduced to the model of a couple’s labour supply. It is 
found to negatively impact on wives’ participation suggesting that “cultural” parameters 
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also play a role in explaining behaviour. This result demonstrates that bargaining is not the 
only issue missing from traditional studies of labour supply behaviour. The related issue of 
cultural preferences is also likely to play a role in the determination of behaviour. This 
aspect is the subject of the study of the third chapter of the thesis.    
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Chapter 3   
Gender-role attitudes and labour 
market behaviour of  British 
couples 
1 Introduction 
A key finding of the last chapter was that a wife’s decision to work is influenced by the 
employment status of her husband’s mother when he was 14 years old. As stated in chapter 
two, Fernandez et al (2004) argue that one possible explanation for this result is that men, 
whose mothers worked when they were young, might have developed preferences 
concerning gender roles that make them more likely to have a working wife.  
Attitudes, beliefs and social norms are not normally accounted for in economic models as 
they are “considered to be rather ‘fuzzy’ variables, whose existence is often recognized but 
rarely quantified” (Fernandez et al (2004), p.1296). There exists, however, an important 
literature on gender roles in sociology. This chapter’s aim is to explore whether including 
variables that capture an individual’s beliefs on the appropriate role of women in the labour 
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market in a standard neoclassical model of labour supply enriches our understanding of the 
mechanisms governing a couple’s labour market behaviour.   
This chapter addresses two research questions. First, an attempt is made to identify the 
main determinants of attitudes of husbands and wives towards a woman’s role in the 
labour market in Great Britain. This is done using a bivariate ordered probit model, which 
has rarely been applied in the empirical literature and certainly not in the current context. 
In doing so, measures of spousal attitudes are constructed. They are then introduced into 
the basic bivariate probit model used in the last chapter in order to address the second, and 
primary, research question, which is to assess the extent to which a husband’s and wife’s 
attitudes towards a woman’s role in the labour market influence a couple’s labour market 
participation behaviour.  
2 Background 
An analysis of attitudes towards gender roles cannot be complete without a definition of 
the term “gender roles”, as well as a brief history of gender roles in the home and the 
labour market and the current challenges in this area. These topics have been treated by 
many disciplines and cannot possibly be done justice in just one thesis chapter. However, a 
concise review of the various issues provides a necessary background within which to 
address the research questions posed in this study. 
2.1 A definition of gender roles 
Differences between men and women have been addressed in several ways by academics 
from various disciplines. Research on what has been labelled “sex differences”, that deals 
partly with anatomical, physiological and hormonal issues but also with differences in 
emotions, intellectual and cultural traits, has been conducted mainly by biologists, 
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sexologists, psychologists and anorthropologists (Lipman-Blumen and Tickamyer, 1975). 
According to Holter (1970), another concept, “sex differentiation” has widely, but not 
exclusively, been used in sociology to tackle women’s position in society, the division of 
labour and the difference in power between men and women, often referred to as “sex 
stratification” in the literature. One aspect of differentiation concerns norms that govern 
the behaviour of men and women and the concept of gender roles. As noted by Holter 
(1970):   
A role is the sum of norms directed towards a person occupying a given 
position. Sex roles, or gender roles, are those norms which are applied to a man 
because he is a man and, or to a woman because she is a woman (p.54) 
As pointed out by Lipman-Blumen and Tickamyer (1975), research on gender roles is 
relatively recent but the latter term does not seem to have a unique definition. All of the 
terms “sex”, “sex role”, “gender”, “gender identity” and “gender role” have tended to be 
used interchangeably in the literature but distinguishing among the latter can be useful.  
Although it is clear that there exists more or less subtle differences of definition between all 
the notions mentioned above, it is beyond the scope of this chapter, and probably of 
economics itself, to look closely into this issue. The terms “gender roles” and “sex roles” 
are used interchangeably in this chapter as done by Holter (1970) in the definition above.  
The author also provides a further definition that is required for the present analysis. She 
labels gender roles as “traditional” if they imply a high differentiation in roles of men and 
women and “egalitarian” in the reverse situation. Moreover, Holter (1970) states: “the use 
of the terms “traditional” and “egalitarian” is based on the fact that, for centuries, the roles 
of men and women have been sharply segregated in the Western world” (p.58). Before 
providing a brief summary of the evolution of gender roles, it is important to note that 
even though this analysis and the literature in general tend to consider gender roles mainly 
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from the perspective of women, men also face challenges with respect to their role as 
father and husband (Scott et al, 1998). 
In his article on the evolution of gender roles, Davis (1984) argues that in ‘hunting and 
gathering societies’, which have existed for almost all of human history; there was a basic 
division of labour by sex. Males went hunting and women gathered and prepared food and 
hunted smaller animals. Mothers could not leave their dwelling easily as they had to care 
for their progeny. Later on, in agrarian societies, most men and women’s employment was 
compatible with their status of parent as they were working inside the home and on the 
land nearby. This was changed by the advent of the Industrial Revolution that made men 
leave the house to work in factories, shops and firms while their wives stayed at home to 
take care of the children and various domestic tasks. Men thus started to be less involved in 
domestic work and they became the link between their wives and the outside world. Men 
were “breadwinners” and women “homemakers”, an arrangement, which is often referred 
to as “traditional”. This organization of the household is disappearing in industrial 
countries and being replaced by what has been labelled the “egalitarian system”. 
According to Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (1995), there are five factors that have helped 
women free themselves from traditional tasks. First, women nowadays have a longer life 
expectancy which means that the amount of time dedicated to child rearing is now 
relatively shorter leaving room for other activities. Second, contraception and abortion 
have given women more control over their fertility. Third, increased individualization has 
reduced the duties of the nuclear family towards extended kin, neighbours and friends. 
Fourth, the increased divorce rate has increased female vulnerability and the need for 
independent sources of support. Finally, women have been increasingly encouraged to join 
the labour market when they have become the equal of men in terms of education.  
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Davis (1984) argues that the “egalitarian system” which is slowly replacing the 
“breadwinner model” is not free from problems. It has no normative guidelines so couples 
learn what to expect from each other through experience. Also, and more importantly, 
“although it brings the wife back into economic production, it does so outside the home 
and thus in a way incompatible with child raising” (p.413). The author acknowledges that 
while men as well as women face the incompatibility between work and childcare, it is the 
latter that have suffered most from it because they have been primarily responsible for 
domestic tasks in previous systems of division of labour.  
There exists an important literature on the impact of a mother’s employment on children. 
Goldscheider and Waite (1991) note that in the early 1960s, the notion that children of 
working mothers suffered from severe psychological problems was taught in courses on 
child development studies. Theories of “maternal deprivation” were however proved to be 
unfounded in later studies. As pointed out in Blau et al (2006), there are many factors other 
than a mother’s employment that affect children’s outcomes among which: family 
resources, children’s own characters, the role played by their father in their education and 
the quality of their alternate care. Moreover, there are many parameters that define a child’s 
welfare. However, Hochschild (1989) reveals that women who were interviewed for her 
book, The Second Shift, felt more responsible than their spouse for the home and their 
children even when he helped with housework. She adds “women felt torn between one 
sense of urgency and another, between the need to soothe a child’s fear of being left at day 
care, and the need to show the boss she is “serious” at work” (p.8).  
Hochschild (1989) also investigates another issue that is closely related to the emergence of 
the egalitarian household, which is that of housework. This area has been widely explored 
from both a sociology and economics perspective. As discussed by Harkness (2003), an 
important issue to consider is whether the change in gender roles in the labour market also 
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brought about a change in gender roles within households. Husbands of working wives 
may perform a larger share of the housework or time spent on the latter might have 
decreased by relying on purchased household help or time saving domestic appliances. A 
third possibility is that women nowadays carry a “double burden”. The author investigates 
these issues for the United Kingdom and her results will be discussed in the next section. 
She refers to a further important issue to consider in examining male and female shares of 
housework which is their relative earnings, as the latter can be a proxy for their bargaining 
power. The issue of measuring power relations between spouses has been extensively 
debated in the first chapter, at least from an economics perspective. Even though gender 
roles and decision-making in the household are closely related issues with egalitarian 
spouses being more likely to have an equal say on matters related to the family (Scanzoni 
and Fox, 1980), it is beyond the scope of this chapter to unveil the complex mechanisms of 
this interaction. Only two specific aspects of the various issues mentioned above are 
addressed in the present analysis. First, the potential determinants of a couple’s attitudes 
towards male and female roles in the workplace and in the home in Britain are examined. 
Then, the question of whether these attitudes influence labour market behaviour is 
subsequently addressed. 
2.2 Gender roles in the United Kingdom 
The incorporation of questions regarding gender roles in British surveys is not recent. 
While this chapter does not investigate whether there has been a change in British attitudes 
in the last half century, a quick overview of British attitudes towards female employment is 
nevertheless useful.26 Dex (1988) reviews the main surveys that have looked at attitudes 
towards female employment in the last 50 years. Among the earlier ones, the author 
                                                 
26 For a discussion of attitude change in Great Britain see Scott (1999). 
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mentions the 1943 Social Survey that explored working women’s opinions on female 
employment in order to evaluate how many women that had started working during the 
Second World War would remain employed after it. The majority of women then did not 
approve married women’s employment irrespective of their age. She also refers to another 
survey, conducted in 1965, which investigated the potential of women as additional 
members of the workforce in a period of economic growth. The 1965 Government Social 
Survey; A Survey of Women’s Employment by Hunt (1968), shows that the majority of women 
approved married women working if they have no children but considered that women 
with children ought to stay at home. There were differences of opinions between younger 
non-working women and older ones. Dex (1988) however argues that samples are not 
directly comparable. Even if there are indications that acceptance of married women’s 
employment has grown between the 1940s and the 1970s, the author advises against 
making generalisations. In depth analysis and comparisons are possible for data from the 
1980s. The Women and Employment Survey was conducted mainly in order to evaluate the 
impact of unemployment on women during recessions. Martin and Roberts (1984) cited in 
Dex (1988), reveal that a majority of women approved married women’s employment but 
the latter was rarely considered a priority. Attitudes were found to depend on an 
individual’s age, education and work status. Husbands were found to be more traditional 
than wives as 17% of the former agreed that a woman’s place is in the home compared to 
11% for the latter.  
The British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) is a further source of information on attitudes and 
was first started in 1983. It has been conducted every year since then and its yearly reports 
constitute an important source of information on attitudes of British people. Scott et al 
(1998) use data from the 1994 International Social Survey Programme to analyse British 
gender-role attitudes. While the belief that mothers with young children should be 
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housewives was commonly held, many also acknowledged the importance of female work 
as a means for their independence and a financial support to the household. Using the 
BSA, Crompton et al (2003) report that the percentage of men and women, who agree with 
the statement that a man’s job is to earn money and a woman’s job is to look after the 
home, has fallen from 26% and 21% respectively in 1994 to 20% and 15% respectively in 
2002. They argue that while attitudes have continued to become more egalitarian in the 
1990s, individuals state more traditional views as soon as they are interrogated about more 
specific scenarios. Indeed, Alwin et al (1992) state that while British women have tended to 
reject the traditional view of separate roles for women and men in the home and the 
marketplace, they have not fully accepted that their family will be happier if they work. The 
authors attribute this discrepancy to the “double shift” mentioned previously. In her study 
of housework division among British couples, Harkness (2003) confirms that women do 
suffer from a strain on their time. The author states that: “the assumption that children 
affect only women’s time use remains largely true” (p.168). This often pushes women into 
part-time work or even into leaving the labour market. 
3 Theoretical and Empirical Review  
There are two different but closely related issues that need to be considered in order to 
address the two research questions examined in this chapter. This section starts by an 
overview of the theoretical and empirical research on gender-role attitudes. In the second 
part, a framework is developed to investigate the impact of gender-role attitudes on a 
couple’s labour market participation.   
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3.1 Gender-role attitudes  
An individual’s attitude and opinion has been mainly explored in the psychology and 
sociology fields but their popularity as a subject of study has fluctuated over the years. 
There are a number of reasons why researchers have been uneasy about analysing attitudes. 
Some academics have questioned the reliability of opinion surveys and the usefulness of 
attitude scales. These criticisms were validated by studies that found mixed results 
regarding the question of whether there exists a link between attitudes and behaviour 
(Dex,1988). 
Hakim (2003) provides further explanations of why social scientists have been “slow to 
recognize the importance of attitudes and values as causal factors in their own right” 
(p.339). These include the fact that sociologists tend to emphasize the role of social 
structural factors and have hesitated to seek alternative routes. Furthermore, attitudes are 
relatively “invisible” and can be “volatile”. The author also highlights a crucial point in the 
study of attitudes that has often been overlooked in the literature. She cites Hofstede (1980; 
1991), as the first researcher to have pointed out that approval/disapproval of general 
statements on public beliefs is not a reflection of choice and personal preferences. This 
distinction has been increasingly acknowledged in the sociological literature. Hakim (2003) 
states that many secondary analysts have overlooked this point in the study of gender roles, 
using general attitudes as proxies for personal preferences, which might explain why a 
number have failed to find a correlation between attitudes and behaviour.27 She advocates 
the use of personal work orientations instead of public morality questions in the study of 
individual behaviour. However, the author approves the use of general gender-role 
attitudes to study the national trends and compare ideologies across countries (Hakim, 
2000).  
                                                 
27 See Kraus (1995).  
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While the point of Hakim (2000; 2003) is legitimate, it does not reduce the significance of 
the current study. First, the weak relationship between gender-role attitudes and behaviour 
can be due to methodological failures as acknowledged by Hakim (2000). Second, for 
economists, the distinction between attitudes as reflecting a society’s collective values or an 
individual preference can be seen as secondary since neither has been incorporated in 
economic models. Indeed, in her review of the academic research on attitudes, Dex (1988) 
notes that no reference to economics was made because the latter has not tackled this issue.  
Since there is no definite economic framework to analyse gender-role attitudes, this section 
attempts to provide an overview of the various theoretical considerations that could 
provide a background for the study of attitude formation. The analysis of gender-role 
formation in this chapter is largely empirical, therefore no specific or unique theoretical 
framework is outlined.  
If gender-role attitudes are considered to proxy individual preferences, then economics 
cannot fully address the process of their formation. As stated by DiMaggio (1990): “If 
there is any field of study that economists are willing to relegate to sociology, it is the issue 
of tastes and their formation” (p.123). Kapteyn et al (1980) point to the fact that while 
some economists have acknowledged the variability of tastes for a long time most of them 
have tended to choose one of three approaches to deal with preferences. The first group of 
economists insist on the assumption that tastes are constant. The second adopts the 
pragmatic approach of leaving the study of preferences to other social sciences, and one 
last group acknowledges the variability of preferences and develops models to address this 
type of phenomenon.  
One seminal paper by Stigler and Becker (1977) has often been quoted as evidence that 
tastes can be considered stable over time and do not vary from one individual to another. 
The authors show that this assumption is even consistent with cases that are usually seen as 
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contradicting it, such as addiction, tradition, advertising and fashion. They demonstrate that 
all of these situations can be explained by variations in prices and income. However, 
Becker (1996) himself has recently developed a new framework to account for the 
endogeneity of tastes in economic behaviour. The author acknowledges that: “a large 
number of choices in all societies depend very much on past experiences and social forces” 
(p.4). He incorporates both social capital and personal capital to an individual’s utility. He 
discusses his new model in the context of addictions, habits and social norms. Indeed, the 
latter constitute another reason why tastes have not been tackled by economists as they 
cannot easily deal with the concept of interdependence (DiMaggio, 1990). They tend to 
assume that individual behaviour does not directly depend on the behaviour of others. This 
is why they generally ignore the importance of culture, norms and social structure (Becker 
and Murphy, 2000). In the case where gender-role attitudes are considered to represent 
social norms, as with preferences, economists do not have a framework for an analysis of 
the latter either. For all the reasons outlined above, this chapter does not attempt to 
provide a theoretical model to explain the formation of attitudes. However, a review of 
related concepts is discussed.  
One useful theoretical model to approach the issue of gender is provided by Akerlof and 
Kranton (2000). The paper attempts to expand the understanding of economic outcomes 
by introducing the concept of identity to economic theory. In this framework, the 
individual’s utility depends on their sense of self. With respect to gender for example, each 
individual in society is classified as “man” or “woman” and the fact they act accordingly 
contributes in defining their identity. Defying the prescribed behaviour results in anxiety 
and is equivalent to a loss of utility in the model. Related to the concept of identity is that 
of socialization. The latter is needed to understand the formation of an individual’s beliefs. 
A compact and useful definition of socialization is found in Blau et al (2006): “Socialization 
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is the name given to the process by which the influence of family, friends, teachers and the 
media shapes an individual’s attitudes and behaviour” (p.174). It is through socialization 
that individuals form their ideas of appropriate gender-role behaviour.  
In a series of papers, Bisin and Verdier (1998, 2000, 2001) model the intergenerational 
transmission of cultural traits. Bisin and Verdier (2001) refer to two types of influences on 
children28: socialization by parents, called direct “vertical” socialization and socialization 
outside the family called “oblique” socialization. Cultural transmission is a mixture of both. 
Parents influence the traits acquired by their children and have specific preferences 
regarding the ones they transmit. In the case where the cultural traits that parents want 
their children to acquire are only present among a minority of the population, families will 
spend more resources in socialization. Also, parents are considered to be altruistic in the 
sense that they will transmit certain traits if they believe the latter will benefit their 
offspring. However, parents tend to want their children to inherit traits they prefer. Bisin 
and Verdier (2000) show that in their framework, homogamy in marriage is encouraged 
among cultural minorities, as couples with similar traits are more efficient at socialization 
and preserving particular ethnic and religious traits. While the modelling in this paper is 
undoubtedly innovative in economics, its empirical consequences are not clearly set out.  
While the influence of parents is important in the determination of attitudes towards 
gender roles, variables from an individual’s childhood are not the only potential factors that 
influence the latter. Cronkite (1977) provides a useful framework to analyse the 
determinants of an individual’s attitudes. Her study focuses on couples. Three types of 
variables potentially influence attitude formation in the model she uses. First, male and 
female background characteristics shape male and female gender-role attitudes respectively. 
Second, socioeconomic factors of both spouses influence their own and their partner’s 
                                                 
28 They attribute terminology to Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981).  
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attitudes. Third, both husband and wife’s attitudes are influenced by “family life-cycle 
stages”. Finally, the model takes into account potential influences that the attitudes of the 
husband or wife can have on their partner’s ones. The following section provides a 
discussion of all the potential variables that have been identified as influencing the 
formation of attitudes in the sociological literature. 
Background characteristics:  
There are a number of variables from an individual’s background that can influence their 
view on gender roles. First, gender is highly likely to determine opinions on roles of men 
and women as the latter tend to be more conscious of inequality than the former.29 
Ethnicity can influence gender roles as ethnic minorities might socialize children differently 
than the majority of the population because they have particular traits they want to 
preserve as discussed by Bisin and Verdier (2000) in the model reviewed above. Ethnicity 
can also affect gender roles through situational factors such as racial discrimination that 
might affect employment and job security and thus, indirectly, beliefs about gender roles 
(Cronkite, 1977).30    
Religion and religiosity are also likely to influence individual beliefs. Haller and Hoellinger 
(1994) refer to Weber’s 1984 seminal work The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 
which discussed the influence of religion in a period of increasing capitalism on people’s 
behaviour and ideology. The authors argue that Protestantism and Catholicism are based 
on different values. The former has tended to be “more individualistically minded from its 
beginnings” (p.93). They state that the religious legacy probably still has an impact on 
people nowadays even though they are generally more secular. Religiosity is a related factor 
                                                 
29 See Davis and Robinson (1991) for a review of theories on gender inequality. 
30 For a detailed analysis of the effect of ethnicity on gender roles in the United States see Ransford and 
Miller (1983). 
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that could affect gender roles as it indicates the intensity with which individuals practise 
their religion.    
Education is a further variable that is likely to determine attitudes towards women’s role in 
the labour market. According to Holter (1970), individuals with higher educational 
qualifications are likely to have more egalitarian views because “advanced education entails 
the indoctrination of democratic and humanistic values, and the examination of traditional 
beliefs that are not supported by scientific evidence” (p.65). The author also points out that 
education stresses intellectual capabilities on the one hand, and reduces the importance of 
emotional and physical attributes on which traditional sex segregation has been based.31 
 Vella (1994) looks at the reverse causality between the two variables. He argues that 
gender-role attitudes potentially affect decisions regarding human capital accumulation.  
Finally, and more directly relevant to the notion of socialization, is the impact of childhood 
variables on gender-role attitudes. Parental attributes such as the working behaviour and 
education of an individual’s mother and father are both likely to play an important role in 
the formation of their offspring’s attitudes. Vanfossen (1977) states that educated and/or 
working mothers are likely to have access to more resources and benefit from a higher 
status which might affect their children’s views on women’s role. The power balance 
between parents can also affect their children’s beliefs and even override the influence of 
other variables. If the father is the “boss”, mother’s education and employment status 
might then play a secondary role in the determination of their children’s idea of sex roles.  
Kiecolt and Acock (1988) point out the importance of taking into account family 
disruption, through death or divorce, in the analysis of attitudes towards gender roles. 
Another factor related to family structure is the presence of siblings. Vella (1994) states that 
                                                 
31 For a detailed analysis of the effect of education on gender roles in the United States see Schreiber (1978) 
and Kane (1995). 
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a larger family might lead to the “reinforcement of role model effects through the 
assignment of family tasks” (p.196). Related variables that might affect gender role are birth 
order and the gender of siblings (Tomeh, 1978). 
One variable from an individual’s childhood that is not family-related but that has been 
linked to the formation of gender-role attitudes is the city size the individual was resident 
in. In their analysis of the impact of city size on tolerance of sexual nonconformity, 
Stephan and McMullin (1982) refer to the sociological finding that people in cities tend to 
be more tolerant of abnormal behaviour. A person living in a city during their youth is 
therefore likely to have a more egalitarian gender-role attitude. 
Socioeconomic characteristics: 
This chapter’s aim is to test the potential impact of attitudes on labour supply behaviour. 
According to Molm (1978), while this is a common assumption in the attitudes literature, it 
is not unlikely that working behaviour affects attitudes as well. Such an assumption, she 
states, would be consistent with the theory of cognitive dissonance developed by Festinger 
(1957) that posits that people change their attitudes to make them consistent with their 
behaviour. The reciprocity of effect between gender-role attitudes and labour market 
participation will be discussed in more detail later in the analysis. This section’s aim is only 
to review variables related to employment, which are likely to affect attitudes. 
Thornton et al (1983) posit that work experience is likely to affect female attitudes as it 
widens their interests outside the home. Cronkite (1977) discusses the potential effect of 
wives’ earnings on men’s attitudes. They are likely to welcome additional income to the 
household, but fear this might affect their bargaining power. Women might enjoy greater 
financial independence but might fear to upset their husbands. The potential impact of 
men’s earnings on a couple’s beliefs is that it renders a wife’s work less necessary. 
Vanfossen (1977) sees social class as having a probable influence on sex-role attitudes. 
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Wives of blue-collar workers, because they are more likely to face more difficult conditions, 
might consider that a woman staying at home is fortunate. 
Family lifecycle stages:  
Age is likely to be an important determinant of attitudes towards gender roles. There are 
two different effects of age on attitudes. A lifecycle effect implies that individuals become 
more traditional with time which may be due to lifetime experiences or age itself. A cohort 
effect also leads to more traditional effects among older people but for different reasons. 
Indeed, older individuals may be more traditional than younger ones because they grew up 
in a more traditional environment (Crompton et al, 2003).32  
A number of variables related to marriage have been associated with gender-role attitudes 
among which are marital status and marital duration. Davis and Robinson (1991) report 
that men and women who are married, use the experience of their spouse in order to 
formulate their gender-role attitudes. Finally, the number of children and their age is likely 
to influence an individual’s attitude. Children might make their parents more traditional as 
the latter might suffer from the work/childcare conflict mentioned earlier in the chapter. 
On the other hand, Thornton et al (1983) suggest the opposite can happen if couples 
benefit from the wife’s employment and do not find it harmful to their offspring.   
Before looking at the way these various factors have been analysed in the literature, two 
further issues need to be addressed. First, Brooks and Bolzendhal (2004) mention that the 
reason research on gender roles has not continued to flourish in the 1980s is that it has 
been criticised for focusing solely on background determinants and not on the macro-level 
dimensions of gender. Recently, a number of studies have acknowledged the role played by 
various determinants external to the household and not exclusively relevant to one 
individual. Haller and Hoellinger (1994) look at the potential relationship between gender-
                                                 
32 For an analysis of the relationship between age and family roles see Albrecht et al (1979). 
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role attitudes, on the one hand, and GNP per capita and employment rate, on the other.  
McRae (1999) indicates that high levels of male unemployment might increase support for 
traditional views of gender roles. Cross-country analysis has highlighted the potential 
relevance of the welfare state in the determination of attitudes (see Treas and Windmer 
(2003)). Second, as mentioned earlier, it is important to note that attitudes of spouses might 
be related. According to Holter (1970), if attitudes of spouses are positively correlated, this 
might reflect positive assortative mating, or indicate that one of the spouses has adapted to 
the other’s attitudes. 
As explained earlier, most of the research that has addressed the issue of gender-role 
formation is found in the sociological literature and a minority in economics. A review of 
the main studies that have analysed the determinants of gender-role attitudes is now 
conducted. Mason and Bumpass (1975) analyse the sex-role attitudes of ever-married 
American women under the age of 45 using a 1970 national probability sample. The data 
include responses to 17 statements that tackle various aspects of sex roles. An analysis of 
the correlation between various statements reveals that women do not tend to view all 
aspects of sex roles in the same way. Two attitudes scales are constructed. One reflects 
“core ideology” and the other “equal labor market rights”. Each of these scales is then used 
as a dependent variable in a binary variable regression model. Age and education are both 
found to have an effect on attitudes with the latter having the strongest impact on both 
scales. Religiosity and race are also found to affect both measures of sex-role attitudes 
while age at marriage, marital status and number of children are not. This leads the authors 
to conclude that membership in groups with different ideologies contribute more to the 
formation of attitudes than most demographic variables.  
Cronkite (1977) analyses both the determinants of what she calls “normative preferences 
for family roles” and their trends, using data from the Denver Income Maintenance 
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Experiment (years 1971 and 1972). The author applies confirmatory factor analysis to 
obtain three measures (or factors) of attitudes towards gender roles that represent internal 
differentiation (roles inside the home), external differentiation (roles outside the home) and 
cohesion (responsiveness to emotional needs). She then uses a simultaneous-equation 
model with the attitudes of husbands and wives as dependent variables. The model also 
allows for the potential impact of preferences of one spouse on the preferences of the 
other. Three models, corresponding to each measure of gender roles, are estimated using 
two-stages least squares. Ethnicity is found to significantly affect a man’s view of roles 
inside the home with black men being more traditional than white. It is not found to affect 
male views on the other two dimensions and does not affect female attitudes either. Female 
earnings are found to render male beliefs more traditional in terms of internal 
differentiation but exert the opposite effect on external differentiation. The author states 
that this finding might be due to the fact that men are likely to resent the fact their working 
wives do less housework but welcome the additional income. Male earnings make their 
wives more traditional regarding external differentiation but do not affect the other two. 
Own earnings are not found to significantly affect attitudes for both men and women. 
Being more educated leads men to have less traditional beliefs in terms of internal 
differentiation but has the opposite effect on external differentiation. For a woman, being 
more educated impacts solely on her views on external differentiation causing her to be less 
traditional. Finally, the impact of an individual’s belief on their partner’s is found to be 
positive for both men and women regarding internal differentiation.  
Thornton et al (1983) investigate a number of issues regarding sex-roles using a US sample 
of panel data from the July 1961 birth records of first, second and fourth born white 
children in the Detroit metropolitan area, the mothers of which are interviewed six times 
over an 18-years period. The authors look at the determinants of sex-role attitudes and 
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changes in the latter by estimating a series of regression models. The first one models a 
mother’s 1962 sex-role attitude as a function of all the following variables: age, religion, 
church attendance, own and husband’s education, work before marriage, work after 
marriage until 1962 and the number of children. The authors consider all of these variables 
to be exogenous, as they argue that most of the events they measure have occurred before 
the date at which responses to gender-role statements were collected. Results for this first 
model show that work experience after marriage and before 1962, and the number of 
children in 1962, both positively affect attitudes in 1962. While this result is expected for 
the first of the two variables, it is “contrary to expectations” (p.224) for the second. The 
authors rationalize this finding by saying that many of these women were probably in the 
process of raising families and felt a need for their husband’s help. They cite the strong 
correlation between measures reflecting men’s work and the number of children as 
providing further support for their hypothesis. Other variables are not found to be 
significant. Both religiosity and religious denomination become important between 1962 
and 1977. The 1962 educational level of the husband is found to impact on his wife’s 
attitudes in 1977.  
Thornton et al (1983) also study the consequences of sex role attitudes by examining the 
impact of attitudes held in 1962 on behaviour in 1977 and more specifically education, 
labour force participation, religiosity, fertility and divorce. Attitudes in 1962 are found to 
positively impact on work experience after marriage until 1977, and negatively influence 
fertility in 1977.  Finally, the authors examine intergenerational transmission of preferences 
by estimating separate regression models of attitudes of sons and daughters in 1980 on 
their mother’s attitudes in 1977 and other parental characteristics in 1962 and 1977. Results 
reveal that attitudes are relatively persistent across generations suggesting that parental 
attitudes influence attitudes of their offspring. 
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Morgan and Walker (1983) investigate the determinants of gender-role attitudes using a 
stratified national probability sample of American adult women from 1975. They aggregate 
answers to five questions regarding opinions on female and male roles in the labour market 
into a single continuous variable. The authors use regression analysis to evaluate the impact 
on women’s opinions regarding gender roles, of three categories of variables: labour market 
opportunities, marital and age characteristics and feelings of competence. Labour market 
opportunities include current employment status, occupation and education. Marital and 
age characteristics include marital status, number of children and family income. The third 
category is actually one variable that aggregates answers to a set of questions on an 
individual’s perceived aptitude to deal with certain situations. This measure is one of 
“feelings of personal competence”. The authors find that women with higher levels of 
education, women who are currently employed and those with higher occupational status 
tend to have more liberal views of gender-roles. Age also influences attitudes as older 
women are found to be more traditional. The variation in both the number of children and 
the individual’s marital status does not seem to explain as much of the variation in attitudes 
as other variables. The variable on “feelings of competence” is also found to affect 
opinions on gender roles as having low competence leads to more traditional views, on 
average and ceteris paribus. The authors conclude that even though their model does not fully 
uncover the mechanisms behind attitude formation (as the R-squared is found to be 0.266), 
their results show that women who are the most traditional tend to be those that have the 
least alternatives to staying at home. 
Kiecolt and Acock (1988) evaluate the impact of a number of factors on gender-role beliefs 
with a particular interest in the effect of household type in adolescence. They investigate 
whether mother-headed households or families affected by divorce or death hold less 
traditional views on gender roles. They also analyse the impact of a mother’s employment 
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when the individual was aged six, or 16, or both, on their attitudes. The research is 
conducted using pooled cross-sections from the NORC General Social Surveys from 1972 
to 1986. Three types of beliefs are investigated: attitudes towards women in politics, 
rejection of traditional gender roles and finally; attitudes towards married women’s 
employment. A series of regressions, which have these different attitudes as dependent 
variables, are estimated separately for males and females.  
Findings regarding attitudes towards married women’s employment reveal that for both 
men and women, an increase in age leads to more traditional views while an increase in 
education leads to less traditional ones. Mother’s education has a positive impact on both 
male and female views regarding this type of belief while mother’s employment has no 
effect. With respect to family structure, the death of a mother leads men to be less 
traditional in their views of working women, but has no effect on women. Finally, 
regarding rejection of traditional roles by men, results reveal that only education is 
significant and positively affects the latter. The same result holds for women. Age is not 
found to affect this type of belief for men. On the other hand, women become more 
traditional in this respect as they become older. Mother’s employment and education are 
found to increase a woman’s rejection of traditional roles but do not affect a man’s. Family 
structure, on the other hand, is found not to be significant for both men and women.     
Dex (1988) uses factor analysis on various sex-roles statements from the Women and 
Employment Survey to explore what she calls “women’s orientations to Employment and 
the Home”. Eleven factors are found to represent various dimensions of a woman’s role 
inside and outside the home and four of these are singled out to construct attitude scales. 
The four final measures of gender-role atttitudes are personal involvement in work and 
home, traditional attitudes to gender roles, independence attitudes and financial constraint. 
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The first three are used as dependent variables in a series of OLS regressions estimated for 
three samples: childless women, women with children, and all women.  
Results for the personal involvement scale show that older women are happier with the 
idea of staying home than younger ones ceteris paribus. The same “perhaps (an) unexpected” 
(p.101) result holds for more qualified women. However, higher potential earnings and 
working at the time of the survey both reduced involvement in the home, ceteris paribus. 
Having a young child was found to increase involvement in the home, ceteris paribus. The 
mother’s employment status when the respondent was a child is only found to be 
statistically significant in the sample of childless women. Regarding the traditional attitudes 
to gender roles scale, results reveal that once again, older women are found to be more 
traditional than younger ones but unlike the previous scale, educated women are found to 
be less traditional. The mother’s work behaviour, which was not found to affect the 
personal involvement scale, does impact negatively on traditional attitudes. The last 
measure studied is the independence scale. Results show that women with higher potential 
earnings and those with a higher level of education valued independence more. The reverse 
was found for older women and those women with young children. Family income was 
found to have the strongest effect on this measure of attitudes compared to all other 
variables.  
Haller and Hoellinger (1994) investigate the determinants of attitudes towards female 
employment both at the country and at the individual level, using data from the 1988 
International Social Survey Programme. Their sample includes Austria, the United States of 
America, West Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Italy and Great Britain. Factor analysis 
is applied on a series of statements on gender roles. Results show that the latter can be 
grouped into three dimensions. The first one includes statements that tackle the 
consequences of women’s work. The second dimension refers to women’s contribution to 
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household income, women’s independence through employment and family happiness if 
women work. Finally, the third dimension includes norms towards gender roles. Further 
investigation revealed that the first and third sets of statements are highly correlated. 
Therefore, the six statements included in the two dimensions are compounded into a single 
scale under the label of “gender role attitudes”. The items in the second factor are not 
aggregated and only the statement on the contribution of both spouses to household 
income is explored in detail.    
Three regression models are estimated for each of these measures. The first is based on the 
whole sample and includes gender, age, education, religious denomination and attendance 
at religious services as explanatory variables. Findings reveal that women are more 
egalitarian than men with respect to both the attitudes towards gender roles measure and 
the attitudes towards double income measure. The second regression model is based on a 
sample of married females under the age of 60 and adds measures of household income 
and employment status as explanatory variables. The latter are found to significantly affect 
both gender role attitudes and attitudes towards double income. A high household income 
leads to more egalitarian gender-role attitudes but lower approval of the statement that 
both spouses should contribute to household income. Women’s employment makes 
women more egalitarian for both dimensions. The third regression model is estimated 
using a sample of employed married women under the age of 60. Instead of household 
income and employment status, it includes personal income as an explanatory variable. The 
latter is a significant determinant of both attitude measures. 
Finally, in the last part of the analysis, Haller and Hollinger (1994) examine the correlation 
between attitudes towards gender roles and a series of macro-economic indicators. All but 
one of the latter are found to be strongly correlated to the gender-role attitude measure. 
The percentage of Protestants, the GNP per capita and the percentage of the labour force 
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in the service sector are positively correlated with egalitarianism. The percentage of 
respondents with close family is negatively correlated to egalitarian attitudes while 
employment rate of women aged 30 to 44 is not linked to beliefs on gender roles.  
The discussion above shows that there are various ways to define gender-role attitudes 
towards the labour market. Some studies have developed indices of attitudes while others 
have used separately answers to one or more statements on gender roles. There are also 
many determinants for the latter: parental characteristics, age, education, family 
composition, socioeconomic conditions and structural factors. A few studies cited above 
have failed to acknowledge that the same processes might simultaneously determine 
attitudes and some of its determinants. This is likely to bias their results. Others have used 
variables for concepts that are themselves hard to define (e.g; political orientation, feelings 
of competence). Before discussing the methodology to be used in this chapter to model 
gender-role attitudes, an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature linking 
attitudes to labour force behaviour is conducted.  
3.2 Gender-role attitudes and labour force participation 
Fernandez et al (2004) argue that economists tend to be cautious when it comes to 
introducing a concept such as culture as a parameter in their models largely because they 
consider it unscientific, both at the theoretical and empirical level, to explain variation in 
outcomes with differences in beliefs or preferences. Fernandez and Fogli (2009) state that 
“culture is rather a hazy concept that lends itself to many alternative definitions” (p.147) 
and argue that it is a challenge to separate cultural influences from economical and 
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institutional ones. Despite all this, the last decade has seen the publication of a number of 
papers on the effect of beliefs, attitudes and culture on economic outcomes.33  
A number of more or less recent studies in economics have addressed the issue of labour 
force participation and culture at the country level often using information on immigrants 
to proxy for the latter (See for example Antecol (2000) and Fernandez (2007)). Much less 
frequently, articles have used attitudes to model the effect of culture at the individual level.  
The problem of studying gender-role attitudes and labour market behaviour is that it is 
extremely likely that the causality between the two factors runs both ways. Sociologists 
have acknowledged this reciprocal relationship and empirical studies tend to focus either 
on how employment determines attitudes or how attitudes determine employment. One 
way to avoid the problem of causation is to use variables on one outcome that predate the 
occurrence of the other.   
Another strategy, which is adopted by this chapter, is to follow the work of Levine (1993). 
The theoretical framework of which is a “straightforward extension of past labor supplies 
studies” (p.667). The author focuses on women and models the decision to work as a 
function of the difference between wages and reservation wages (standard labour supply 
model). However, the paper is innovative in its attempt to extend the neoclassical 
framework by modelling the taste variable using opinions about sex roles. As discussed 
earlier, attitudes might represent approval of norms and not personal preferences. 
However, this does not change the prediction of the model as both will probably affect 
utility and behaviour. The argument of sociologists relates to the fact that personal attitudes 
will affect behaviour more than public ones. The paper by Levine (1993) ends with the 
following agenda for future research that has been pursued in the first part of this chapter: 
                                                 
33 See Fernandez and Fogli (2009) for an overview of studies outside the topic of labour force participation. 
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If further analyses support this paper’s finding that attitudes help predict which 
women work in a cross section, we still need to understand the determinants of 
attitudes (…) Finding appropriate instrumental variables-(…)- is an essential 
part of this research program. (p.677) 
Levine (1993) extends the neoclassical model by incorporating a measure of opinions on 
gender roles in an individual’s utility function. He then uses American data from the 1972-
1986 General Social Survey to test whether female decision to work is affected by their 
opinions on gender roles in any given year and whether the rise in labour force 
participation is partly explained by a change in attitudes. The author restricts his analysis to 
urban married women with husband present and uses responses to six questions regarding 
the female role. None of the statements illustrates exactly the effect the author wants to 
measure. Six variables representing six measures of attitudes are created and no index is 
constructed. The statements are the following: ‘Is it desirable that a male (female) child acts 
like a boy (girl)’; ‘If your party nominated a woman for president, would you vote for her if 
she were qualified for the job’; ‘A woman should be able to have an abortion for any 
reason’; ‘A woman should be able to have an abortion in case of rape’; ‘Do you approve or 
disapprove of a married woman earning money in business or industry if she has a husband 
capable of supporting her’ and finally ‘women should take care of running their homes and 
leave running the country to men’. The potential endogeneity of the responses is 
acknowledged but there are no instruments to capture the independent effect of attitudes 
on behaviour.   
Vella (1994) uses data from the 1985 Australian Longitudinal Survey to investigate the 
determinants’ of attitudes towards gender roles among individuals aged 16 to 25 years old 
and their impact on labour market choices. In doing so, the relationship between education 
and beliefs regarding women’s role is investigated. Attitudes can influence the level of 
education an individual wants to achieve. On the other hand, education itself might 
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influence attitudes. The author starts by modelling both the demand for education and the 
formation of attitudes. The model allows for the potential endogeneity of attitudes in the 
determination of human capital investment. An index of gender-role attitudes is obtained 
by aggregating an individual’s responses to seven statements. Separate regressions are 
estimated for males and females. The females’ regression yields an R-squared of 0.076 
while the male one has an R-squared of 0.049. This suggests the model is more suited 
(albeit marginally) to explain variation in female attitudes rather than male ones. Results 
show that individuals whose parents are university-educated are more likely to be modern 
in their opinions on sex-role attitudes. This result also holds for individuals who had a 
working mother when they were aged 14. On the other hand, having one additional sibling, 
results in more traditional beliefs. Religion also plays a role in the determination of attitudes 
as Islam is found to result in more traditional views. Being in a government school 
influences negatively male attitudes but has no impact on female ones. Finally, attitudes 
also show some regional variation. A further important finding is that opinions are weakly 
exogenous to the educational process. With respect to the relationship between beliefs and 
labour market behaviour, attitudes are found to negatively impact on female hours of work 
and to be weakly exogenous to the latter. However, they are found not to affect male 
labour supply. The author then evaluates the impact of attitudes in 1985 on women’s hours 
of work in 1988 and finds similar results with the magnitude of the attitude effect having 
fallen slightly while that of education increased.    
Fortin (2005) uses data from the World Value Surveys (1990, 1995 and 1999) to look at the 
impact of various types of variables on a woman’s decision to participate in the labour 
market in 25 OECD countries. One type relates to gender-role attitudes, the second type 
concerns work values and the third addresses issues of leadership and religiosity. Regarding 
gender role attitudes, the author investigates opinions about several statements. Two of 
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them concern women’s traditional role, the first is: “Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as 
working for pay”, and the second, only available in the last wave, is: “Both the husband and 
wife should contribute to household income”. The third statement concerns women’s 
inner-conflict, “a working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship as a 
mother who does not work” and the last one deals with anti-egalitarian thoughts: “ when 
jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women”. In the first instance, 
the author models the probability of being employed as a function of the various variables 
mentioned above for men, women and immigrant women. Gender roles are introduced as 
binary independent variables that equal one in the case of agreement with the statement 
and zero otherwise. Results show that having traditional opinions on gender roles decreases 
a woman’s probability of working. Gender roles do not seem to affect men’s decisions to 
work. Finally, the second part of her research investigates whether the difference in labour 
force participation rates across countries can be explained by differences in norms and 
studies, for every country, the effect of gender norms and work values on the gender pay 
gap.  
Farre and Vella (2007) analyse the intergenerational transmission of attitudes concerning 
women’s role and investigate whether these attitudes impact on subsequent work 
behaviour. They use different years from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
dataset and the Children and Young Adults of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. 
An index of attitudes is constructed by summing the responses to seven statements 
concerning sex roles. Regression analysis is then used to investigate the relationship 
between the opinions of children in 2002 (aged 15 to 22) and their mothers’ attitudes in 
2004. Mothers’ attitudes are found to positively impact on their children’s ones and is one 
of the strongest determinant of the latter. Other variables that also affect attitudes are: the 
education level of both parents and the presence of siblings. 
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In order to look at the relationship between labour market participation and attitudes, the 
authors examine the effect of the 1979 attitudes of female respondents on their labour 
supply in 2004 and the effect of 1979 male respondents’ attitudes on the working 
behaviour of their partners in 2003. The authors test for the exogeneity of the attitudes’ 
measure and find that they need to instrument the latter. In the first set of regressions, 
1979 characteristics along with attitudes are used to predict behaviour. In the second set, 
characteristics in 2004 are added to the regression. Results show, for the female sample, 
that an increase in the attitude measure by one standard deviation, increases the probability 
of working by 15 percentage points.34 The effect of an increase in males’ attitudes on their 
partners’ work probability is found to be similar in magnitude.   
Albrecht et al (2000) analyse the impact of attitudes on both earnings functions and the 
decision to work full-time for seven European countries (including Great Britain) and the 
USA. The data come from the 1988 International Social Survey Project. Individuals are 
asked whether a woman should work part-time, full-time or not at all in three different 
situations: (i) after getting married and before having children, (ii) in the presence of 
preschool children, and finally (iii) in the presence of school age children. The authors start 
by analysing the responses to this question by country and gender. Descriptive statistics for 
Great Britain reveal that 90% of women and 87% of men approve full-time work before 
there are any children. These proportions are reduced to 3% and 2% respectively in the 
presence of preschool children and 17% and 13% respectively in the presence of school 
age children. Regarding part-time work, both 10% of men and women approve it before 
there are any children, 35% of women and 27% of men approve it in the presence of 
preschool children and finally 76% of women and 75% of men approve it in the presence 
                                                 
34 The magnitude of this increase is too large to be empirically meaningful. 
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of school age children. The last set of statistics corresponds to the proportion of 
individuals who opt for women to stay at home. In the case where there are no children, 
the proportions equal 1% for women and 3% for men. These estimates increase to 62% 
and 71% respectively in the presence of preschool children and drop again to 7% and 12% 
respectively in the presence of school age children.  
Albrecht et al (2000) then estimate earnings functions for full-time employees aged between 
25 and 54 years old and find that attitudes towards gender roles do not influence wages. 
The authors mention that this might be due to collinearity between attitudes and education 
or potential experience. In the last part of the paper, they study the impact of attitudes on 
the probability of working full-time for individuals aged between 25 and 54 years old. They 
estimate separate models for males and females. The base model for both includes 
schooling, experience quadratic and marital status. Three variables are then added in the 
female regression model, which are: household size, a dummy variable indicating if the 
woman’s mother worked and a dummy variable representing attitudes for if the woman 
approved full-time employment in the presence of children (of any age). The attitude 
variable is found to be significant and has a positive impact on female labour market 
participation. In other words, women who approve full-time work in the presence of 
children are more likely to be working full-time.  
Berrington et al (2008) apply graphical chain modelling to panel data from the BHPS from 
1991 to 1997 in order to look at the relationship between gender role attitudes of women 
aged between 16 and 39 years old in 1991 and their behaviour. The reason for this 
particular sample choice is that the authors start with a sample of childless women who are 
likely to have children in the next six years in order to analyse the impact of fertility and 
change in employment on attitudes. Factor analysis is used to study the correlation matrix 
of six attitudinal statements displayed in table 3.1 below and numbered from (1) to (6). One 
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factor is deemed enough to represent them all, therefore a single measure of attitudes is 
constructed by summing the responses to the six statements. The analysis is conducted as 
follows. First, background variables including age, marital status, education, income, 
mother’s employment status and father’s social class in youth, are used as explanatory 
variables in a linear regression modelling attitudes in 1991. Age is found to have a 
significant negative impact on attitudes with older women being less egalitarian than 
younger ones. A higher education level or having a mother who worked when the 
respondent was aged 14 both lead to more egalitarian attitudes. The second step consists in 
exploring the potential relationship between attitudes in 1991 and changing labour market 
activity and/or parenthood status between 1991 and 1993. An ordinal variable representing 
a change in either economic activity and/or parenthood during this period is constructed 
and comprises of the following categories: no change (or increased hours of work), new 
parent and no change in economic activity, new parent and decrease in economic activity 
and no change in parenthood and decrease in economic activity. This variable is then used 
as a dependent variable in a multinomial logistic regression. The explanatory variables are 
both the 1991 attitude measure and the background variables. Results reveal that for 
married women who were in their teens or early twenties in 1991, the probability of 
becoming a parent does not vary across attitude scores. Among women aged between 23 
and 29 in 1991, a third of those who have an attitude score of 17.5 are predicted to become 
mothers while the proportion decreases to a fifth for those with a score of 24.5. In other 
words, having more traditional attitudes increases the probability of becoming a parent in 
this age range. Furthermore, in the case where a woman becomes a mother, more 
traditional attitudes make her reduce her hours of work or leave the labour market. The 
analysis is replicated for the period from 1993 to 1995 and 1995 to 1997 but attitudes are 
not found to be statistically significant predictors of attitude change then.    
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The survey above has reviewed economic studies that have explored the relationship 
between gender-role attitudes and employment. It is important to mention that there are a 
number of sociological studies that have looked at this relationship as well. Smith (1985) 
finds a significant impact of a wife’s employment status on her husband’s attitudes towards 
gender roles. Spitze and Waite (1981) investigate the effect of a husband’s perceived 
attitude towards gender roles on his wife’s wok behaviour and find that a husband’s 
attitudes change in the early years of marriage to adapt to their wife’s. In addition, a 
husband’s own family experience seems to determine his attitudes (as perceived by his 
wife). 
As demonstrated in the review above, there are a number of issues to consider when 
analysing gender-role attitudes. First, there is no agreement on a single measure of 
attitudes. A decision has to be made on whether to use one or more statements and the 
latter need to be selected. Second, studies that have modelled attitudes have used different 
variables to explain the formation of gender roles. Determinants of attitudes include 
parental background, demographic variables and human capital variables among others. 
Some studies have also used attitudes from previous years to predict current ones. Drawing 
on findings from both sociology and economics, the next section describes the variables to 
be used in the analysis paying a particular attention to the selection of the attitude variable. 
4 Data 
In this section, a description of the variables to be used in the empirical analysis is 
undertaken before looking at the main descriptive statistics of the sample.  
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4.1 A measure of attitudes towards gender roles 
Every other year, the BHPS collects data on a respondent’s attitude regarding various 
aspects of gender roles with a focus on the position of women in the labour market. This is 
done by asking respondents to “strongly agree”, “agree”, “neither agree nor disagree”, 
“disagree” or “strongly disagree” with a series of nine statements. Six of them can be 
grouped into three types of attitudes as done by Scott et al (1996). The remaining three do 
not correspond to those categories and are classified as “miscellaneous”. In selecting a 
measure of attitudes towards women’s role in the labour market to be used in the analysis, 
a choice has to be made between constructing an index of the various statements reported 
in table 3.1 below, and selecting one statement that can be seen as representative enough of 
a traditional ideology of gender roles. As described in the literature review above, studies of 
opinions regarding gender roles vary in the way they measure the latter and in the aspects 
they emphasize.  
The development of aggregate measures of gender roles in the literature has been a topic of 
research in its own right in both the psychology and sociology disciplines.35 The latter often 
are not confined to roles in the labour market and the home, and tackle various issues. As 
discussed in the literature review, studies have used different ways to measure gender roles. 
Some have used a series of statements aggregated into one or more indices either by simple 
summation or using factor analysis. This is not done in this study for the following reasons. 
First, there are a number of disadvantages to using an index of attitudes. Summing 
responses to questions can lead to numerical structures that might not be appropriate. 
Moreover, merely adding statements is equivalent to assuming each question carries the 
same weight (Vella, 1994). Investigating the responses to the various questions in the data 
available, contradictions are sometimes found whereby one individual will have a traditional 
                                                 
35 See McHugh and Frieze (1997).  
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view on one question and a non-traditional one on a question with a very similar meaning. 
This may undermine the accuracy of an index of attitudes. For similar reasons, factor 
analysis is not used in this chapter. A decision is made to select one statement that reflects 
the ideology on women’s role in the labour market.  
There are a few issues to consider before making a judgement regarding the most suitable 
statement to use in order to measure attitudes towards gender roles in the labour market. 
As mentioned by Alwin et al (1992), it seems important to distinguish between the 
“acceptability of a woman working outside the home” and “the perceptions of the possible 
consequences of her doing so” as women in Britain have become more egalitarian in their 
views with time, but have not joined the labour market unconditionally because of the 
potential “double shift” they would face. This issue is closely related to the presence of 
children, as they are the ones who require their mother’s presence most. Since there are no 
adequate instruments to address the issue of endogeneity of fertility, it would be preferable 
to choose a question that does not belong to the category that explores the consequences 
of female work. Moreover, the statement chosen needs to be clear about the aspect it 
covers. Berrington et al (2008) pinpoint a few issues related to the use of statements that 
measure attitudes. First, some questions can have more than one interpretation or are not 
specific enough. Particularly regarding the issue of work and children, it seems important to 
specify whether it is full-time or part-time work that is implied in the question. The use of 
words such as “husbands” and “wives” also can be misleading among a population that has 
seen a major increase in cohabitation rather than marriage. Wilkie (1993) mentions the 
importance of distinguishing between approval of women’s work to earn money for 
“extras” or to support the family.  
The statement chosen is “Husband should earn, wife stay at home”. The latter seems the 
least likely to be determined jointly with fertility decisions and the presence of young 
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children. Furthermore, it has been labelled as: “perhaps the most unambiguous statement” 
(p.30), by Scott et al (1998). 
Table 3.1: Classification of gender-role statements  
Type of attitude Statement 
 
 
Consequences of women working
(1) A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother 
works 
(2) All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-
time job 
(3) A woman and her family would all be happier if she goes 
out to work  
 
Gender ideology 
 
(4) A husband’s job is to earn money; a wife’s job is to look 
after the home and family 
 
Importance of work  
(5) Both the husband and wife should contribute to 
household income 
(6) Having a full-time job is the best way for a woman to be 
an independent person 
 
Miscellaneous 
(7) Children need a father to be as closely involved in their 
upbringing as the mother 
(8) Employers should make special arrangements to help 
mothers combine jobs and childcare 
(9) A single parent can bring up children as well as a couple 
 
In the BHPS, the answers to the questions regarding gender role attitudes use a Likert 
scale.36 Respondents have a choice between five options. They can “strongly agree”, 
“agree”, “neither agree nor disagree”, “disagree” or “strongly disagree” with the statement. 
Less than 2.5% of males and 1.5% of females strongly agree with the fact that a husband’s 
role is to earn money and a wife’s to take care of the home. A decision is made to merge 
the “(dis)agree”/ “strongly (dis)agree” categories into one. Based on the discussion of 
gender roles earlier in the chapter, an individual is considered as traditional if they “strongly 
agree” or “agree” with the statement chosen. They are neutral if they reply “don’t know” to 
the question and egalitarian if they “disagree” or “strongly disagree” with the statement. 
                                                 
36 It is a scale which measures the level of agreement with a statement and was named after the author who 
developed it: Likert (1932).   
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The final measure of attitudes is categorical with three outcomes. A nominal value is 
assigned to each category as described in table 3.2 below. Two separate variables 
male_attitude and female_attitude are created to represent male and female attitudes 
respectively. 
As discussed earlier in the chapter, attitudes towards gender roles and labour market 
behaviour are likely to be jointly determined. Using the male and female attitude measures 
(male_attitude and female_attitude) as explanatory variables in a labour supply equation 
might result in unreliable estimates due to the endogeneity of attitudes to labour market 
participation. There are two ways to address this problem. Ideally, one can use lagged 
attitudes as a proxy for current ones. The latter would be exogenous as they pre-date 
labour market behaviour. Attitudes are not available in wave 12 but are in wave 11, which 
is equivalent to a two year gap with the dataset used in this chapter. Using wave 11 loses 
20% of the original sample, which is deemed too much for the current application. The 
second solution, which is adopted in this chapter, is to use the regression model of 
attitudes based on current responses to predict a measure of attitudes. The availability of a 
number of potential instruments in the dataset is likely to be helpful in this task. As 
mentioned previously, this method is the one suggested by Levine (1993). As discussed in 
the theoretical section, there are different aspects that influence attitudes towards gender 
roles. The next paragraph describes the variables used to model attitudes in this chapter.  
4.2 Potential determinants of attitude formation 
Sociologists have tended to avoid addressing this issue, or have used variables that predate 
attitude measurement to minimize the problem. Economists on the other are not inclined 
to ignore the problem of endogeneity as they argue it can distort the estimated results from 
their models. This chapter does not pretend to address all of these issues. A choice is made 
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to minimize as much as possible the inclusion of variables that are likely to be affected by 
similar factors than attitudes.    
As discussed previously, there are three types of variables related to an individual that 
potentially determine their gender-role attitudes in addition to macroeconomic factors. 
First, regarding background characteristics, the BHPS data include information on various 
aspects of an individual’s childhood. Respondents are asked about the type of area they 
were living in at the age of 15. A series of dummy variables is constructed indicating 
whether the individual mainly lived in an inner city, a suburb, a town, a village, a rural 
location or moved around. In addition, individuals reveal if they were living with both their 
biological parents when aged 16, the reason if they were not, and whom they were living 
with in this case. A set of dummy variables indicating whether the respondent was living 
with both parents, one parent and one step-parent, only one parent or “other” is 
constructed.37 One variable that is included in the model and that has not, to our 
knowledge, been used before, is the number of books available in the childhood home. The 
latter provides a good proxy for the effect of non-formal education on the development of 
gender-role attitudes. 
Respondents also answer a number of questions on their parental background including 
their parents’ age at the birth of the individual. This variable contains too many missing 
observations and is not used in the current analysis. More importantly, the data also include 
information on whether each parent was working when the individual was aged 14, their 
occupation, job position, social class, and educational level. Two of these measures are (i) 
retained: each parent’s employment status and (ii) their educational level.38 
                                                 
37 While the cause for not living with both parents is also available in the data it was not found to be 
significant. 
38 Social class, occupation and job position are only available for parents who work and it is not clear how the 
other parents would be classified if those variables are used. 
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Background variables (other than childhood ones) also include age, education, ethnicity and 
religion. Although the latter has been identified as an important determinant of attitudes 
towards gender roles it cannot be included in the present analysis. Indeed, wave thirteen of 
the BHPS only includes religious denomination for respondents from Northern Ireland 
(which are excluded from the sample). Regarding other variables measuring religion, the 
data used in the analysis incorporate information on whether a respondent is a member of, 
or active in, a religious group. Moreover, wave 11 includes a variable on frequency of 
church attendance. The latter has been widely used in the analysis of attitude formation 
(see literature review). A decision is made not to incorporate these variables in the analysis 
as it is highly likely that similar factors affect both religious behaviour and attitude towards 
gender roles and there are insufficient instruments in the dataset to address this issue. 
Furthermore, data from wave 11 are not available for 20% of the sample (as noted earlier). 
Regarding education, as argued in Vella (1994), the latter can be endogenous to the process 
of attitude formation. However, full-time students have been excluded from the sample in 
all samples. In this analysis, a decision is made not to include individuals who are in further 
training at the time of the survey to minimize the potential issue of endogeneity. This 
concerns less than 1% of the sample. For the remainder of the sample, the “temporal 
ordering” of gender-role attitudes and education justifies the “one-way arrow” between the 
two variables (Molm, 1978, p.524). Educational qualification is included as a set of dummy 
variables. Finally, age is included as a quadratic in the model (see theoretical section) and 
ethnicity as a series of dummy variables denoting whether the individual is British White, 
White (other than British) or from another ethnicity.   
The second and third types of variable that determine attitude formation are 
socioeconomic and family-cycle ones respectively. As discussed earlier, including these in 
an empirical model of attitude formation is a challenging one due to the interlinked nature 
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of the various processes determining attitudes and behaviour. Indeed, variables that 
determine attitudes towards a female role in the labour market are likely to determine 
participation in the labour market. In addition, while earnings are likely to affect attitudes, 
the causality is likely to run in both directions. Regarding socioeconomic variables, work 
experience is not included in the model, as the BHPS data do not include an explicit 
measure of it although as discussed in chapter one, it can be derived from the “lifetime 
employment history data” available from the previous wave. Age is taken to proxy for the 
latter. Non-labour income is introduced into the model and treated as exogenous (see first 
two chapters). While labour income in the year prior to the interview is available, the latter 
is not introduced to the regression model as this measure is not likely to vary much from 
year to year, and is therefore likely to be endogenous to the process of attitude formation. 
Education is taken to proxy the individual’s wage offer. The third type of variable to be 
included is the age of children. While fertility behaviour, the presence of children, their age 
and attitude towards gender roles in the labour market are likely to be affected by similar 
factors, a decision is made to include dummy variables that indicate the presence of at least 
one child in each of three age categories. As discussed earlier, an attempt is made to 
minimize this potential problem through the selection of the attitude statement used for 
the analysis. No distinction is made between married and cohabitating couples as done 
throughout the thesis. Finally, female and male unemployment rates are included in the 
regression model to proxy for the impact of an important macro-economic indicator on 
attitudes. These latest variables also proxy for regional variation, which is not explicitly 
accounted for in the model. Before reviewing the methodology to be used in this chapter, 
the data are briefly discussed in the next section.  
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4.3 Descriptive statistics  
Summary statistics for the various variables used in the analysis of attitude formation are 
reported in table 3.2 below. The variables in the participation equation are not reviewed 
here as a detailed description of those is found in chapter 2. A closer look at the data 
reveals a number of notable points. Less than 10% of couples are of a different ethnicity 
than “White British” and married men are on average two years older than their wives. 
Similar proportions of married men and women are found at the lowest and two highest 
educational categories. However, for the two middle categories men have a higher level of 
qualification than women. Regarding variables related to childhood, family type and area of 
residence and the number of siblings do not seem to display significant differences across 
gender. The same holds for parental education and work behaviour, although it is 
important to pinpoint that the proportion of fathers working is higher than that of 
mothers, which can be explained by the fact that previous generations did not record high 
participation among married women. One notable difference between males and females is 
the number of books reported to have been available in the childhood home. A higher 
proportion of women report that they had a lot of books, while more men than women, 
state that they had quite a few or not many books. This can be due to the fact that girls 
might notice books more than boys or the fact that the latter do not induce their parents to 
buy books as much as for their daughters.  
Finally, mean male and female attitudes show that married women tend to be more 
egalitarian than married men. This difference is statistically significant as a t-test on the 
hypothesis that the latter is equal to zero yields a t statistic of -7 thus strongly rejecting the 
null hypothesis of the equality of means. 
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Table 3.2: Variable description  
Variable 
 type 
Variable name Description  
 
Male Female  
 
 
 
 
Gender-
role 
Attitude  
male_attitude 
 
Ordinal variable that equals 1, 2 or 3 if a male 
respectively agrees (traditional), neither agrees 
nor disagrees (neutral) or disagrees (egalitarian) 
with the statement: “husband should work, wife 
stay at home” 
 
 
2.47 
 
female_attitude 
 
Ordinal variable that equals 1, 2 or 3 if a female 
respectively agrees (traditional), neither agrees 
nor disagrees (neutral) or disagrees (egalitarian) 
with the statement: “husband should work, wife 
stay at home” 
  
 
2.58 
 
Age 
age Continuous variable representing the 
individual’s age in years. 
43 41 
 age_squared Continuous variable obtained by squaring the 
age variable  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Education 
educ0 Binary variable that equals 1 if the respondent 
has no qualification and 0 otherwise 
0.12 0.13 
educ1 Binary variable that equals 1 if the respondent 
has o levels, a levels, cse grade 2-5 or 
commercial qualification and 0 otherwise 
0.33 0.38 
educ2 Binary variable that equals 1 if the respondent 
has a nursing or teaching qualification, other 
higher qualification or apprenticeship 0 
otherwise 
0.38 0.32 
educ3 Binary variable that equals 1 if the respondent 
has a first degree and 0 otherwise 
0.13 0.14 
educ4 Binary variable that equals 1 if the respondent 
has a higher degree and 0 otherwise 
0.04 0.03 
 
 
Ethnicity 
white Binary variable that equals 1 if the respondent is 
British, Irish, Welsh or Scottish white and 0 
otherwise 
0.94 0.95 
other_white Binary variable that equals 1 if the respondent is 
white but not British and 0 otherwise 
0.04 0.03 
other_ethnic Binary variable that equals 1 if the respondent is 
not white and 0 otherwise 
0.02 0.03 
Number of 
books in 
childhood 
home 
 
 
 
books_unknown Binary variable that equals 1 if the respondent 
does not know how many books there were in 
his childhood home and 0 otherwise 
0.01 0.01 
books_lot Binary variable that equals 1 if there were lots 
of books in the childhood home and 0 
otherwise 
0.26 0.41 
books_few Binary variable that equals 1 if there were quite 
a few books in the childhood home and 0 
otherwise 
0.38 0.34 
books_not Binary variable that equals 1 if there were not 
many books in the childhood home and 0 
otherwise 
0.34 
 
0.24 
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Table 3.2: (continued)  
Variable 
 Type 
Variable name Description  
 
Male Female  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of area 
of residence 
during 
childhood 
inner_city Binary variable that equals 1 if the individual 
was living in an inner city area when they were 
young and 0 otherwise 
0.11 0.08 
suburb Binary variable that equals 1 if the individual 
was living in an suburban area when they were 
young and 0 otherwise 
0.24 0.24 
town Binary variable that equals 1 if the individual 
was living in a town when they were young and 
0 otherwise 
0.28 0.31 
village Binary variable that equals 1 if the individual 
was living in a village when they were young 
and 0 otherwise 
0.23 0.22 
rural Binary variable that equals 1 if the individual 
was living in a rural area when they were young 
and 0 otherwise 
0.10 0.10 
move Binary variable that equals 1 if the individual 
moved around when they were young and 0 
otherwise 
0.05 0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Family type 
during 
childhood 
live_parents Binary variable that equals 1 if the individual 
lived with both their biological/natural parents 
when aged 16 and 0 otherwise 
0.8 0.8 
live_mother_ 
stepfather 
Binary variable that equals 1 if the individual 
lived with their mother and stepfather when 
aged 16 and 0 otherwise 
0.05 0.05 
live_father_ 
stepmother 
Binary variable that equals 1 if the individual 
lived with their father and stepmother when 
aged 16 and 0 otherwise 
0.01 0.01 
live_mother_ 
only 
Binary variable that equals 1 if the individual 
lived with their mother only when aged 16 and 
0 otherwise 
0.07 0.07 
live_father_ 
only 
Binary variable that equals 1 if the individual 
lived with their father only when aged 16 and 0 
otherwise 
0.02 0.02 
live_other Binary variable that equals 1 if the individual 
lived in foster care or “other” when aged 16 
and 0 otherwise 
0.03 0.04 
 
 
 
 
Mother’s 
educational 
level 
mother_no_educ Binary variable that equals 1 if the respondent’s 
mother left school without any qualification and 
0 otherwise(*)  
0.46 0.46 
mother_som_ 
educ 
Binary variable that equals 1 if the respondent’s 
mother left school with some qualification and 
0 otherwise 
0.28 0.25 
mother_further_ 
educ 
Binary variable that equals 1 if the respondent’s 
mother left school with further qualification 
and 0 otherwise 
0.14 0.17 
mother_uni_ 
educ 
Binary variable that equals 1 if the respondent’s 
mother left school with university qualification 
and 0 otherwise 
0.03 0.05 
 mother_unknow
n_educ 
Binary variable that equals 1 if the respondent 
does not know his mother’s educational level 
and 0 otherwise 
0.09 0.07 
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Table 3.2: (continued)  
Variable 
 type 
Variable name 
 
Description  
 
Male Female  
 
 
 
 
Father’s 
educational 
level 
father_no_ 
educ 
Binary variable that equals 1 if the 
respondent’s father left school without any 
qualification and 0 otherwise(*)  
0.42 0.38 
father_some_
educ 
Binary variable that equals 1 if the 
respondent’s father left school with some 
qualification and 0 otherwise 
0.18 0.15 
father_further
_educ 
Binary variable that equals 1 if the 
respondent’s father left school with further 
qualification and 0 otherwise 
0.25 0.29 
father_uni_ 
educ 
Binary variable that equals 1 if the 
respondent’s father left school with 
university qualification and 0 otherwise 
0.05 0.07 
father_unkno
wn_educ 
Binary variable that equals 1 if the 
respondent does not know his father’s 
educational level and 0 otherwise 
0.10 0.10 
 
Mother’s 
employment 
status 
mother_not_
work 
Binary variable that equals 1 if the 
respondent’s mother was not working 
when they were aged 14 and 0 otherwise 
0.39 0.35 
mother_work Binary variable that equals 1 if the 
respondent’s mother was working when 
they were aged 14 and 0 otherwise 
0.53 0.57 
 mother_work
_misc 
Binary variable that equals 1 if the 
individual does not know if their mother 
was working, if she was deceased or if data 
on this variable is missing and 0 otherwise  
0.08 0.08 
 
Father’s 
employment 
status 
father_not_ 
work 
Binary variable that equals 1 if the 
respondent’s father was not working when 
they were aged 14 and 0 otherwise 
0.03 0.03 
father_work Binary variable that equals 1 if the 
respondent’s father was working when 
they were aged 14 and 0 otherwise 
 
0.87 
 
0.84 
father_work_
mis 
Binary variable that equals 1 if the 
individual does not know if their father 
was working, if he was deceased or if data 
on this variable is missing and 0 otherwise  
 
0.11 
 
0.12 
Number of 
siblings 
siblings Ordinal variable representing the number 
of siblings the respondent ever had. 
2 2 
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Table 3.2: (continued)  
Variable 
 type 
Variable name Description  
 
Male Female  
 
Unemployment 
rate 
male_unemployment Continuous variable. Constructed at 
the county level or unitary authority 
level, it equals the ratio of the number 
of unemployed males over the number 
of males in the labour force 
0.06 0..06 
female_unemployment Continuous variable. Constructed at 
the county level or unitary authority 
level, it equals the ratio of the number 
of unemployed females over the 
number of females in the labour force 
0.04 0.04 
 
 
Non-labour 
income 
male_income Continuous measure. Monthly male 
non-labour income obtained by 
dividing the yearly non-labour income 
of the previous wave by 12. It includes 
transfer, benefit, pension and 
investment income 
 
 
1393 
(4092) 
 
 
1393 
(4092) 
 female_income Continuous measure. Monthly female 
non-labour income obtained by 
dividing the yearly non-labour income 
of the previous wave by 12. It includes 
transfer, benefit, pension and 
investment income 
 
 
892 
(2440) 
 
 
892 
(2440) 
 childlessthan5 Binary variable that is equal to 1 if 
there is at least one child aged between 
0 and 4 in the household and 0 
otherwise 
 
0.19 
 
0.19 
Presence of 
children  
child5to11 Binary variable that is equal to 1 if 
there is at least one child aged between 
5 and 11 in the household and 0 
otherwise 
 
0.28 
 
0.28 
 childolderthan12 Binary variable that is equal to 1 if 
there is at least one child aged between 
12 and 18 in the household and 0 
otherwise 
 
0.22 
 
0.22 
 
Sample Size 
 
 
2590 
 
2590 
Notes: proportions in each type of variable do not always sum to 1 due to rounding errors 
(*) mother_educ_no and father_educ_no also include individuals who never went to school. The latter are included in the 
same category as those that left school without qualification and they constitute less than one percent of individuals in 
each gender group 
 187 
 
Based on data from the British Social Attitudes Survey, Crompton et al (2003) report that in 
2002, 20% of men and 15% of women agreed with the statement that “a man’s job is to 
earn money; a woman’s job is to look after the home and family”. These estimates can 
appear to be inconsistent with those computed from BHPS data in this study (see table 3.3 
below). However, a closer examination of the data reveals that this discrepancy is merely 
due to the fact that the two sets of estimates are not from comparable samples. In 
Crompton et al (2003), reported statistics are based on a full sample while those of this 
study are computed from a sample of married couples. This is confirmed by the 
proportions computed from the whole sample of the BHPS, which yield values similar to 
those of the BSAS.  
The common finding that women are more egalitarian in their attitude to the labour market 
than men is confirmed by the data. The Pearson’s chi-square statistic of the independence 
of male and female attitudes measures is equal to 14 with 2 degrees of freedom implying 
that attitudes of male and female spouses in couples are not independent of one another.    
 
Table 3.3: Distribution, by gender, of responses to the attitude statement: “Husband 
should work; wife stay at home” 
 Males Females 
Traditional individual 
 
11.9% 9% 
Neutral individual 
 
29.8% 25.4% 
Egalitarian individual 58.3% 65.6% 
 
                            Total 100% 100% 
 
Notes: Sample size: 2590 couples 
 Pearson chi-square (2) = 14 
 
Descriptive statistics on the relationship between spouses’ employment and their attitudes 
are also analysed (see tables 3.4 (a) to (c) below). The majority of wives of traditional men 
do work. However, the proportion of wives working is the lowest among traditional males 
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compared to neutral or egalitarian ones. The sample of traditional women is equally split 
between those who work and those who don’t, with the proportion of women working 
being the lowest among women with this type of attitude. The proportion of males 
working shows less variation across male and female attitude type. All of the Pearson chi-
square tests of independence between work behaviour and attitudes reject the hypothesis 
of no correlation between the two variables.39 
 
Cross tabulations of gender-role attitude and working behaviour  
Tables 3.4 (a): Male attitude and female employment 
 Female  
not working 
Female  
working 
Total 
Traditional male 
 
41.4% 58.6% 100% 
Neutral male 
 
30% 70% 100% 
Egalitarian male 
 
17.2% 82.8% 100% 
 
Notes: Sample size: 2505 couples 
 Pearson chi-square (2)=101 
 
Tables 3.4 (b): Male attitude and male employment 
 Male  
not working 
Male  
working 
Total 
Traditional male 
 
19.2% 80.8% 100% 
Neutral male 
 
13.2% 86.8% 100% 
Egalitarian male 10.2% 89.8% 100% 
 
Notes: Sample size: 2505 couples 
 Pearson chi-square (2)= 20 
 
                                                 
39 See Conover (1999) for a description of the Chi-square test of goodness of fit.  
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Tables 3.4 (c): Female attitude and female employment  
 Female  
not working 
Female   
working 
Total 
Traditional female 
 
50.7% 49.3% 100% 
Neutral female 
 
30.9% 69.1% 100% 
Egalitarian female 17.7% 82.3% 100% 
 
Notes: Sample size: 2505 couples 
 Pearson chi-square (2)=137 
 
Tables 3.4 (d): Female attitude and male employment 
 Male  
not working 
Male  
working 
Total 
Traditional female 
 
15.4% 84.7% 100% 
Neutral female 
 
15.1% 84.9% 100% 
Egalitarian female 10.6% 89.4% 100% 
 
Notes: Sample size: 2505 couples 
 Pearson chi-square (2)= 11 
 
The next section describes the empirical model used to investigate the impact of the 
various factors mentioned on attitude formation, before exploring whether gender-role 
attitudes affect the labour market participation of a couple. 
5 Econometric methodology 
This chapter’s research agenda is divided as follows. First, a model of couples’ attitudes 
towards gender roles is developed and measures of a couple’s attitudes towards gender 
roles are derived from the latter. Second, these measures are added then to the bivariate 
probit discussed in the last chapter in order to analyse the impact of a couple’s gender-role 
attitudes on labour market participation.  
As described in the data section, the measures of attitudes to be used in this chapter are 
ordinal in nature with three possible outcomes. Both husbands’ and wives’ attitudes are to 
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be modelled. Since it is likely that the two are determined simultaneously, a framework that 
models jointly the probabilities of husbands and wives’ agreeing, disagreeing or being 
neutral towards the statement chosen is needed. A bivariate ordered probit model is used 
to this effect. Studies using this framework are rare in economics (see Butler and Chatterjee 
(1997)) and it has not, to our knowledge, been used to model a couple’s attitudes before. 
The bivariate ordered probit model can be considered similar to a bivariate probit model 
where the number of categories of the dependent variables exceeds two (see Sajaia (2008) 
for further details). The model is derived from two latent variables *my  and 
*
fy that 
represent male and female attitudes respectively. Assume that these variables are defined as 
follows: 
ymi
* = ′ x miβm + εmi   [5.1] 
y f
* = ′ x fiβ f + ε fi   [5.2] 
The general likelihood function for the ith couple is: 
),,(),,( '1
'
1
'' ρββρββ fffjmmmjfffjmmmj xcxcFxcxcF −−−−− −−  
Where F(.) is the bivariate normal distribution function operator; m and f denote male 
and female subscripts respectively and i represents individual observations. 
miε  and fiε  are error terms, mβ  and fβ  are parameters associated with vectors of 
explanatory variables mix'  and fix'  where neither include a one (i.e., the constant) in the 
vector of realizations for the variables. The above framework assumes the following: 
0)'( =mimixE ε and 0)'( =fifixE ε .  
Only discrete realizations of the latent variables are observed. They are male and female 
aggregated responses to the statement on gender roles discussed above. They are discrete 
with three possible outcomes (agree, neither agree nor disagree and disagree). 
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The model is set up as follows: 
=miy 1  if 1* mm cy ≤  =fiy 1  if 1* ff cy ≤  
=miy 2  if 2*1 mmm cyc ≤<  =fiy 2  if 2*1 fff cyc ≤<  
=miy 3  if mm yc *2 <  =fiy 3  if ff yc *2 <  
1mc  and 2mc  represent the unknown cut-off points (or thresholds) in the male distribution 
of attitudes while 1fc and 2fc  represent the female ones. In order to identify the 
parameters of the model, exclusion restrictions need to be satisfied. 
In terms of attitudes’ modelling, various specifications are estimated based on equations 
[5.1] and [5.2]. The first specification (specification one) includes all the variables from an 
individual’s background, their age, introduced as a quadratic and their education level. As 
discussed previously, all of these variables are likely to be exogenous to the determination 
of attitudes. In the second specification (specification two), male and female non-labour 
income levels are added to the model. Even if non-labour income is taken to be exogenous 
in this analysis (see data section), it is likely that variables that determine the latter are 
similar to those that determine attitudes, which is why it is important to verify the effect of 
the introduction of income on the impact of background variables. The third specification 
(specification three) introduces unemployment rates to the regression model in order to 
look at the impact of an economic indicator on gender roles. This area of research is 
relatively recent and the findings from this specification will hopefully contribute to enrich 
the small empirical literature on the topic. In the fourth specification (specification four), 
variables indicating the presence of children of all ages are added to the regression model. 
While efforts have been made to bypass the endogeneity of fertility (see data section); 
results for this latest specification need to be interpreted cautiously given the inclusion of 
children variables clearly brings this into question.  
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While all the specifications estimated above did allow for a correlation in unobservables 
that determine male and female attitudes in couples, they did not incorporate a measure of 
male attitude in the female equation (or the reverse). Unlike in chapter two where the 
availability of instruments to identify both equations was limited (if not non-existent), the 
use of background variables in this chapter might provide adequate instruments to allow 
for identification. Therefore, the fifth (and last) specification introduces male attitudes into 
the female regression equation (specification five). 
The set-up is then modified as follows: 
ymi
* = ′ x miβm + εmi   [5.3] 
y f
* = ′ x fiβ f + γ f ym* + ε fi   [5.4] 
All the variables are specified as before and a new log likelihood function can be derived.40  
A series of Wald tests are conducted on each of the specifications above. First, cross-
equation tests are performed to determine whether the impact of each dependent variable 
is the same for males and females. Second, tests are performed to test for the equality of 
cut off points across gender.41 In addition, a Pseudo R-squared measure is computed for 
each model.42   
The methodology above addresses this chapter’s first research question. The next section 
delineates the various steps needed to address the second one which attempts to investigate 
the impact of gender-role attitudes on the labour market participation of a couple. 
The regression model established earlier is used to construct measures of attitudes. The 
reason for doing so is the endogeneity problem mentioned in the theoretical and data 
                                                 
40 Note that equations 5.1 and 5.2 are equivalent to 5.3 and 5.4 with the constraint that 0=fγ . 
41 The Wald test in Stata investigates the hypothesis that the difference in estimated effects between two 
variables is zero. It is reported as a chi square statistic in large samples. 
42 Stata does not, to our knowledge, easily compute a constant only model in a bivariate ordered probit 
framework. Therefore, the constant only model is estimated as a single ordered probit model for males and 
females separately. The resulting R squared is unlikely to be altered by this approximation.   
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sections. Attitudes towards gender roles and labour market participation are likely to be 
correlated with each impacting on the other. A measure of attitudes that is not correlated 
with the errors from the participation equation is needed. Both specifications 4 and 5, that 
are used to obtain two separate attitude scores, contain identifying instruments and 
exogenous variables found in the participation equation. Only wages (included in the latter) 
are not added due to their endogeneity but it is assumed that education is a good proxy for 
the latter. Age and its quadratic are also included. Performing a formal test of exogeneity of 
attitudes to labour market behaviour is not straightforward in this setting as the pseudo-
residuals from the ordered bivariate probit in Stata cannot, to our knowledge, be extracted 
easily. In order to obtain a measure of attitudes that is “purged” from the elements that 
correlate it with employment, a search for instruments that affect attitudes but do not 
affect labour market participation is undertaken. With respect to the husbands’ equation, 
his mother’s labour market behaviour and his ethnicity is found to impact on his beliefs but 
not on the probability that he works. With respect to the female equation, having a lot of 
books in childhood and ethnicity both affect attitudes but not the probability of being 
employed. Using specifications four and five in turn, two sets of predictions of the 
probabilities of being in each of the three categories are obtained for males and females. 
Each set of predictions is then aggregated into one measure of attitude for each gender 
group. The attitude scores are weighted averages with weights provided by the marginal 
probabilities using either the male or female bivariate ordered probit coefficients. The 
traditional outcome is given a 1, the neutral a 2 and modern a 3.   
These two sets of weighted average scores are used as additional independent variables in 
the bivariate probit for employment activity (see chapter two for a description of the 
model). 
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Before looking at the results of the model, it is important to note that in the bivariate 
ordered probit model of gender-role attitudes, identification is unlikely to be a problem as 
there are sufficient variables (from an individual’s background) that are present in the male 
(female) equation and not in the female (male) one. In the bivariate probit of chapter 2, to 
which measures of attitudes are added, identification is likely to be improved since the 
variables that are introduced are continuous.  
6 Results  
The preferred specification for attitude formation was obtained after a series of preliminary 
regressions were performed. The father’s education and employment status when the 
respondent was aged 14 were not found to affect male and female attitudes. The female 
unemployment rate was also found not to affect attitudes. The preferred set of regression 
models is reported in tables 3.4 and 3.5. Even if it was found not to be statistically 
significant, the number of siblings is retained in the specification, as it is likely to slightly 
impact on coefficients representing the impact of family structure if it is not controlled for. 
Husbands and wives’ attitudes regarding a woman’s role in the labour market are not 
independent of one another and unobservables that determine them are positively 
correlated as shown by the significant positive correlation coefficients in tables 3.4 and 3.5 
below. This could indicate that individuals with common values tend to marry (positive 
assortative mating). Furthermore, there does not seem to be significant differences in the 
underlying structure of male and female attitudes as chi-square tests on the equality of cut-
off points for the attitude thresholds do not reject the hypothesis of equality (see table 
(A3.1) in appendix 3). The effect of age on attitudes varies depending on the specification. 
For males, the latter is only found significant in the last two specifications. For females, it is 
significant in specification four only. This might be due to the inclusion of variables 
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representing the number of children, which allowed for a cleaner effect of the role of age in 
the formation of attitudes. Both age and its quadratic are significant indicating individuals 
become more egalitarian with age until they reach 28.5 or 31 for males depending on the 
specification and 33 for females. The point estimates suggest that males tend to become 
traditional earlier in the lifecycle than females. A chi-square test in specification 4 for 
equality of age effects for males and females does not reject the latter suggesting no 
statistical differences in point estimates (refer to table A3.1). Ethnicity of both husband and 
wife is a strong determinant of attitudes toward women in the labour market. Being white 
but not British or being of other ethnic background leads to more traditional attitudes 
compared to the British white base category. A chi-square test reveals that the impact of 
ethnicity on male and female attitudes does not vary by gender (refer to table A3.1). This 
result is consistent with findings from the US literature. The type of region the husband 
was living in aged 14 does not influence his attitudes in almost all specifications. The effect 
of being in a rural location compared to the inner city base decreases the probability that a 
man is egalitarian only in the last specification (although results are marginal at the 10% 
significance in other specifications). On the other hand, the type of region a woman was 
living in when she was 14 affects her current attitudes (in all specifications). Being in a 
town or in a rural location both lead to more traditional attitudes than those who were 
living in an inner city at the age of 14. The number of books in one’s childhood home plays 
a role in the determination of female attitudes. Women who grew up in homes with a lot of 
books are more likely to be egalitarian, on average and ceteris paribus, than those who grew 
up without many books. This result holds in all specifications, the variable being significant 
at the 1% level in all the regressions and is robust to the introduction of the individual’s 
education level. This variable does not seem as important in the determination of male 
attitudes. This shows the importance of non-formal education for the development of 
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attitudes. The result is important as such variables have not, to our knowledge, been used 
in this context before. The educational qualification of a woman’s mother does not seem to 
matter in the determination of her attitudes. However, the educational qualification of a 
man’s mother does influence his attitude. Having a mother who achieved a university 
degree makes a man more likely to be egalitarian on average and ceteris paribus compared to 
a man whose mother has no education. This is consistent with results from the literature 
(see Kiecolt and Acock (1988)). A mother’s working status when the individual was 14 is an 
important determinant of their attitudes as an adult. If the mother worked, both husbands 
and wives have a greater probability to be modern on average and ceteris paribus. A chi-
square test shows that the impact of mother’s employment is the same for male and female 
attitudes (refer to table A3.1). All of the educational variables are significant at the 1% level. 
Having any level of education higher than none makes both men and women more likely 
to be egalitarian on average and ceteris paribus. This is consistent with findings from the 
literature. The impact of education does not seem to vary by gender (refer to table A3.1). 
The impact of family structure is not consistent across specifications for males. However, 
in all but the last specification, being in the “other” family type (i.e., foster care) makes men 
more egalitarian than those who were living with both parents when aged 16. For females, 
living with their father only at age 16 makes them more traditional than if they were living 
with both their parents.    
In specification two, male and female non-labour incomes are introduced into the 
regression model. Male non-labour income is not found to affect attitudes towards gender 
roles. Female non-labour income increases the probability that a woman and a man will be 
traditional. A chi-square test shows that the effect of non-labour income is not the same 
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across gender (refer to A3.1). A closer examination of the data reveals that this result is due 
to the impact of benefit income. Benefits thus re-enforce a traditional view of sex roles.43  
In specification 3, the male unemployment rate is introduced into the regression model. 
The latter is found to be significant only in the female equation whereby a higher 
unemployment rate increases the probability that the wife is modern. This finding does not 
support the view that suggests a negative relationship between male unemployment and 
attitudes towards sex roles. The result for females suggests that in difficult economic 
conditions for men, the wife is more likely to work. A parallel can be drawn between this 
result and the added worker effect in labour supply analysis. 
In specification four, binary variables indicating the presence of children aged less than 
five, between five and 11 and older than 12 are introduced in the regressions. The presence 
of children aged less than 5 makes both men and women more likely to be traditional on 
average and ceteris paribus with the variable being significant at the 1% significance level. 
The presence of children older than 12 increases the probability of being traditional at the 
10% significance level for men and at the 1% significance level for women. This might be 
proxying an age effect as individuals tend to be more lenient in their views of gender roles 
when there are no children. Finally, the presence of children aged between 5 and 11 does 
not impact on attitudes.  
Finally, in specification five, the male attitude variable is introduced in the regression 
model. It is found to be a significant determinant of female attitudes. A more egalitarian 
male increases the probability that his spouse will be egalitarian.44 A number of variables 
that had significant effects in the previous specifications (such as the presence of at least 
one preschool child or female non-labour income) are no longer found to have an impact 
                                                 
43 This might be due to the fact that the welfare state is still based, to an extent, on a traditional view of the 
family. 
44 Introducing the female attitudes in the male regression model yields similar result indicating the reverse is 
also true.  
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here. Their effect is probably absorbed by the male attitude variable. The correlation 
coefficient is still significant but is now found to be negative. In other words, once male 
attitudes are controlled for in the female equation, the unobervables that determine male 
and female attitudes are negatively correlated. The explanation for such a result is probably 
to be found outside economics. Psychologists have often focused on the impact of 
personality traits on attitudes and happiness in couples. Holter (1970) mentions issues such 
as “submissiveness” and “conflict avoidance”. The latter might explain the negative 
correlation in attitudes. If women are conflict avoiders, they will probably be more 
traditional in their gender-role attitudes as they are aware of the strain of the “double shift” 
on the couple. On the other hand, if men are conflict avoiders, they might encourage their 
wives to work if they feel they would like to. This is only a tentative explanation and there 
are probably many other possible rationales for the negative correlation coefficient 
obtained. Another interesting result is that the cut-off points for male and female attitudes 
are now found to be statistically different suggesting that where females define the 
threshold between say modernity and neutrality is different from where men draw this 
boundary.  
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Tables 3.5: Bivariate Ordered Probit Estimates of attitude formation (specifications one to 
three) 
  
Specification one 
 
Specification two 
 
Specification three  
Dependent 
Variables 
 
Male 
 
Female 
 
Male 
 
Female 
 
Male 
 
Female 
age 0.0230 
(0.0183) 
0.0173 
(0.0198) 
0.0218 
(0.0185) 
0.0188 
(0.0199) 
0.0238 
(0.0187) 
0.0198 
(0.0201) 
age_squared -0.0004* 
(0.0002) 
-0.0003 
(0.0002) 
-0.0004* 
(0.0002) 
-0.0003 
(0.0002) 
-0.0004*   
(0.0002) 
-0.0003 
(0.0002) 
educ1 0.2148*** 
(0.0784) 
0.3488*** 
(0.0773) 
0.2107*** 
(0.0785) 
0.3429*** 
(0.0775) 
0.2001*** 
(0.0795) 
0.3459*** 
(0.0788) 
educ2 0.2981*** 
(0.0765) 
0.4550*** 
(0.0825) 
0.2885*** 
(0.0767) 
0.4455*** 
(0.0828) 
0.2835*** 
(0.0777) 
0.4468*** 
(0.0844) 
educ3 0.5415*** 
(0.1003) 
0.7679*** 
(0.1066) 
0.5334*** 
(0.1006) 
0.7604*** 
(0.1068) 
0.5370*** 
(0.1018) 
0.7617*** 
(0.1090) 
educ4 0.8674*** 
(0.1543) 
0.8179*** 
(0.1820) 
0.8621*** 
(0.1549) 
0.8132*** 
(0.1826) 
0.8741*** 
(0.1574) 
0.7907*** 
(0.1855) 
other_white -0.2351** 
(0.1179) 
-0.3150** 
(0.1428) 
-0.2426** 
(0.1182) 
-0.3147** 
(0.1430) 
-0.2530**  
(0.1191) 
-0.2800**  
(0.1459) 
other_ethnic -0.5752*** 
(0.1532) 
-0.4238*** 
(0.1490) 
-0.5890*** 
(0.1535) 
-0.4313*** 
(0.1490) 
-0.6024*** 
(0.1549) 
-0.4326*** 
(0.1557) 
books_unknown -0.2637 
(0.2077) 
0.2837 
(0.2592) 
-0.2431 
(0.2080) 
0.2795 
(0.2592) 
-0.2129 
(0.2171) 
0.2037 
(0.270) 
books_few 0.0685 
(0.0559) 
0.0737 
(0.0645) 
0.0758 
(0.0561) 
0.0769 
(0.0646) 
0.0752 
(0.0567) 
0.0826 
(0.0654) 
books_lots -0.0158 
(0.0655) 
0.1572**  
(0.0663) 
-0.0099 
(0.0656) 
0.1619*** 
(0.0664) 
-0.0006 
(0.0664) 
0.1805*** 
(0.0676) 
suburb 0.021 
(0.0860) 
0.0108 
(0.1014) 
0.0087 
(0.0863) 
0.0057 
(0.1016) 
-0.0105 
(0.0871) 
-0.0011 
(0.1034) 
town 0.0311 
(0.0837) 
-0.1785*   
(0.0963) 
0.0176 
(0.0840) 
-0.1831*   
(0.0966) 
0.0002 
(0.0849) 
-0.1889**  
(0.0982) 
village -0.0928 
(0.0861) 
-0.1277 
(0.1007) 
-0.1104 
(0.0864) 
-0.1318 
(0.1009) 
-0.1108 
(0.0876) 
-0.1345 
(0.1028) 
rural -0.1472 
(0.1014) 
-0.2390**  
(0.1156) 
-0.1634 
(0.1017) 
-0.2441**  
(0.1158) 
-0.1607 
(0.1032) 
-0.2390**  
(0.1181) 
move -0.0602 
(0.1296) 
-0.0337 
(0.1394) 
-0.0668 
(0.1298) 
-0.0254 
(0.1398) 
-0.076 
(0.1312) 
-0.0331 
(0.1430) 
mother_some_ 
educ 
0.0543 
(0.0598) 
-0.0468 
(0.0650) 
0.0453 
(0.060) 
-0.0458 
(0.0651) 
0.043 
(0.0608) 
-0.0507 
(0.0661) 
mother_further_ 
educ 
0.0249 
(0.0768) 
-0.0632 
(0.0764) 
0.0197 
(0.0769) 
-0.0645 
(0.0765) 
0.0018 
(0.0780) 
-0.06 
(0.0779) 
mother_uni_ 
educ 
0.4942*** 
(0.1688) 
-0.1091 
(0.1333) 
0.5058*** 
(0.170) 
-0.1088 
(0.1335) 
0.5207*** 
(0.1743) 
-0.0752 
(0.1368) 
mother_unknow
n_educ 
-0.1024 
(0.0860) 
-0.1529 
(0.0947) 
-0.0858 
(0.0864) 
-0.14 
(0.0950) 
-0.0815 
(0.0870) 
-0.1474 
(0.0961) 
mother_work 0.1463*** 
(0.0512) 
0.1825*** 
(0.0534) 
0.1441*** 
(0.0513) 
0.1834*** 
(0.0535) 
0.1423*** 
(0.0519) 
0.1833*** 
(0.0542) 
mother_work_ 
mis 
-0.037 
(0.0919) 
0.0864 
(0.1015) 
-0.0528 
(0.0922) 
0.1097 
(0.1023) 
-0.0687 
(0.0933) 
0.0988 
(0.1041) 
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Tables 3.5: (continued) 
  
Specification one 
 
Specification two 
 
Specification three 
Dependent 
Variables 
 
Male 
 
Female 
 
Male 
 
Female 
 
Male 
 
Female 
       
siblings -0.0068 
(0.0134) 
-0.0050 
(0.0140) 
-0.0042 
(0.0135) 
-0.0038 
(0.0140) 
-0.0043 
(0.0137) 
-0.0045 
(0.0143) 
live_father_ 
only 
0.0189 
(0.1774) 
-0.3229*  
(0.180) 
0.0201 
(0.1779) 
-0.3250*   
(0.1804) 
0.0373 
(0.1814) 
-0.3298*   
(0.1860) 
live_mother_ 
only 
0.0223 
(0.0899) 
-0.1032 
(0.0953) 
0.0219 
(0.0901) 
-0.0946 
(0.0956) 
0.0273 
(0.0906) 
-0.1161 
(0.0966) 
live_mother_ 
stepfather 
-0.1880*   
(0.1079) 
0.1166 
(0.1122) 
-0.1717 
(0.1085) 
0.1257 
(0.1125) 
-0.1309 
(0.1101) 
0.1504 
(0.1139) 
live_father_ 
stepmother 
-0.0062 
(0.2723) 
0.0724 
(0.3327) 
0.0124 
(0.2736) 
0.0535 
(0.3335) 
0.0326 
(0.2736) 
0.0575 
(0.3398) 
live_other 0.2345*   
(0.1396) 
0.2222 
(0.1387) 
0.2501*   
(0.140) 
0.2261*   
(0.1391) 
0.2617*   
(0.1402) 
0.2197 
(0.1402) 
male_income   -0.0061 
(0.0060) 
-0.0009 
(0.0063) 
-0.0061 
(0.0061) 
-0.0015 
(0.0063) 
female_income -0.0374*** 
(0.0095) 
-0.0300*** 
(0.0098) 
-0.0378*** 
(0.0095) 
-0.0291*** 
(0.0099) 
male_ 
unemployment 
  -0.316 
(0.9691) 
1.7119*   
(1.0151) 
cut off1 
 
-0.7094 
(0.4043) 
0.3296 
(0.4041) 
-0.7607 
(0.4064) 
0.2462 
(0.4065) 
-0.81 
(0.4067) 
0.2337 
(0.4065) 
-0.7778 
(0.4088) 
0.2317 
(0.4089) 
-0.7753 
(0.4197) 
0.2666 
(0.4195) 
-0.6064 
(0.4201) 
0.3989 
(0.4203) 
cut off2 
Correlation 
coefficient 
0.2555*** 
(0.0279) 
0.2511*** 
(0.0280) 
0.2484*** 
(0.0284) 
Log likelihood -4314 -4303 -4209 
Pseudo R 
squared 
0.45 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.43 0.49 
Sample size 
 
2590 2590 2590 2590 2590 2590 
Notes: (*) denotes significance at the 10% level 
 (**) denotes significance at the 5% level 
 (***) denotes significance at the 1% level 
 Base categories for education, ethnicity, number of books, location, mother’s education and 
employment and type of family are educ0, white, inner_city, mother_no_educ, 
mother_not_work and live_parents respectively 
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Tables 3.6: Bivariate Ordered Probit Estimates of attitude formation (specifications four 
and five) 
 Specification four  Specification five 
Dependent 
Variables 
Male 
 
Female Male Female 
age 0.0342*   
(0.0201) 
0.0398*   
(0.0223) 
0.0370*   
(0.020) 
0.0208 
(0.0225) 
age_squared -0.0006**  
(0.0002) 
-0.0006**  
(0.0003) 
-0.0006*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0003 
(0.0003) 
educ1 0.1968*** 
(0.0797) 
0.3413*** 
(0.0790) 
0.1930*** 
(0.0785) 
0.3029*** 
(0.0790) 
educ2 0.2759*** 
(0.0779) 
0.4364*** 
(0.0847) 
0.2700*** 
(0.0773) 
0.3807*** 
(0.0857) 
educ3 0.5252*** 
(0.1021) 
0.7527*** 
(0.1094) 
0.4885*** 
(0.1032) 
0.6211*** 
(0.1158) 
educ4 0.8688*** 
(0.1578) 
0.7783*** 
(0.1859) 
0.8397*** 
(0.1579) 
0.6285*** 
(0.1886) 
other_white -0.2449**  
(0.1193) 
-0.2934**  
(0.1463) 
-0.2318**  
(0.1186) 
-0.2468*   
(0.1451) 
other_ethnic -0.5727*** 
(0.1559) 
-0.4011*** 
(0.1566) 
-0.6193*** 
(0.1524) 
-0.2272 
(0.1612) 
books_unknown -0.2099 
(0.2177) 
0.2118 
(0.2706) 
-0.3394 
(0.2149) 
0.1936 
(0.2640) 
books_few 0.0778 
(0.0568) 
0.0908 
(0.0655) 
0.0556 
(0.0564) 
0.0843 
(0.0643) 
books_lots 0.0029 
(0.0666) 
0.1854*** 
(0.0678) 
0.0248 
(0.0658) 
0.1800*** 
(0.0666) 
suburb -0.0082 
(0.0872) 
-0.0177 
(0.1037) 
-0.0619 
(0.0864) 
-0.0373 
(0.1018) 
town 0.0027 
(0.0850) 
-0.2004**  
(0.0986) 
-0.0261 
(0.0840) 
-0.2019**  
(0.0969) 
village -0.1108 
(0.0877) 
-0.1497 
(0.1032) 
-0.128 
(0.0865) 
-0.1355 
(0.1015) 
rural -0.1593 
(0.1033) 
-0.2482**  
(0.1186) 
-0.2169**  
(0.1017) 
-0.2399**  
(0.1165) 
move -0.0753 
(0.1314) 
-0.031 
(0.1436) 
-0.1822 
(0.1298) 
-0.0192 
(0.1409) 
Mother_some_ 
educ 
0.0429 
(0.0609) 
-0.0593 
(0.0663) 
0.0449 
(0.060) 
-0.0737 
(0.0651) 
mother_further_ 
educ 
-0.0007 
(0.0781) 
-0.0659 
(0.0782) 
0.0243 
(0.0770) 
-0.0802 
(0.0766) 
mother_uni_ 
educ 
0.5013*** 
(0.1746) 
-0.0818 
(0.1375) 
0.6142*** 
(0.1765) 
-0.109 
(0.1353) 
mother_unknown 
_educ 
-0.0779 
(0.0871) 
-0.1503 
(0.0963) 
0.0009 
(0.0877) 
-0.1509 
(0.0943) 
mother_work -0.0031 
(0.0137) 
0.1771*** 
(0.0544) 
-0.0029 
(0.0135) 
0.1750*** 
(0.0536) 
mother_work_mis 0.1417*** 
(0.0520) 
0.091 
(0.1044) 
0.1518*** 
(0.0514) 
0.1007 
(0.1024) 
siblings -0.0703 
(0.0934) 
-0.0031 
(0.0143) 
-0.0208 
(0.0929) 
0.0012 
(0.0141) 
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live_father_ 
only 
0.0448 
(0.1819) 
-0.3100*   
(0.1868) 
-0.1045 
(0.1820) 
-0.3291*   
(0.1830) 
live_mother_ 
only 
0.0217 
(0.0908) 
-0.1086 
(0.0970) 
0.0029 
(0.0894) 
-0.104 
(0.0952) 
live_mother_ 
stepfather 
-0.1369 
(0.1103) 
0.1627 
(0.1143) 
-0.1808*   
(0.1083) 
0.1483 
(0.1122) 
live_father_ 
stepmother 
0.017 
(0.2744) 
0.0938 
(0.3435) 
0.2302*   
(0.1388) 
0.0511 
(0.3349) 
live_other 0.2511*   
(0.1404) 
0.2274 
(0.1408) 
0.0246 
(0.2722) 
0.1992 
(0.1382) 
male_income -0.0053 
(0.0061) 
-0.0009 
(0.0063) 
-0.0054 
(0.0060) 
0.0036 
(0.0064) 
female_income -0.0329*** 
(0.0098) 
-0.0223**  
(0.0102) 
-0.0333*** 
(0.0098) 
-0.0085 
(0.0107) 
male_unemployment -0.3559 
(0.9702) 
1.6807*   
(1.0166) 
-0.2694 
(0.9719) 
1.8708*   
(1.0095) 
childlessthan5 -0.1411**  
(0.069) 
-0.1758**  
(0.0730) 
-0.1453**  
(0.0688) 
-0.1094 
(0.0744) 
child5to11 -0.0527 
(0.0581) 
-0.0503 
(0.0618) 
-0.0532 
(0.0580) 
-0.0309 
(0.0615) 
childolderthan12 -0.1076*   
(0.062) 
-0.1758*** 
(0.0660) 
-0.1164*   
(0.0619) 
-0.1157*   
(0.0674) 
male_attitude    0.7322*** 
(0.1470) 
cut off1 
 
 
cut off2 
-0.6844 
(0.4421) 
0.3594 
(0.4419) 
-0.3942 
(0.4510) 
0.6146 
(0.4513) 
-0.6596 
(0.4405) 
0.3820 
(0.4404) 
1.2063 
(0.5567) 
2.1982 
(0.5390) 
Correlation 
coefficient 
0.2437*** 
(0.0285) 
-0.3484*** 
(0.1240) 
Log likelihood 
 
-4200 -4192 
Pseudo R squared 
 
0.43 0.49 0.43 0.49 
Sample size 
 
2590 2590 2590 2590 
 Notes: (*) denotes significance at the 10% level 
 (**) denotes significance at the 5% level 
 (***) denotes significance at the 1% level 
Base categories for education, ethnicity, number of books, location, mother’s education and employment 
and type of family are educ0, white, inner_city, mother_no_edu, mother_not_work and live_parents 
respectively 
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These two latest specifications (four and five in table 3.6) are used to predict male and 
female attitude scores, which are introduced into the bivariate probit model originally 
developed in chapter two. The male and female score predicted from specification four 
denoted by predicted_male_attitude and predicted_female_attitude have a mean and 
standard deviation (in parenthesis) of 2.46 (0.19) and 2.58 (0.17) respectively. The male and 
female score predicted from specification five denoted by predicted_male_attitude2 and 
predicted_female_attitude2 have a mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of 2.46 
(0.19) and 2.53 (0.34) respectively. Incorporating male attitudes in the formation of female 
ones results in greater variation in the latter even though, on average, female scores from 
specifications four and five are broadly the same.     
The sample used in order to investigate the impact of attitudes on labour market 
participation is different than the one used to predict attitudes. Respondents that are into 
further educational training were not removed from the sample in chapter two, as only full-
time students were not considered then. Second, some individuals have not provided 
information on some variables used in the modelling of labour market participation but 
have answered questions on attitudes and vice-versa. The basic model developed in chapter 
two is re-estimated on the new sample in order to render results comparable. A decision is 
made not to impose the restriction of pooled income for males. The results are displayed in 
table 3.7 below. They are broadly consistent with those obtained in chapter two for 
females. For males, age effects and the impact of the presence of a child aged less than five 
becomes better determined while other effects are broadly in line with results from chapter 
two. The two sets of male and female attitude scores are added to this model. Male and 
female attitude scores do not seem to significantly impact on the participation decision of 
males. However, it is difficult to assess whether this is due to the fact that attitudes do not 
matter or that they do not reflect personal preferences. In the male regression model, own 
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and cross-wage effects as well as income effects are unaltered after the inclusion of both 
types of attitude measures. However, there is a slight change in the magnitude of the 
impact of the female wage on male participation. As expected, the inclusion of the work 
status of his mother (displayed in table 3.7 below) does not alter results either. This is not 
the case for females. The introduction of the first set of attitude scores does not impact on  
own wage effects or income effects but does affect the impact of the male wage on his 
wife’s participation. The latter becomes better determined and increases in magnitude. The 
impact of a female’s own attitude score on her participation is not statistically different 
from zero while the impact of her husband’s is. However, this effect is washed out when 
the mother-in-law’s working status is introduced in the model (as shown in table 3.7). This 
confirms the hypothesis adduced in chapter two, that the status of a mother’s behaviour 
impact on her son’s preferences, which in turn affect his wife’s decisions. However, results 
from the first set of scores suggest that the benefits of introducing the latter are not 
different from the ones obtained by introducing the mother-in-law’s work status in the 
model. For the second set of scores, it is the female score that is found to impact on female 
participation. However, this is probably due to the fact that the latter is a linear 
combination of the male score. An interesting result is obtained when the mother-in-law’s 
working status is introduced into the model as both the attitude score and the mother-in-
law’s working status remain significant. This might suggest that the impact of the mother-
in-law’s work status is not only due to an effect on male attitudes. Maybe the other effect 
identified by Fernandez el al (2004) that the husband’s productivity in the household also 
plays a role is at work here. However, investigating this is beyond the scope of this chapter 
but constitutes an interesting agenda for future research.    
It is important to mention that the fact that the estimated effects of attitude scores are not 
significant is most probably due to the high correlation between wages and attitudes for 
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both gender groups. This is due to the fact that important determinants of attitudes are also 
important determinants of wages too (education and ethnicity through the Mills ratio). In 
order to disentangle these effects; further research needs to be done on the relationship 
between attitudes and wages. This last aspect of gender-role analysis has not been 
extensively researched. Albrecht et al (2000) are among the rare studies to have looked at 
the relationship between wages and gender roles.   
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Table 3.7: Bivariate probit estimates for a couple’s labour market participation (with 
attitude scores) 
 Basic specification Specification with 
predicted attitudes (from 
specification four)† 
Specification with 
predicted attitudes (from 
specification five) ††  
Dependent 
variables 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
male_wage 1.2295*** 
(0.1410) 
-0.1494 
(0.1182) 
1.2177*** 
(0.1651) 
-0.3301** 
(0.1436) 
1.1838*** 
(0.1614) 
-0.2979** 
(0.1400) 
female_wage 0.4828*** 
(0.1392) 
1.3746*** 
(0.1232) 
0.3975** 
(0.1838) 
1.3259*** 
(0.1558) 
0.5166*** 
(0.1495) 
1.1312*** 
(0.1302) 
male_income -0.6201*** 
(0.0689) 
-0.2572*** 
(0.0680) 
-0.6275*** 
(0.0700) 
-0.2747*** 
(0.0690) 
-0.6176*** 
(0.0694) 
-0.2938*** 
(0.0691) 
female_income -0.6809*** 
(0.1288) 
-1.1471*** 
(0.1157) 
-0.6734*** 
(0.1306) 
-1.1120*** 
(0.1165) 
-0.6631*** 
(0.1312) 
-1.1539*** 
(0.1171) 
age25_34 -0.5826** 
(0.2754) 
-0.1634 
(0.1536) 
-0.5674** 
(0.2760) 
-0.1157 
(0.1559) 
-0.5847** 
(0.2776) 
-0.0837 
(0.1572) 
age35_44 -0.7050*** 
(0.2830) 
-0.3879** 
(0.1608) 
-0.6782** 
(0.2866) 
-0.3035* 
(0.1664) 
-0.6987** 
(0.2877) 
-0.2604 
(0.1663) 
age45more -1.0563*** 
(0.2731) 
-0.6077*** 
(0.1539) 
-1.0142*** 
(0.2884) 
-0.4579*** 
(0.1682) 
-1.0360*** 
(0.2878) 
-0.4104*** 
(0.1664) 
male_ 
unemployment 
-4.2464*** 
(1.5661) 
f -4.5372*** 
(1.6241) 
f -4.1249*** 
(1.5746) 
f 
female_ 
unemployment 
 
f -0.0822 
(2.6086) 
f -0.5283 
(2.6608) 
f -1.7534 
(2.6428) 
childlessthan5 0.1731 
(0.1288) 
-0.5289*** 
(0.0855) 
0.1793 
(0.1311) 
-0.4866*** 
(0.0875) 
0.1842 
(0.1311) 
-0.4933*** 
(0.0879) 
child5to11 0.2827*** 
(0.1092) 
-0.0669 
(0.0755) 
0.2854*** 
(0.1100) 
-0.0450 
(0.0763) 
0.2869*** 
(0.1100) 
-0.0479 
(0.0768) 
childolderthan12 0.2218** 
(0.1057) 
0.1610** 
(0.0811) 
0.2394** 
(0.1079) 
0.2041** 
(0.0848) 
0.2218** 
(0.1062) 
0.2384*** 
(0.0836) 
predicted_male_ 
attitude† 
 
f f 0.0200 
(0.3031) 
0.5409** 
(0.2397) 
f f 
predicted_female
_attitude† 
 
f f 0.2360 
(0.3412) 
0.0977 
(0.2682) 
f f 
predicted_male_ 
attitude2†† 
 
f f f f 0.1924 
(0.2862) 
0.3531 
(0.2296) 
predicted_female
_attitude2†† 
 
f f f f -0.0957 
(0.1260) 
0.5526*** 
(0.0988) 
constant -1.1378*** 
(0.3967) 
-0.8213*** 
(0.3014) 
-1.6177* 
(0.8439) 
-1.9924*** 
(0.6554) 
-1.3543** 
(0.6856) 
-2.3406*** 
(0.5196) 
Correlation 
coefficient 
0.3187*** 
(0.0514) 
0.3177*** 
(0.0517) 
0.3347*** 
(0.0577) 
Notes: (*) denotes significance at the 10% level 
 (**) denotes significance at the 5% level 
 (***) denotes significance at the 1% level 
               (f) denotes variables omitted from the regression model ;  
                     (†) male and female attitude scores predicted using specification four 
                (††) male and female attitude scores predicted using specification five 
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Table 3.8: Bivariate probit estimates for a couple’s labour market participation (with 
attitude scores and mother-in-law working status) 
 Bivariate probit with mother-in-law 
and predicted attitude (1)   
Bivariate probit with mother-in-law 
and predicted attitude (2)  
Dependent variables Male Female Male Female 
male_wage 1.2543*** 
(0.1688) 
-0.2288 
(0.1469) 
1.2087*** 
(0.1644) 
-0.2123 
(0.1428) 
female_wage 0.3782** 
(0.1847) 
1.3070*** 
(0.1562) 
0.5109*** 
(0.1497) 
1.1296*** 
(0.1303) 
male_income -0.6242*** 
(0.0703) 
-0.2612*** 
(0.0694) 
-0.6145*** 
(0.0697) 
-0.2812*** 
(0.0696) 
female_income -0.6820*** 
(0.1308) 
-1.1278*** 
(0.1169) 
-0.6703*** 
(0.1314) 
-1.1703*** 
(0.1175) 
age25_34 -0.6062** 
(0.2812) 
-0.1505 
(0.1574) 
-0.6175** 
(0.2827) 
-0.1193 
(0.1586) 
age35_44 -0.7241*** 
(0.2927) 
-0.3440** 
(0.1684) 
-0.7381*** 
(0.2936) 
-0.3025* 
(0.1682) 
age45more -1.0723*** 
(0.2968) 
-0.5081*** 
(0.1712) 
-1.0853*** 
(0.2959) 
-0.4643*** 
(0.1693) 
male_unemployment -4.5958*** 
(1.6271) 
f -4.1354*** 
(1.5764) 
f 
female_unemployment f -0.3732 
(2.6647) 
f -1.5305 
(2.6462) 
childlessthan5 0.1665 
(0.1316) 
-0.5169*** 
(0.0882) 
0.1736 
(0.1316) 
-0.5233*** 
(0.0885) 
child5to11 0.2743*** 
(0.1109) 
-0.0695 
(0.0768) 
0.2782*** 
(0.1109) 
-0.0714 
(0.0773) 
childolderthan12 
 
0.2425** 
(0.1083) 
0.1974** 
(0.0849) 
0.2224** 
(0.1065) 
0.2277*** 
(0.0836) 
motherinlaw_work 0.0763 
(0.0900) 
0.2310*** 
(0.0693) 
0.0645 
(0.0899) 
0.2251*** 
(0.0698) 
motherinlaw_misc -0.0746 
(0.1449) 
0.0652 
(0.1158) 
-0.0612 
(0.1449) 
0.0586 
(0.1164) 
predicted_male_attitude† 
 
-0.1251 
(0.3313) 
0.2146 
(0.2596) 
f f 
predicted_female_attitude† 
 
0.2743 
(0.3432) 
0.1484 
(0.2696) 
f f 
predicted_male_attitude2†† 
 
f f 0.0886 
(0.3095) 
0.0562 
(0.2473) 
predicted_female_attitude2†† 
 
f f -0.0947 
(0.1261) 
0.5570*** 
(0.0988) 
constant -1.3805 
(0.8725) 
-1.5911** 
(0.6714) 
-1.1288 
(0.7270) 
-1.8867*** 
(0.5424) 
Correlation coefficient 0.3257*** 
(0.0577) 
0.3330*** 
(0.0580) 
 Notes: (*) denotes significance at the 10% level 
  (**) denotes significance at the 5% level 
  (***) denotes significance at the 1% level 
                         (f) denotes variables omitted from the regression model 
                               (†) male and female attitude scores predicted using specification four  
                               (††) male and female attitude scores predicted using specification five  
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7 Concluding Comments 
The first part of this chapter has drawn on both the sociological and psychological 
literatures to develop measures of attitudes towards gender roles. An analysis of the 
determinants of the latter reveals that the attitudes of spouses are interdependent. They are 
influenced by a number of factors from an individual’s childhood such as ethnicity, 
mother’s education (for men) and number of books in the childhood home (for women) as 
well as their educational level. One aspect of attitude determination which has not, to our 
knowledge been analysed before, is the role of the unemployment rate. The latter is found 
to affect female attitudes with a higher unemployment rate increasing the probability that 
the wife is modern. This shows that wives no longer consider themselves secondary 
workers in the household as they see themselves as important contributors to household 
income in the case of an economic downturn. As is commonly found in the literature, the 
presence of children increases the probability of being traditional for both men and 
women. Finally, having a modern husband increases the probability that a wife is modern 
herself; which would suggest either that individuals tend to marry partners that have similar 
views (assortative mating) or that individuals adapt their attitudes to their spouse’s.   
The introduction of measures of attitudes in the bivariate probit model of chapter two does 
not impact on own wage and income effects. Furthermore, attitudes do not seem to affect 
male participation in the labour market. This could suggest that, as predicted by the 
neoclassical model, price effects remain the stronger determinants of labour supply 
behaviour with their effects being robust to alternative forms of specifications. Attitudes 
do play a role in the determination of female participation, but this role varies depending 
on the specification and definition of attitudes used. Overall, it seems that the mother-in-
law effect introduced in chapter two does represent an attitude effect but could in addition, 
proxy for something else such as the productivity of a husband in housework. Data on 
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household production, which are available in the BHPS, could be used to investigate this 
proposition and this is left as an agenda for future research.   
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Conclusions 
In his seminal paper on male labour supply, Pencavel (1986) argued that empirical studies 
of labour supply have tended to be anchored in strong theoretical frameworks. The author 
adds that researchers have not been concerned about testing whether the standard 
assumptions on which these models relied were justified by the data. This has certainly 
changed in the contemporary labour supply literature. Indeed, the last two decades have 
seen a proliferation of research on the theoretical modelling of household labour supply. 
This research was prompted by an increasing dissatisfaction with the assumptions of the 
early neoclassical framework that treated the family as a single utility-maximizing unit, also 
known as the unitary model. The latter is the subject of study of the first two chapters.  
In chapter one, a model of a couple’s supply of working hours is developed. An 
Instrumental Variables estimator is used to estimate labour supply regression models for 
males and females in order to test whether an individual’s own wage is endogenous to their 
supply of working hours. Results reveal that wages are exogenous for males but 
endogenous for females. Furthermore, it is found that there is no correlation in 
unobservables that determine male and female labour supply, which means that male and 
female regression models are estimable separately. Labour supply estimates are generally 
consistent with previous findings for Great Britain. Wage effects do not seem sensitive to 
the type of non-labour income included in the specification, which might indicate the 
unitary model can be used to derive wage elasticities for policy purposes. However, wages 
are not the only indicators used by policymakers. When it comes to the welfare of 
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individuals, and in particular regarding children, it is important to determine the identity of 
the person receiving benefits. The unitary model stipulates that the latter does not matter as 
a household pools income. This proposition of the unitary model is investigated as well as 
the assumption of Slutsky symmetry. While the test on symmetry appears conclusive in 
favour of the unitary model, it relies on a pooled measure of non-labour income and 
therefore might not be valid. Nevertheless, finding that symmetry is upheld constitutes an 
important result in favour of the neoclassical assumption of rational behaviour. An attempt 
to test for income pooling reveals the limits of this test when income effects are not well 
determined. More promising results are obtained with disaggregated measures of income. 
While this could be interrogated further, the question remains on whether there is 
sufficient variation in data on each type of non-labour income.  
The unitary model has also been criticized for failing to provide insights into the 
mechanisms governing interactions of individuals within households. In the last two 
decades, a number of alternative models of household behaviour have been developed. An 
important concept has surfaced in a number of these models: a spouse’s bargaining power. 
Doss (2003) states: 
Although policymakers may be uncomfortable with the idea of redistributing  
power within households, they must realize that any policy, including a policy 
of doing nothing, will affect the intrahousehold allocation of resources (p.59)  
Variables that represent bargaining power have been labelled as “distribution factors” in 
the collective model. There are a number of ways to measure bargaining power of 
household members. However, most indicators are likely to be endogenous to household 
behaviour. In the first empirical chapter, two types of distribution factors are investigated: 
sex ratios and the age difference between spouses as well as a binary variable indicating if 
the wife is older than her husband. Unfortunately, results show that sex ratios and the age 
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difference do not impact on the hours of work of spouses. The variable indicating that the 
wife is older is significant in the female equation but it is unlikely that the latter reflects 
bargaining as it is not found to influence male hours. This is not a surprising result as 
determining appropriate measures of bargaining has been described by Doss (2003) as “ 
the biggest challenges for researchers interested in these issues” ( p.46). Therefore, even if 
the unitary model does not seem to provide an adequate framework for the analysis of 
labour supply responses, the majority of newer neoclassical models mostly rely on a 
concept that is extremely hard to tackle empirically.  
The first chapter only analysed the supply of hours for couples where both spouses work. 
In chapter two, the unitary model is explored in the broader context of labour market 
participation. Joint analyses of the decision to work of spouses are rare in the literature due 
to a number of theoretical and empirical challenges. A decision is made to apply an ad hoc 
approach in order not to constrain the analysis. A bivariate probit model is used to model 
participation decisions among couples. Results show that unlike hours of work, 
unobservables that determine the participation decision of males are positively correlated to 
unobservables that determine the participation decisions of their wives. The elasticity of 
female participation with respect to their wage and non-labour income are generally 
consistent with findings in the literature.  
Regarding testing of the income-pooling proposition, unlike in the first chapter, income 
effects are well determined and suggest that income is pooled for males but not for 
females. This echoes the results obtained in chapter one using the measure without 
investment income. This result might suggest that the unitary model is a good description 
of male behaviour but not female. While it is plausible that male income is considered to be 
household income and female income is considered to be her own, the question remains of 
whether it makes sense to conclude that spouses’ behaviours do not fit in a single 
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framework of household behaviour. The introduction of distribution factors, as in the case 
of hours of work equations, does not yield promising results. Sex ratios are found to 
impact both male and female participation in the same direction, which is not consistent 
with a “bargaining” interpretation while age difference is found to impact only on male 
behaviour. This confirms the difficulty, flagged in chapter one, of incorporating the notion 
of bargaining into models of labour supply. Furthermore, a more careful interrogation of 
bargaining would need to incorporate household production. While an analysis of the latter 
was deemed outside the scope of this thesis, it is an important aspect of household 
behaviour. Data on domestic production is available in the BHPS and studies have analysed 
the domestic work of British couples with promising results (see Harkness, 2003, 2007). 
This is left as a topic for further research. Finally, incorporating domestic work to the 
analysis will also allow further investigation of the reasons behind the impact of the 
working status of a husband’s mother on his wife’s labour supply. If it is found that the 
husbands of wives that are influenced by their mother-in-law tend to work longer hours in 
the household, it would imply that assortative mating is not the only explanation behind 
the correlation in behaviour of wives and their mother-in-law. However, it is unclear how a 
formal model of the relationship between a husband’s contribution in household 
production and his mother’s influence on his wife would be set up. 
The assumptions of the unitary model are not the only subject of debate in the current 
literature on household labour supply behaviour.   
From a more general perspective, the neoclassical model altogether has been criticized by 
economists and academics from other disciplines for failing to account for dimensions 
such as culture and preferences.45 Research has been flourishing in the last ten years to 
                                                 
45 See DiMaggio (1990) for examples. 
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address these issues. The second part of chapter two and chapter three contribute to this 
emerging literature. In the second part of chapter two, it is found that the work status of 
the husband’s mother when he was aged 14 has an impact on his wife’s labour market 
participation decision. This impact, which has not, to our knowledge, been analysed for 
Great Britain reveals that the neoclassical model does neglect some important factors in its 
empirical specifications. Encouraging the labour supply of women will also increase the 
participation of women in younger generations. However, wage and income effects are in 
general found not to be sensitive to the inclusion of this variable, which means that 
policymakers can rely on austere models to make predictions regarding behaviour even if 
they do not identify all the effects behind certain behaviour. The mother-in-law’s work 
status might be a proxy for a male’s attitudes regarding women’s role in the labour market.  
Chapter three uses the rich set of questions on gender roles available from the BHPS to 
identify the main determinants of attitude formation. This subject has been traditionally 
assigned to disciplines outside economics. A bivariate ordered probit is used to explore the 
determinants of attitudes among couples. This methodology is recent and has not been 
employed in this context before. Results indicate that spouses’ attitudes towards gender 
roles are interdependent. Education, ethnicity and mother’s working behaviour play an 
important role in the formation of both male and female attitudes. For males, mother’s 
education is also important while for females the number of books available in the 
childhood home constitutes an important factor in the determination of gender-role 
attitudes. This variable has not been used in previous studies and shows the importance of 
informal education. Another dimension, which has only been partially looked at in the 
sociological literature is the impact of male unemployment on gender-role attitudes. It is 
normally suggested that in an economic downturn, women’s role in the labour market will 
be challenged. Results show that not only is this not the case, but a high male 
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unemployment rate encourages more egalitarian female attitudes and does not impact on 
male ones. Having an egalitarian husband is also found to increases the probability that a 
wife is more egalitarian.  
The last part of the thesis investigates the impact of male and female attitudes on their 
labour market behaviour. Attitude scores do not seem to impact on male participation but 
male attitudes impact on female participation. This is probably due to a high correlation 
between wage offers and attitudes. Further analysis shows that the impact of male attitudes 
is linked to that of the mother-in-law’s work behaviour confirming the hypothesis of 
Fernandez et al (2004). The introduction of attitudes (or mother-in-law work behaviour) 
improves the specification of cross wage effects. However, results suggest that 
policymakers can still rely on own wage effects and income effects provided by a more 
austere specification.  
This thesis does not provide an unequivocal answer to the question of whether the 
neoclassical model does constitute an adequate framework for the study of household 
labour supply. While the pooling assumption implied by earlier neoclassical model seems to 
be rejected, this obviously affects income elasticities but not the impact of wages. 
Promising alternative frameworks are hard to implement (at least using British data). 
However, further research might be able to identify new dimensions of bargaining to 
introduce to the model, maybe making use of data from previous waves.  
A complete questioning of the neoclassical model also requires a collective model to be 
estimated as the latter is increasingly becoming an alternative to the unitary model within 
neoclassical economics. However, the latter relies on finding significant distribution factors. 
Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, a suitable collective model needs to incorporate 
household production in the analysis.  
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Another aspect that is not discussed in this thesis is the issue of part-time work, which is an 
important aspect of female labour market behaviour in the United Kingdom. The latter is 
bound to be closely linked to the issue of bargaining. One way to analyse the latter would 
be to estimate a multinomial logit in chapter two, in which the decision being modelled 
would be between full-time work, part-time work and no work. The problem with BHPS 
data is that the status of part-time is defined from reported hours.  
 217 
 
Bibliography 
Agarwal, B. (1997) “Bargaining” and Gender Relations: Within and Beyond the Household. 
Feminist Economics, 3(1), 1-51.   
 
Akerlof, G.A., and Kranton, R.E (2000). Economics and Identity. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 115(3), 715-753.  
 
Albrecht, S.L., Bahr, H.M. and Chadwick, B. A. (1979). Changing Family and Sex Roles: An 
Assessment of Age Differences. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 41(1), 41-50.  
 
Albrecht, J.W., Edin, P., and Vroman, S.B. (2000) A Cross-country Comparison of 
Attitudes Towards Mothers Working and their Actual Labor Market Experience. Labour, 
14(4), 591-608.  
 
Alderman, H., Chiappori, P.-A., Haddad, L., Hoddinott, J., and Kanbur,R. (1995). Unitary 
versus Collective Models of the Household: Is It Time to Shift the Burden of Proof? The 
World Bank Research Observer, 10(1), 1-19. 
 
Alderman, H., Haddad, L., and Hoddinott, J. (1997). Policy Issues and Intrahousehold 
Resource Allocation: Conclusions. In Haddad, L., Hoddinott, J., and Alderman, H (eds) 
Intrahousehold Resource Allocation in Developing Countries: Methods, models and Policy (pp. 129-141). 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press for the International Food Policy Research 
Institute. 
 
Angrist, J. (2002). How Do Sex Ratios Affect Marriage and Labor Markets? Evidence from 
America's Second Generation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(3), 997-1038. 
 
Antecol, H. (2000). An Examination of Cross-Country Differences in the Gender Gap in 
Labor Force Participation Rates, Labour Economics, 7, 409-426. 
 
Apps P., and Rees, R. (1997) Collective Labor Supply and Household Production. The 
Journal of Political Economy, 105 (1), 178-190 
 
Arrufat, J.L., and Zabalza, A. (1986). Female Labor Supplu with Taxation, Random 
Preferences, and Optimization Errors. Econometrica, 54(1), 47-63.   
 
Ashenfelter, O. and Heckman, J. (1974) The Estimation of Income and Substitution 
Effects in a Model of Family Labor Supply. Econometrica, 42(1), 73-86. 
 
 218 
 
Ashworth, J.S., and Ulph, D.T. (1981). Household Models. In Brown, C.V. (ed), Taxation 
and Labour Supply. London: Allen and Unwin. 
 
Barmby, T. (1996). Computation of Nash-Bargained Models of Household Labour Supply. 
Bulletin of Economic Research, 48(2), 161-165. 
 
Basmann, R.L. (1960). On Finite Sample Distributions of Generalized Classical Linear 
Identifiability test statistics. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 55(292), 650-659. 
 
Basu, K. (2006) Gender and Say: a Model of Household Behaviour with Endogenously 
Determined Balance of Power. The Economic Journal, 116(511), 558-580.  
 
Baum, C.F., Schaffer, M.E., and Stillman, S. (2002). Instrumental Variables and GMM: 
Estimation and Testing. Boston College Economics Working Paper 545.   
 
Becker, G. (1973) A Theory of Marriage: Part I. Journal of Political Economy, 81 (4), 813-846. 
 
Becker, G. (1991) A Treatise on the Family, Enlarged edition. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
 
Becker, G. (1996) Accounting for Tastes. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Becker, G.S, and Murphy, K.M. (2000). Social Economics: Market Behaviour in a Social 
Environment. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.  
 
Beck, U., and Beck-Gernsheim, E. (1995). The Normal Chaos of Love. Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
 
Berrington, A., Hu, Y., Smith, P.W.F., and Sturgis, P. (2008). A Graphical Chain Model for 
Reciprocal Relationships between Women’s Gender Role Attitudes and Labour Force 
Participation. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A, 171(1), 89-108. 
 
Bjorn, P.A, and Vuong, Q.H. (1997). Modeles d’equations Simultanees pour Variables 
Endogenes Fictives: Une Formulation par la Theorie des Jeux avec Application a la 
Participation au Marche du Travail. L'Actualité économique, Revue d'analyse économique, 73,161-
205.  
 
Bingley, P. and Walker, I. (2001). Household Unemployment and the Labour Supply of 
Married Women. Economica, 68(270), 157-185. 
 
Bisin, A. and Verdier, T. (1998) On the Cultural Transmission of Preferences for Social 
Status. Journal of Public Economics, 70, 75-97.   
 
Bisin, A. and Verdier, T. (2000). Beyond the Melting Pot": Cultural Transmission, Marriage, 
and the Evolution of Ethnic and Religious Traits. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(3), 
955-988.   
 
Bisin, A. and Verdier, T. (2001). The Economics of Cultural Transmission and the 
Dynamics of Preferences. Journal of Economic Theory, 97, 298-319.   
 
 219 
 
Blau, F.D., Ferber, M.A., and Winkler, A.E. (2006). The Economics of Women, Men and Work. 
Fifth Edition. Upper Saddle River: Pearson Prentice Hall. 
 
Blundell, R. (2000). Work Incentives and ‘In-Work’ Benefit Reforms: A Review. Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy, 16(1), 27-44. 
 
Blundell, R., and Walker, I. (1982). Modelling the Joint Determination of Household 
Labour Supplies and Commodity Demands. The Economic Journal, 92(366), 351-364. 
 
Blundell, R., Duncan, A., and Meghir, C. (1998). Estimating Labour Supply Responses 
using Tax Reforms. Econometrica, 66(4), 827-861.    
 
Blundell, R., and MaCurdy, T. (1999). Labor Supply: A Review of Alternative Approaches. 
In Ashenfelter, O., and Card, D. (eds), Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3 (pp. 
1559-1695). Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
 
Blundell, R., Chiappori, P.-A., and Meghir, C. (2005). Collective Labor Supply with 
Children. Journal of Political Economy, 113(6), 1277-1406.  
 
Blundell, R., Chiappori, P.-A., Magnac, T., and Meghir, C. (2007). Collective Labour 
Supply:Heterogeneity and Non-Participation. Review of Economic Studies ,74, 417–445.   
 
Booth, A. L., Jenkins, S.P., and Garcia Serrano, C. (1999). New Men and New Women? A 
Comparison of Paid Work Propensities from a Panel Data Perspective. Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, 61(2), 167-197. 
 
Borjas (1980) The Relationship between Wages and Weekly Hours of Work: The Role of 
Division Bias. Journal of Human Resources, 15(3), 409-423.   
 
Bound, J., Jaeger, D.A., and Baker, R.M. (1995). Problems With Instrumental Variables 
Estimation When the Correlation Between the Instruments and the Endogenous 
Explanatory Variable is Weak. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 90(430), 443-450.   
 
Bourguignon F., and Chiappori, P.-A (1992). Collective Models of Household Behavior: an 
Introduction. European Economic Review, 36, 355-364. 
 
Breusch, T. S., and Pagan, A. R. (1979). A Simple Test for Heteroskedasticity and Random 
Coefficient Variation. Econometrica, 47, 1287-1294. 
 
British Household Panel Survey [STATA format]. Principal investigator, ESRC Research 
Centre on Micro-social Change. Colchester: The Data Archive. 
 
Brooks, C., and Bolzendahl, C. (1994). The transformation of US gender role attitudes: 
cohort replacement, social-structural change, and ideological learning. Social Science Research, 
33, 106-133.  
 
Browning, M., and Chiappori, P.-A. (1998). Efficient Intra-household Allocation: A 
Characterisation and Tests. Econometrica, 66 (6), 1241-1278.   
 
 220 
 
Browning, M., Chiappori, P.-A., and Lechene, V. (2006). Collective and Unitary Models: A 
Clarification. Review of Economics of the Household, 4(1), 5-14. 
 
Burt, K.B., and Scott, J. (2002). Parent and Adolescent Gender Role Attitudes in 1990s 
Great Britain. Sex Roles, 46(7/8), 239-245.  
 
Cavalli-Sforza, L., and Feldman, M. (1981). Cultural Transmission and Evolution: A Quantitative 
Approach. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
 
Chiappori, P.-A. (1988). Rational Household Labor Supply. Econometrica, 56, 63-90. 
Chiappori, P.-A. (1992). Collective Labor Supply and Welfare. The Journal of Political 
Economy, 100(3), 437- 467.  
 
Chiappori, P.-A. (1997). Introducing Household Production in Collective Models of Labor 
Supply. The Journal of Political Economy, 105(1), 191- 209.  
 
Chiappori, P.-A. (2002). Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation, and Household Labor 
Supply. Journal of Political Economy, 110(1), 37-72.  
 
Chiappori P.A., and Donni O. (2006). Les modèles non-unitaires de comportement du 
ménage: un survol de la littérature. L'Actualité économique: revue d'analyse économique, 82, 9-52.  
 
Christofides, L.N., Stengos, T., and Swidinsky, R. (1997). On the Calculation of Marginal 
Effects in the Bivariate Probit Model, Economic Letters, 54, 203-208. 
 
Christofides, L.N., Hardin, J.W., and Stengos, T. (2000). Corrigendum to: “On the 
Calculation of Marginal Effects in the Bivariate Probit Model”, Economic Letters, 68, 339. 
 
Clark, A., Couprie, H. and Sofer, C. (2002). Household Negotiation and Labor Supply: 
Evidence from the BHPS. IDEP Working Paper 201.  
 
Clark, A., Couprie, H. and Sofer, C. (2004). La Modelisation Collective de L’Offre de 
Travail: Mise en Perspective et Application aux Donnees Britanniques. Revue Economique, 
55(4), 767-789.    
 
Cohen, M.S., Rea, S.A., and Lerman, R.I. (1970). A Micro Model of Labor Supply. BLS 
Staff Paper 4, US Department of Labor. Washington: Government Printing Office. 
 
Conover, W.J. (1999). Practical Nonparametric statistics. Third Edition. New York: John Wiley 
and Sons. 
 
Cook, R. D. and Weisberg, S. (1983). Diagnostics for heteroscedasticity in regression. 
Biometrika, 70, 1-10. 
 
Creighton, C. (1999). The rise and decline of the ‘male breadwinner’ family in Britain. 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 23, 519-541.  
 
 221 
 
Crompton, R., Brockmann, M., and Wiggins, R.D. (2003). A Woman’s Place… 
Employment and Family Life for Men and Women. In Park, A., Curtice, Thomson, Jarvis, 
L., and Bromley, C. (eds). British Social Attitudes: the 20th Report. London: Sage Publications. 
 
Cronkite, R.C. (1977). The Determinants of Spouses’ Normative Preferences for Family 
Roles. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 39(3), 575-585. 
 
Davis, K. (1984). Wives and Work: The Sex Role Revolution and Its Consequences. 
Population and Development Review, 10(3), 397-417.  
 
Davis, N.J., and Robinson, R.V. (1991). Men's and Women's Consciousness of Gender 
Inequality: Austria, West Germany, Great Britain, and the United States. American Sociological 
Review, 56(1), 72-84.    
 
Davies, H., Joshi, H., Killingsworth, M., and Peronaci, R.. (2000). How do Couples Spend 
Their Time? Hours of Market and Domestic Work Time in British Partnerships. In 
Gustafsson, S,. and Meulders D. (eds), Gender and the Labour Market: Econometric Evidence of 
Obstacles to Achieving Gender Equality (pp.226-259). Macmillan.  
 
Deaton, A. and Muellbauer, J. (1980) Economics and Consumer Behavior. New-York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Del Boca, D. (1997). Intrahousehold Distribution of Resources and Labor Market 
Participation Decisions. In Persson I, and Jonung C (eds) Economics of the Family and Family 
Policies, (pp. 65-83 ). London: Routledge  
 
Del Boca, D., Locatelli, M., and Pasqua, S. (2000). Employment Decisions of Married 
Women: Evidence and Explanations. Labour, 14(1), 35-52.  
   
Dex, S. (1985) The Sexual Division of Work: Conceptual Revolutions in the Social Sciences. Brighton: 
Wheatsheaf Books Ltd. 
 
Dex,S. (1988) Women's Attitudes Towards Work, London: Macmillan. 
 
DiMaggio, P. (1990). Chapter4: Cultural Aspects of Economic Action and Organization. In 
Friedland, R., and Robertson, A.F. (eds) Beyond the Marketplace: Rethinking Economy and Society 
(pp.113-136). New York: Aldine de Gruyter. 
 
Donni O. (2006). Les modèles non-coopératifs d'offre familiale de travail: théorie et 
évidence. L'Actualité économique: revue d'analyse économique, 82, 181-206. 
 
Donni, O. (2008). Labor Supply, Home Production, and Welfare Comparisons. Journal of 
Public Economics, 92(7), 1720-1737.  
 
Doss, C. (1996). Testing Among Models of Intrahousehold Resource Allocation. World 
Development , 24(10), 1597-1609. 
 
Doss, C. (2003). Chapter 3: Conceptualizing and Measuring Bargaining Power within the 
Household. In Moe, K.S. (eds) Women, Family and Work: Writings on the Economics of Gender, 
(pp.43-61). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.  
 222 
 
 
Duguet, E. and Simonnet, V. (2007). Labour market participation in France: an asymptotic 
least squares analysis of couples’ decisions. Review of Economics of the Household, 5(2), 159-179. 
 
Ermisch, J.F. (2003). An Economic Analysis of the Family. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press.  
 
Ermisch, J.F., and Wright, R.E. (1994). Interpretation of negative sample selection effects 
in wage offer equations. Applied Economic Letters, 1, 187-189.  
 
Farre, L., and Vella, F. (2007). The Intergenerational Transmission of Gender Role 
Attitudes and its Implications for Female Labour Force Participation. IZA Discussion 
Paper number 2802.    
 
Ferber, M. A., (2003) A Feminist Critique of the Neoclassical Theory of the Family. In 
Moe, K.S. (eds) Women, Family and Work: Writings on the Economics of Gender (pp.9-23). 
Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.  
 
Fernandez, R. (2007). Women, Work, and Culture. NBER Working Paper Number 12888.  
 
Fernandez, R., Fogli, A., and Olivetti, C. (2002). Marrying your Mum: Preference 
Transmission and Women’s Labor and Education Choices. NBER Working Paper Number 
9234. 
 
Fernandez, R., Fogli, A. and Olivetti, C.(2004). Mothers and Sons: Preference Formation 
and Labor Force Dynamics. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(4), p1249-1299. 
 
Fernandez, R., and Fogli, A. (2009). Culture: An Empirical Investigation of Beliefs, Work 
and Fertility. American Economic Journal, 1(1), 146-177. 
 
Festinger, L. (1957). A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
Fortin B., and Lacroix, G. (1997). A Test of the Unitary and Collective Models of 
Household Labour Supply. The Economic Journal, 107, 933-955. 
 
Fortin N., (2005). Gender role attitudes and the labour-market outcome of women across 
OECD countries. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 21(3), 416-438. 
 
Freud, S. (1927). Some Psychological Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction 
Between the Sexes. In J. Strachey, (Ed. and Trans.) The standard edition of the complete 
psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 8, pp.133-142). London: Hogarth Press.  
 
Godfrey, L.G.(1978).Testing for multiplicative heteroskedasticity. Journal of Econometrics, 8, 
227-236. 
 
Goldscheider, F.K, and Waite, L. J. (1991). New Families, No Families? The transformation of the 
American Home. Berkeley: University of California Press.  
 
Gomulka, J., and Stern, N. (1990). The Employment of Married Women in the United 
Kingdom 1970-83. Economica, 57(226), 171-199.   
 223 
 
 
Gutierrez-Domenech, M. and Bell, B. (2004). Female Labour Force Participation in the 
UK: Evolving Characteristics or Changing Behaviour? Bank of England Working Papers 221. 
 
Gray, J.S. (1998). Divorce-Law Changes, Household Bargaining, and Married Women’s 
Labour Supply. The American Economic Review, 88(3), 628-642.    
 
Greene, W.H. (1996). Marginal Effects in the Bivariate Probit Model. Stern School of Business, 
Department of Economics, Working paper EC-96-11. 
 
Greene, W.H. (2008). Econometric Analysis: Sixth Edition. Upper Saddle River: Pearson 
Prentice Hall. 
  
Greenhalgh, C. (1980). Participation and Hours of Work for Married Women in Great 
Britain. Oxford Economic Papers, 32(2), 296-318.    
 
Grossbard-Shechtman, A. (1984) A Theory of Allocation of Time in Markets for Labour 
and Marriage.” Economic Journal, 94, 863-82. 
 
Grossbard-Shechtman, S.A. (1993). On the Economics of Marriage. Boulder: Westview Press. 
 
Grossbard-Shechtman, S.A., and Neideffer, M. (1997). Women’s Hours of Work and 
Marriage Market Imbalances. In Persson I, and Jonung C (eds) Economics of the Family and 
Family Policies, (pp. 100-118 ). London: Routledge  
  
Grossbard, S., and Amuedo-Dorantes, C. (2007). Cohort-Level Sex Ratio Effects on 
Women’s Labor Force Participation. IZA Discussion Paper 2722.  
 
Hakim, C. (2000). Work–Lifestyle Choices in the 21st Century: Preference Theory. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Hakim, C. (2003). Public morality versus personal choice: the failure of social attitude 
surveys. British Journal of Sociology, 54(3), 339-345. 
 
Haller, M. and Hoellinger, F. (1994). Female Employment and the Change of Gender 
Roles: the Conflictual Relationship between Participation and Attitudes in International 
Comparison. International Sociology, 9(1), 87-112.    
 
Hansen, L.P. (1982). Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments 
Estimators. Econometrica, 50(4), 1029-1054.  
 
Harkness, S., Machin, S., and Waldfogel. J. (1997). Evaluating the Pin Money Hypothesis: 
The Relationship Between Women’s Labour Market Activity, Family Income and Poverty 
in Britain. Journal of Population Economics, 10, 137–158.  
 
Harkness, S. (2003). The Household Division of Labour: Changes in Families’ Allocation 
of Paid and Unpaid Work, 1992-2002. In Dickens, R., Gregg, P., and Wadsworth, J. (eds) 
The Labour Market Under New Labour: The State of Working Britain. (pp. 150-169). New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
 224 
 
Harkness, S. (2007). The Household Division of Labour: Changes in Families’ Allocation 
of Paid and Unpaid Work. In Scotts, J., Dex, S., and Joshi, H. (eds) Women and Employment: 
Changing Lives and New Challenges. (pp. 234-267). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
 
Hausman, J. (1978). Specification Tests in Econometrics. Econometrica, 46(3), 1251-1271. 
Hicks, J. R. (1946) Value and Capital. Second Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hochschild, A.R. (2003). The Second Shift. New York: Penguin Books. 
 
Hoddinott, J, Alderman, H., and Haddad, L. (1997) Testing Competing Models of 
Household Allocation. In Haddad, L., Hoddinott, J., and Alderman, H (eds) Intrahousehold 
Resource Allocation in Developing Countries: Methods, models and Policy (pp. 129-141). Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press for the International Food Policy Research Institute. 
 
Hofstede, G. (1980). Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work-
Related Values, New York and London: Sage. 
 
Hofstede, G. (1991).Cultures and Organisations, London: HarperCollins. 
 
Holter, H. (1970). Sex Roles and Social Structure. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 
 
Hoynes, H.W. (1996). Welfare Transfers in Two-Parent Families: Labor Supply and 
Welfare Participation Under AFDC-UP. Econometrica, 64(2), 295-332.   
 
Hunt, A. (1968). A Survey of Women's Employment .HMSO: London. 
Jacobsen, J.P., and Rayack, W.L. (1996). Do Men Whose Wives Work Really Earn Less? 
The American Economic Review, 86(2), 268-273. 
 
Jejeebhoy, S. J. (1995). Women’s Education, Autonomy, and Reproductive Behaviour: Experience from 
Developing Countries. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Joshi, H. (1986). Participation in Paid Work: Evidence from the Women and Employment 
Survey. In Blundell, R. and Walker, I. (eds.) Unemployment, Search and Labour Supply 
(pp. 271–42). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Kane, E.W. (1995). Education and Beliefs about Gender Inequality. Social Problems, 42(1), 
74-90.  
 
Kapteyn, A., Wansbeek, T., and Buyze, J. (1980). The Dynamics of Preference Formation. 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1(2), 123-157. 
 
Katz, E. (1997) The Intra-Household Economics of Voice and Exit. Feminist Economics, 
3(3), 25-46. 
 
Kawaguchi, D. (1994). Testing Neoclassical and Non-neoclassical Models of Household 
Labour Supply. Applied Economics, 26, 9-19.  
 
 225 
 
Kawaguchi, D., and Miyazaki, J. (2009). Working Mothers and Sons’ Preferences Regarding 
Female labor supply: direct evidence from stated preferences. Journal of Population Economics, 
22, 115-130.   
 
Kell, M., and Wright, J. (1990). Benefits and the Labour Supply of Women Married to 
Unemployed Men. The Economic Journal, 100(400), 119-126. 
 
Kiecolt, K. J., and Acock, A. C. (1988). The Long-Term Effects of Family Structure on 
Gender-Role Attitudes. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 50(3), 709-717. 
 
Killingsworth, M. (1983) Labor Supply. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Koenker, R. (1981). A note on Studentizing a test for heteroskedasticity. Journal of 
Econometrics, 17, 107-112. 
 
Kooreman, P. (1994). Estimation of Econometric Models of Some Discrete Games. Journal 
of Applied Econometrics, 9(3), 255-268. 
 
Kooreman, P., and Kapteyn, A. (1986). Estimation of Rationed and Unrationed Household 
Labour Supply Functions Using Flexible Functional Forms. The Economic Journal, 96(382), 
398-412.   
 
Kooreman, P., and Kapteyn, A. (1990). On the Empirical Implementation of Some Game 
Theoretic Models of Household Labor Supply. The Journal of Human Resources, 25(4), 584-
598. 
  
Kosters, M. H. (1966). Income and Substitution Effects in a Family Labor Supply Model. 
Report 3339, The Rand Corporation.   
 
Kraus, S. J. (1995). Attitudes and the prediction of behaviour: a meta-analysis of the 
empirical literature. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, 58–75. 
 
Layard, R., Barton, M. and Zabalza, A. (1980) Married Women’s Participation and Hours. 
Economica, 47, 51-72 
 
Leuthold, J.H. (1968). An Empirical Study of Formula Income Transfers and the Work 
Decision of the Poor. The Journal of Human Resources, 3(3), 312-323. 
  
Levine, D.I., (1993). The effect of non-traditional attitudes on married women’s labour 
supply. Journal of Economic Psychology, 14, 665-679.  
 
Lewis, J. (2001). The decline of the Male Breadwinner Model: Implications for Work and 
Care. Social Politics, 8(2), 152-169. 
 
Likert, R.. (1932). A Technique for the Measurement of Attitudes. Archives of Psychology, 140, 
1-55. 
 
Lipman-Blumen, J., and Tickamyer, A. R. (1975). Sex Roles in Transition: A Ten-Year 
Perspective. Annual Review of Sociology, 1, 297-337. 
 
 226 
 
Lommerud, K.E (1997). Battle of the Sexes: Non-cooperative Games in the Theory of the 
Family. In Persson, I and Jonung C (eds) Economics of the Family and Family Policies, (pp. 44- 
62). London:Routledge. 
 
Lundberg, S. (1988) Labor Supply of Husbands and Wives: A Simultaneous Equations 
Approach. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 70(2), 224-235. 
 
Lundberg, S., and Pollak, R. A. (1996). Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage. The Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, 10(4), 139-158.  
 
Lundberg, S., and Pollak, R. A. (1997). Separate-Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage 
Market. In Haddad, L., Hoddinott, J., and Alderman, H (eds) Intrahousehold Resource 
Allocation in Developing Countries: Methods, models and Policy (pp. 75-94). Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press for the International Food Policy Research Institute. 
 
Lundberg, S., Pollak, R., and Wales, T. (1997). Do Husbands and Wives Pool Their 
Resources? Evidence from the United Kingdom Child Benefit. The Journal of Human 
Resources, 32(3), 463- 480. 
 
Martin, M. and Roberts, C. (1984). Women and Employment: A Lifetime Perspective. London: 
HMSO. 
 
McElroy, M.B, and Horney, M. (1981). Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Towards a 
Generalization of the Theory of Demand. International Economic Review, 22(2), 333-349. 
 
McElroy, M.B. (1990) The Empirical Content of Nash-Bargained Household Behavior. The 
Journal of Human Resources, 25(4), 559-583. 
  
McElroy, M.B. (1997). The Policy Implications of Family Bargaining and Marriage Markets. 
In Haddad, L., Hoddinott, J., and Alderman, H. (eds) Intrahousehold allocation in developing 
countries: Models, Methods, and Policy (pp. 53-74 ). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, for 
the International Food Policy Research Institute.  
 
Main, B. and Reilly, B. (1994) Married Women’s Hours and Participation Revisited, Applied 
Economics, 26, 277-281.   
 
Manski, C.F. (2000) Economic Analysis of Social Interactions. The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 14(3), 115-136. 
 
Manser, M. and Brown, M. (1980). Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A 
Bargaining Analysis. International Economic Review, 21(1), 31-44.  
 
Mason, K., and Bumpass, L.L. (1975). U.S. Women’s Sex-Role Ideology, 1970. The 
American Journal of Sociology, 80(5), 1212-1219. 
 
McHugh, M.C., and Frieze, I.H. (1997). The measurement of gender-role attitudes. A 
Review and Commentary. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 21, 1-16. 
 
 227 
 
McRae, S. (1999). Introduction: Family and Household Change in Britain in McRae, S. 
(eds) Changing Britain: Families and Households in the 1990s (pp.1-33). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Molm, L.D. (1978). Sex Role Attitudes and the Employment of Married Women: The 
Direction of Causality. The Sociological Quarterly, 19(4), 522-533.  
 
Morgan, C.S. and A. J. Walker. (1983). Predicting Sex Role Attitudes. Social Psychology 
Quarterly, 46(2), 148-151.  
 
Neumark, D., and Postlewaite A. (1998) Relative Income Concerns and the Rise in Married 
Women’s employment. Journal of Public Economics, 70, 157-183.   
 
Office of National Statistics. (2003). Table 9 Mid-2003 Population Estimates: Quinary age 
groups and sex for local authorities in the United Kingdom. From 
www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/Expodata/Spreadsheets/D8549.xls.   
 
Office of National Statistics. (2004a). KS09b Economic activity - males: Key Statistics for 
urban areas, summary results for local authorities. Crown Copyright. 
 
Office of National Statistics. (2004b). KS09c Economic activity - females: Key Statistics for 
urban areas, summary results for local authorities. Crown Copyright. 
  
Pagan, A.R., and Hall, A.D. (1983). Diagnostic tests as residual analysis. Econometric Reviews, 
2(2), 159-218. 
 
Pencavel, J. (1986). Labor Supply of Men: a Survey. In O. Ashenfelter and R. Layard (eds.) 
Handbook of labor economics, Vol. 1 (pp. 3-102). Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
 
Pencavel, J. (1998). The Market Work Behaviour and Wages of Women: 1975-1994. The 
journal of Human Resources, 23(4), 771-804. 
 
Phipps, Shelley A. and Burton, Peter S. (1995). Social/institutional variables and behavior 
within households: An empirical test using the Luxembourg income study, Feminist 
Economics, 1(1), 151-174. 
 
Pollak, R.A. (1985). A Transaction Cost Approach to Families and Households. Journal of 
Economic Literature, 23, 581-608.  
 
Pollak, R.A. (1994). For Better or Worse: The Roles of Powers in Models of Distribution 
within Marriage. The American Economic Review, 84(2), 148-152. 
 
Prieto-Rodriguez, J., and Rodriguez-Gutierrez, C. (2003). Participation of married women 
in the European labor markets and the “added worker effect”. Journal of Socio-Economics, 32, 
429–446. 
 
Quisumbing, A.R., and Maluccio. J.A. (1999). Intrahousehold Allocation and Gender 
Relations: New Empirical Evidence. Policy Research Report on Gender and Development Working 
Paper Series, No. 2. The World Bank.  
 
 228 
 
Ransford, H.E and Miller, J. (1983). Race, Sex and Feminist Outlooks. American Sociological 
Review, 48(1), 46-59.  
 
Ransom, M.R. (1987). An Empirical Model of Discrete and Continuous Choice in Family 
Labor Supply. Review of Economics and Statistics, 69(3), 465-472.  
 
Rake, E. (2001). Gender and New Labour’s Social Policies. Journal of Social Policy, 30(2), 209-
231. 
  
Robinson, H. (2003). Gender and Labour Market Performance in the Recovery. In 
Dickens, R., Gregg, P., and Wadsworth, J. (eds) The Labour Market Under New Labour: The 
State of Working Britain. (pp. 232-247). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Sajaia, Z. (2008). Maximum Likelohood Estimation of a Bivariate Ordered Probit Model: 
Implementation and Monte Carlo Simulations. Poverty Analysis Toolkit, World Bank. 
  
Samuelson, P. A. (1956). Social Indifference Curves. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70(1), 
p1-22. 
 
Sargan, J. (1958). The Estimation of Economic Relationships Using Instrumental Variables. 
Econometrica, 26(3), 393-415. 
 
Scanzoni, J. and Fox, G. L. (1980). Sex Roles, Family and Society: The Seventies and 
Beyond. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 42(4), 743-756.  
 
Schreiber, E.M. (1978). Education and change in American opinions on a woman for 
president. Public Opinion Quarterly, 42, 171-182. 
 
Scott, J., (1996) Generational Changes in Gender-role Attitudes: Britain in a Cross-National 
Perspective. Sociology, 30(3), 471-492.   
 
Scott, J., Braun, M., and Alwin, D. (1998). Chapter 2: Partner, Parent, Worker: Family and 
Gender Roles. In Jowell, R., Curtice, J., Park, A., Brook, L., Thomson, K., and Bryson,C. 
(eds), British and European Social Attitudes: How Britain Differs, the 15th Report, (pp.19-
37). England: Ashgate Publishing Limited.   
 
Scott, J. (1999). Chapter 3: Family Change: Revolution or Backlash in Attitudes. In McRae, 
S. (eds) Changing Britain: Families and Households in the 1990s. (pp.68-99). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Schultz, T.P. (1990) Testing the Neoclassical Model of Family Labor Supply and Fertility. 
The Journal of Human Resources, 25(4), 599- 634. 
 
Smith, L.C, Ramakrishnan, U., Ndiaye, A., Hadddad, L., and Martorell, R. (2003). The 
Importance of Women’s Status for Child Nutrition in Developing Countries. IFPRI 
Research Report 131.  
 
Staiger, D., and Stock, J.H. (1997). Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak 
Instruments. Econometrica, 65(3), 557-586. 
 
 229 
 
Stephan, G. Edward, and Douglas R. McMullin. (1982). Tolerance of sexual non 
conformity: City size as a situational and early learning determinant. American Sociological 
Review, 47, 411-415. 
 
Stigler, G.J., and Becker, G.S. (1977). De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum. The American 
Economic Review, 67(2), 76-90. 
 
Shea, J. (1997). Instrument Relevance in Multivariate Linear Models: a Simple Measure. The 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 79(2), 348-352. 
 
Stern, N. (1986). On the specification of labour supply functions in R.W. Blundell and 
Walker, I. (eds), Unemployment, Search and Labour Supply. (pp.143-189) Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
 
Summerfield, C. and Babb, P. (eds) (2003). Social Trends 33. Office of National Statistics. 
London: The Stationary Office. 
 
Taylor, M. (ed). with Brice, J., Buck, N., and Prentice-Lane, E. (2005). British Household Panel 
Survey User Manual Volume A: Introduction, Technical Report and Appendices.Colchester: 
University of Essex. 
 
Thornton, A., Alwin,D.F., and Camburn, D. (1983). Causes and Consequences of Sex-Role 
Attitudes and Atttitude Change. American Sociological Review, 48(2), 211-227.  
 
Thomas, D., Contreras, D., and Frankenberg E. (1997). Distribution of Power within the 
Household and Child Health. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.  
 
Tomeh, A.K. (1978). Sex-Role Orientation: An Analysis of Structural and Attitudinal 
Predictors. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 40(2), 341-354.  
 
Treas, J., and Widmer, E.D. (2000). Married Women's Employment over the Life Course: 
Attitudes in Cross- National Perspective. Social Forces, 78(4), 1409-1436. 
 
Uhrig, S.C.N. (2008). The Nature and Causes of Attrition in the British Household Panel 
Survey. ISER Working Paper 2008-05.  
 
Vanfossen, B.E. (1977). Sexual Stratification and Sex-Role Socialization. Journal of Marriage 
and the Family, 39(3), 563-574. 
 
Van Soest, A. (1995). Structural Models of Family Labor Supply: A Discrete Choice. The 
Journal of Human Resources, 30(1), 63-88. 
 
Vella, F. (1994). Gender Roles and Human Capital Investment: the relationship between 
traditional attitudes and female labour market performance. Economica, 61(242), 191-211.   
 
Wales, T.J., and Woodland, A.D. (1976). Estimation of Household Utility Functions and 
Labor Supply Response. International Economic Review, 17(2), 397-410. 
 
White, H. (1980). A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct 
test for heteroskedasticity. Econometrica, 48, 817-838. 
 230 
 
 
Wilde, J. (2000). Identification of Multiple Equation Probit Models with Endogenous 
Dummy Regressors. Economic Letters, 69, 309-312. 
 
Winkler, A. E. (1997). Economic decision-making by cohabitators: findings regarding 
income-pooling. Applied Economics. 29, 1079-1090. 
 
Wooldridge, J.M. (2001). Applications of Generalized Method of Moments Estimation. The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(4), 87-100. 
 
Wooldridge, J.M. (2002). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. Cambridge MA: 
MIT Press.  
 
Woolley, F.R. (1993). The Feminist Challenge to Neoclassical Economics. Cambridge Journal 
of Economics, 17, 485-500.  
 231 
 
Appendix 1 
Table: A1.1: Mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) for components of non-labour 
income (dual earner couples in wage employment)  
 
 
Dual earner couples in wage employment 
invest_male_income 31
(147) 
invest_female_income 22
(108) 
trans_male_income 4
(82) 
trans_female_income 9
(65) 
benefit_male_income 
 
15
(60) 
benefit_female_income 
 
81
(122) 
pension_male_income 26
(156) 
pension_female_income 2
(28) 
Note: for variables definitions  
see notes to table A1.6 below 
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Table A1.2: Chi-square statistics for tests of heteroscedasticity  
 
 
Table A1.3: First-stage regression statistics 
 
Males 
 
Females 
Non-
pooled 
income 
Pooled 
income 
Non-
pooled 
income 
Pooled 
income 
 
 
Shea statistic  
 
0.1233 0.1232 0.2192 0.2195
F statistic 19.94
(0.000) 
 
19.84
(0.000) 
42.79
(0.000) 
42.95
(0.000) 
C statistic   
Instrument: tenure  
(joint significance of 
dummies) 
2.560
(0.7674) 
2.597
(0.7618) 
9.688
(0.0846) 
9.813
(0.0807) 
C statistic 
Instrument: education 
(joint significance of 
dummies) 
8.630
(0.0711) 
8.818
(0.0658) 
4.381
(0.3568) 
4.529
(0.392) 
Hansen J statistic
 
10.360
(0.2407) 
 
10.609
(0.2249) 
12.259 
(0.1400) 
12.385
(0.1348) 
Exogeneity test (wage) 0.186
(0.6661) 
0.198
(0.6561) 
6.435
(0.0112) 
6.446
(0.0111) 
 Males 
 
Females 
Non-
pooled 
income 
Pooled 
income 
Non-
pooled 
income 
Pooled 
income 
First stage regression 
White/Koenker nR2 test 
statistic 
71.38 
(0.000) 
69.08 
(0.000) 
42.42 
(0.006) 
41.78 
(0.005) 
Second stage regression 
Pagan and Hall test 
statistic 
40.29 
(0.010) 
38.03 
(0.013) 
104.65 
(0.000) 
97.36 
(0.000) 
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Table A1.4 First-stage regression estimates  
 MALES FEMALES 
 Dependent variable: male wage Dependent variable: female wage
Pooled income Non-pooled income Pooled income Non-pooled income
male_wage † † 0.1999***
(0.0265) 
0.1995***
(0.0262) 
female_wage 0.2029*** 
(0.0279) 
0.2025***
(0.0276) 
† †
male_income † -0.0001
(0.0000) 
† 0.0000
(0.0000) 
female_income † -0.0001
(0.0000) 
† -0.0001
(0.0000) 
couple_income -0.0001* 
(0.0001) 
† 0.0000
(0.0000) 
†
childlessthan5 0.0320 
(0.0336) 
0.0337
(0.0352) 
-0.0191
(0.0303) 
-0.0118
(0.0312) 
child5to11 
 
0.1034*** 
(0.0256) 
0.1053***
(0.0271) 
-0.0345
(0.0260) 
-0.0265
(0.0262) 
childolderthan12 0.0608** 
(0.0272) 
0.0628**
(0.0277) 
-0.1107
(0.0254) 
-0.1021***
(0.0262) 
Age 0.0048*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0048***
(0.0013) 
0.0020
(0.0014) 
0.0019
(0.0014) 
London 0.1410* 
(0.0749) 
0.1407*
(0.0753) 
0.1168**
(0.0518) 
0.1146***
(0.0517) 
South 0.0938*** 
(0.0332) 
0.0941***
(0.0331) 
0.0190
(0.0322) 
0.0198
(0.0322) 
Eastanglia 0.1181* 
(0.0657) 
0.1178*
(0.0655) 
-0.0607
(0.0562) 
-0.0619
(0.0564) 
Midland 0.0406 
(0.0391) 
0.0403
(0.0391) 
-0.0427
(0.0336) 
-0.0436
(0.0336) 
North 0.0144 
(0.0326) 
0.0146
(0.0326) 
-0.0038
(0.0307) 
-0.0033
(0.0307) 
Wales -0.0148 
(0.0327) 
-0.0150
(0.0326) 
-0.0471
(0.0309) 
-0.0480
(0.0309) 
educ1 0.1940*** 
(0.0389) 
0.1943***
(0.0389) 
0.2050***
(0.0319) 
0.2047***
(0.0319) 
educ2 0.3125*** 
(0.0386) 
0.3130***
(0.0386) 
0.3473***
(0.0336) 
0.3478***
(0.0336) 
educ3 0.5739*** 
(0.0513) 
0.5740***
(0.0513) 
0.7117***
(0.0429) 
0.7106***
(0.0430) 
educ4 0.6623*** 
(0.0725) 
0.6628***
(0.0723) 
0.8057***
(0.0722) 
0.8036***
(0.0722) 
less6mths -0.1046*** 
(0.0392) 
-0.1054***
(0.0393) 
-0.1284***
(0.0416) 
-0.1282***
(0.0416) 
7mths_1yr -0.1157*** 
(0.0458) 
-0.1166***
(0.0462) 
-0.0979**
(0.0405) 
-0.0949**
(0.0406) 
1yr_3yr -0.0653* 
(0.0341) 
-0.0660*
(0.0344) 
-0.0921***
(0.0354) 
-0.0926***
(0.0354) 
3yr_5yr -0.0204 
(0.0379) 
-0.0208
(0.0381) 
-0.0299
(0.0394) 
-0.0287
(0.0394) 
5yr_10yr -0.0660* 
(0.0345) 
-0.0664*
(0.0345) 
0.0077
(0.0374) 
0.0091
(0.0373) 
Constant 1.4760*** 
(0.0921) 
1.4789***
(0.0917) 
1.2960***
(0.0933) 
1.3018***
(0.0931) 
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Table A1.5: Regression results with disaggregated non-labour income 
Dependent variable: monthly hours of work
 
Independent variables Males (OLS) Females (IV) 
female_wage 30.6848***
(5.7765)    
1.5012    
(1.9941)    
male_wage -17.0943***
(3.5838)    
-14.9649*** 
(2.5758)    
age -0.8957***
(0.1212)    
0.1268    
(0.0921)    
childlessthan5 -32.4793***
(3.7274)    
2.6737    
(2.3023)    
child5to11 -16.3425***
(3.1464)    
7.5290*** 
(2.2000)    
childolderthan12 4.0424   
(3.3221)    
6.0478*   
(2.3878)    
london -10.9366*  
(5.2209)    
4.3039    
(4.3091)    
south 0.0095   
(3.2917)    
0.9496    
(2.2829)    
eastanglia 7.9174   
(6.4287)    
5.1426    
(3.9799)    
midland -3.5391   
(3.5902)    
3.4294    
(3.1867)    
north 0.0355   
(3.2546)    
0.7983    
(2.8000)    
wales 3.1103   
(3.3345) 
-2.0135    
(2.7618)    
invest_male_income 0.0001   
(0.0090)    
-0.0062    
(0.0072)    
invest_female_income 0.0028   
(0.0192)    
0.0162*   
(0.0069)    
trans_male_income 0.0033   
(0.0029)    
0.0045    
(0.0038)    
trans_female_income -0.0155   
(0.0183)    
-0.0327*   
(0.0158)    
benefit_male_income 
 
-0.0068   
(0.0218)    
-0.0409*   
(0.0162)    
benefit_female_income 
 
-0.0518** 
(0.0162)    
-0.0175    
(0.0098)    
pension_male_income -0.0199*  
(0.0093)    
-0.0257**  
(0.0098)    
pension_female_income -0.0823** 
(0.0276)    
-0.0089    
(0.0375)    
constant 154.6329***
(12.2069)    
197.8925*** 
(7.0827)    
Notes (see notes to table A1.4 below) 
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Table A1.6: Regression results with non-labour income (without investment) 
Dependent variable: monthly hours of work 
 
Independent variables Males (OLS) Females (IV) 
female_wage 1.4200 
(1.8866) 
31.3752*** 
(5.2871) 
male_wage -14.7881*** 
(1.8873) 
-16.5167*** 
(2.8737) 
age 0.1197 
(0.0887) 
-0.9312*** 
(0.1194) 
childlessthan5 2.7383 
(2.4449) 
-33.8410*** 
(3.2367) 
child5to11 7.6100*** 
(2.0342) 
-17.1774*** 
(2.6807) 
childolderthan12 6.5395*** 
(2.1687) 
3.5071 
(2.8942) 
london 3.7032 
(4.3335) 
-11.2599** 
(5.7081) 
south 1.1120 
(2.4808) 
0.2010 
(3.2559) 
eastanglia 
 
 
midland 
 
north 
 
wales 
4.9933 
(4.9108) 
3.1439 
(2.8805) 
0.6675 
(2.5598) 
-2.1155 
(2.6429) 
8.5932 
(6.4592) 
-3.5033 
(3.7886) 
-0.3832 
(3.3596) 
2.9057 
(3.4802) 
 
no_inv_male_income 
 
no_inv_female_income 
-0.0191*** 
(0.0043) 
-0.0222*** 
(0.0064) 
-0.0109** 
(0.0057) 
-0.0381*** 
(0.0084) 
 
constant 
198.0401*** 
(6.3389) 
152.8552*** 
(10.5928) 
Notes: (**) denotes significance at the 1% level 
 (*)  denotes significance at the 5% level 
 (†) denotes significance at the 10% level 
 Base category for regional dummy: Scotland 
 
 
Note: variables that are not defined in the main text are as follows: 
invest_male_income and invest_female_income represent male and female 
monthly investment income.  
trans_male_income and trans_female_income represent male and female 
monthly transfer income.  
benefit_male_income and benefit_female_income represent male and 
female monthly benefit income.  
pension_male_income and pension_female_income represent male and 
female monthly pension income.  
no_inv_male_income and no_inv_female_income represent male and 
female monthly non-labour income excluding investment 
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Table A1.7: OLS and IV regressions results with sex ratio (definition 1)1 
Dependent variable: monthly hours of work 
 
Independent 
Variables 
 
OLS 
Males 
 
IV 
Males 
OLS 
Females 
IV 
Females 
male_wage -13.8324*** 
(2.5674) 
-13.9032*** 
(5.3810) 
-11.5954*** 
(2.7951) 
-15.7859*** 
(3.5552) 
female_wage 1.9334 
(2.0530) 
1.9562 
(2.4706) 
19.3283*** 
(3.0856) 
32.5968*** 
(5.9012) 
male_income -0.0129*** 
(0.0053) 
-0.0129*** 
(0.0052) 
-0.0048 
(0.0056) 
-0.0057 
(0.0059) 
female_income -0.0057 
(0.0061) 
-0.0057 
(0.0061) 
-0.0212*   
(0.0117) 
-0.0202* 
(0.0121) 
childlessthan5 0.9799 
(2.2153) 
0.9822 
(2.1966) 
-35.4123*** 
(3.6372) 
-35.6163*** 
(3.6457) 
child5to11 5.7653*** 
(2.1332) 
5.7734*** 
(2.0714) 
-19.9008*** 
(2.9721) 
-19.0241*** 
(2.950) 
childolderthan12 4.7993** 
(2.2399) 
4.8041**  
(2.2894) 
0.1168 
(2.9485) 
1.7045 
(2.9342) 
age 0.1081 
(0.0982) 
0.0973 
(0.1002) 
-0.9336*** 
(0.1141) 
-0.9253*** 
(0.1169) 
london 3.1991 
(4.2084) 
3.208 
(4.1387) 
-10.5310**  
(5.2316) 
-11.8977** 
(5.2575) 
south 1.4686 
(2.3332) 
1.4756 
(2.3075) 
0.7983 
(3.3746) 
0.6133 
(3.3994) 
eastanglia 5.7225 
(3.9447) 
5.7315 
(3.8977) 
7.8785 
(6.630) 
8.9699 
(6.6112) 
midland 3.6017 
(3.2081) 
3.6053 
(3.1740) 
-3.8834 
(3.6252) 
-3.3184 
(3.6328) 
north 0.5654 
(2.8344) 
0.5658 
(2.8157) 
-0.4662 
(3.2310) 
-0.3801 
(3.2631) 
wales -2.1963 
(2.7702) 
-2.1979 
(2.7589) 
1.9209 
(3.3443) 
2.7177 
(3.3396) 
sex_ratio (1) 0.6628 
(2.7759) 
0.6636 
(2.7567) 
-0.8772 
(3.5328) 
1.1425 
(3.6758) 
Constant 194.1349*** 
(7.6858) 
194.2406*** 
(11.0626) 
167.8543*** 
(10.4933) 
146.8207*** 
(13.1813) 
 
R-squared 
 
0.0605 
 
0.0558 
 
0.2019 
 
0.1857 
 
Sample size 
 
1415 
 
1415 
 
1415 
 
1415 
Notes: (***) denotes significance at the 1% level 
 (**)  denotes significance at the 5% level 
 (*) denotes significance at the 10% level 
 (ƒ) denotes a variable that has been omitted from the regression model 
              (1) sex ratio definition 1: ratio of the number of males whose age falls in  
                    the age category of the husband over the number of females whose age falls in the ages 
                     fall in the category of the wife in a particular county 
 
 
 
 
 
 237 
 
Table A1.8: OLS and IV regressions results with sex ratio (definition 2)1  
Dependent variable: monthly hours of work 
 
Independent 
Variables 
 
OLS 
Males 
 
IV 
Males 
OLS 
Females 
IV 
Females 
male_wage -13.8107*** 
(2.5664) 
-13.8822*** 
(5.3775) 
-11.6418*** 
(2.7942) 
-15.7818*** 
(3.5529) 
female_wage 1.7504 
(2.0247) 
1.7735 
(2.4488) 
19.5862*** 
(3.0538) 
32.7182*** 
(5.8808) 
male_income -0.0130** 
(0.0053) 
-0.0130*** 
(0.0052) 
-0.0048 
(0.0056) 
-0.0057 
(0.0058) 
female_income -0.0056 
(0.0061) 
-0.0056 
(0.0061) 
-0.0212*   
(0.0117) 
-0.0203* 
(0.0121) 
childlessthan5 0.7943 
(2.2154) 
0.7967 
(2.1973) 
-35.1109*** 
(3.6147) 
-35.3561*** 
(3.6158) 
child5to11 5.6172*** 
(2.0954) 
5.6255*** 
(2.0329) 
-19.6871*** 
(2.9575) 
-18.8880*** 
(2.9337) 
childolderthan12 4.6602** 
(2.2429) 
4.6650**  
(2.2936) 
0.2925 
(2.9530) 
1.8978 
(2.9443) 
age 0.1249 
(0.0971) 
0.1251 
(0.0972) 
-0.9475*** 
(0.1162) 
-0.9472*** 
(0.1186) 
london 3.3673 
(4.2148) 
3.3761 
(4.1472) 
-10.7724**  
(5.2394) 
-12.2075** 
(5.2758) 
south 1.9134 
(2.3160) 
1.9203 
(2.2879) 
0.2007 
(3.3683) 
-0.1050 
(3.3926) 
eastanglia 5.9226 
(3.9210) 
5.9317 
(3.8727) 
7.6032 
(6.6333) 
8.7255 
(6.6210) 
midland 3.7858 
(3.2068) 
3.7894 
(3.1719) 
-4.1293 
(3.6120) 
-3.5319 
(3.6237) 
north 0.7249 
(2.8372) 
0.7252 
(2.8190) 
-0.6756 
(3.2315) 
-0.6956 
(3.2552) 
wales -2.3883 
(2.7717) 
-2.3897 
(2.7598) 
2.1879 
(3.3690) 
3.1882 
(3.3736) 
sex_ratio (2) -10.6425 
(10.0854) 
-10.6374 
(10.0377) 
14.3715 
(15.9812) 
21.4771 
(16.7304) 
Constant 205.0477*** 
(12.2210) 
205.1503*** 
(14.2936) 
152.7656*** 
(17.9237) 
127.4981*** 
(21.518) 
 
R-squared 
 
0.0562 
 
0.0562 
 
0.2023 
 
0.1864 
 
Sample size 
 
1415 
 
1415 
 
1415 
 
1415 
Notes: (***) denotes significance at the 1% level 
 (**)  denotes significance at the 5% level 
 (*) denotes significance at the 10% level 
 (ƒ) denotes a variable that has been omitted from the regression model 
                   (1) sex ratio definition 2: ratio of the number of males whose age falls in  
                    the age category of the husband over the number of females whose age falls in that same age category. 
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Table A1.9: OLS and IV regressions results with age difference and female older dummy  
Dependent variable: monthly hours of work 
 
Independent 
Variables 
 
OLS 
Males 
 
IV 
Males 
OLS 
Females 
IV 
Females 
male_wage -13.7911*** 
(2.5657) 
-13.8703*** 
(5.3769) 
-11.4288*** 
(2.7827) 
-15.7038*** 
(3.5474) 
female_wage 2.0892 
(2.0298) 
2.0838 
(2.4466) 
19.2801*** 
(3.0664) 
32.6914*** 
(5.8468) 
male_income -0.0132** 
(0.0053) 
-0.0131*** 
(0.0052) 
-0.0039 
(0.0056) 
-0.0051 
(0.0059) 
female_income -0.0057 
(0.0061) 
-0.0057 
(0.0061) 
-0.0215*   
(0.0117) 
-0.0205* 
(0.0122) 
childlessthan5 0.6592 
(2.1937) 
0.6587 
(2.1774) 
-35.2443*** 
(3.6013) 
-35.5955*** 
(3.6024) 
child5to11 5.6320*** 
(2.0958) 
5.6301*** 
(2.0321) 
-19.9370*** 
(2.9494) 
-19.1845*** 
(2.9230) 
childolderthan12 4.9719** 
(2.2623) 
4.9707**  
(2.3128) 
0.142 
(2.9556) 
1.7388 
(2.9401) 
age 0.0986   
(0.0958) 
0.0985 
(0.0962) 
-0.9736*** 
(0.1167) 
-0.9520*** 
(0.1200) 
london 3.2714 
(4.2162) 
3.2693 
(4.1434) 
-10.1218**  
(5.2306) 
-11.4725** 
(5.2527) 
south 1.5061 
(2.3120) 
1.5045 
(2.2836) 
0.9109 
(3.3304) 
0.8648 
(3.3547) 
eastanglia 5.7352 
(3.9257) 
5.733 
(3.8758) 
8.2274 
(6.6054) 
9.4733 
(6.6062) 
midland 3.5608 
(3.1979) 
3.5600 
(3.1636) 
-3.8362 
(3.6134) 
-3.1536 
(3.6310) 
north 0.5691 
(2.8298) 
0.5690 
(2.8108) 
-0.3704 
(3.2180) 
-0.2752 
(3.2509) 
wales -2.0908 
(2.7592) 
-2.0906 
(2.7493) 
1.8765 
(3.3396) 
2.7785 
(3.3357) 
age_difference 15.4061* 
(8.6821) 
15.4044*   
(8.5916) 
-0.8269 
(13.4561) 
4.6811 
(13.4718) 
female_older 3.2783 
(2.6733) 
3.278 
(2.6748) 
7.4558*   
(3.9972) 
8.3125** 
(4.0104) 
Constant 194.6462*** 
(7.2364) 
193.9697*** 
(10.6861) 
166.8312*** 
(9.5427) 
147.1208*** 
(11.8035) 
R-squared 0.0570 0.0574 0.2057 0.1892 
Sample size 1415 1415 1415 1415 
Notes: (***) denotes significance at the 1% level 
 (**)  denotes significance at the 5% level 
 (*) denotes significance at the 10% level 
 (ƒ) denotes a variable that has been omitted from the regression model 
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Table A1.10: OLS and IV regressions results with all distribution factors  
Dependent variable: monthly hours of work 
 
Independent 
Variables 
 
OLS 
Males 
 
IV 
Males 
OLS 
Females 
IV 
Females 
male_wage -13.8884*** 
(2.5673) 
-13.8473*** 
(5.3745) 
-11.4214*** 
(2.7853) 
-15.7285*** 
(3.5507) 
female_wage 2.0161 
(2.0569) 
2.0028 
(2.4658) 
19.4263*** 
(3.0940) 
33.0385*** 
(5.8954) 
male_income -0.0132*** 
(0.0053) 
-0.0132*** 
(0.0052) 
-0.0037 
(0.0056) 
-0.0048 
(0.0058) 
female_income -0.0057 
(0.0061) 
-0.0057 
(0.0061) 
-0.0216*   
(0.0118) 
-0.0206* 
(0.0122) 
childlessthan5 0.5402 
(2.1919) 
0.5390 
(2.1745) 
-35.0050*** 
(3.6484) 
-35.2175*** 
(3.6552) 
child5to11 5.5266*** 
(2.1658) 
5.5220*** 
(2.1030) 
-19.7259*** 
(2.9701) 
-18.8419*** 
(2.9514) 
childolderthan12 4.9496** 
(2.2562) 
4.9468**  
(2.3053) 
0.1872 
(2.9534) 
1.8244 
(2.9380) 
age 0.1054 
(0.0971) 
0.1052 
(0.0976) 
-0.9886*** 
(0.1181) 
-0.9757*** 
(0.1209) 
london 3.2804 
(4.2184) 
3.2753 
(4.1431) 
-10.1450**  
(5.2355) 
-11.5210 ** 
(5.2580) 
south 1.6077 
(2.3417) 
1.6036 
(2.3130) 
0.7042 
(3.3883) 
0.5354 
(3.4115) 
eastanglia 5.8223 
(3.9444) 
5.8171 
(3.8961) 
-0.369 
(3.2166) 
9.1913 
(6.5802) 
midland 3.6459 
(3.2123) 
3.6439 
(3.1768) 
8.0436 
(6.6025) 
-3.4233 
(3.6410) 
north 0.5686 
(2.8304) 
0.5684 
(2.8096) 
-4.0092 
(3.6340) 
-0.2723 
(3.2489) 
wales -2.0266 
(2.7775) 
-2.0258 
(2.7644) 
1.7454 
(3.3538) 
2.5786 
(3.3475) 
sex_ratio  -1.5406 
(3.4150) 
-1.5405 
(3.3936) 
3.1524 
(4.5187) 
5.0202 
(4.666) 
age_difference 17.6875* 
(9.9533) 
17.6830*   
(9.8587) 
-6.0628 
(15.9827) 
-3.6110 
(15.9872) 
female_older 3.3798 
(2.6871) 
3.3791 
(2.6696) 
7.2404*   
(4.0146) 
7.9768** 
(4.0303) 
Constant 195.5321*** 
(8.0310) 
195.4704*** 
(11.2486) 
163.7270*** 
(10.7306) 
142.0094*** 
(13.3840) 
R-squared 0.0575 0.0575 0.2060 0.1888 
Sample size 1415 1415 1415 1415 
Notes: (***) denotes significance at the 1% level 
 (**)  denotes significance at the 5% level 
 (*) denotes significance at the 10% level 
 (ƒ) denotes a variable that has been omitted from the regression model 
  
 
 240 
 
Appendix 2 
Table A2.1: Male and Female Probit estimates (Heckman two-step procedure) 
Independent variables Male 
 
Female 
age18_24 0.3553*** 
(0.0905)  
0.1589* 
(0.0845) 
age25_34 0.6572*** 
(0.0910)   
0.3268*** 
(0.0729) 
 
age35_44 0.6251*** 
(0.0817)    
0.3236*** 
(0.0631) 
other_white -0.0546 
(0.1403) 
  0.0311 
(0.1386) 
 
other_ethnic -0.3271** 
(0.1436) 
-0.3038*** 
(0.1166) 
educ1 
 
0.5394*** 
(0.1721)    
0.8886*** 
(0.1636) 
educ2 
 
0.4198*** 
(0.1084)    
0.7533*** 
(0.0911) 
 
educ3 
 
0.3617*** 
(0.0818)    
0.6292*** 
(0.0728) 
educ4 
 
0.2420*** 
(0.0812)    
0.4036 
(0.0688) 
disabled‡ -1.2135*** 
(0.0907)    
-0.9592*** 
(0.0828) 
mother_work 0.0308    
(0.0611)    
0.0619 
(0,0499) 
mother_work_misc -0.1011    
(0.1094)    
0.0307 
(0.0927) 
father_work 0.1283    
(0.1681)    
-0.2213 
(0.1454) 
father_work_misc 0.0684    
(0.1869)    
-0.0317 
(0.1278) 
married‡ 
 
0.6241*** 
(0.0792)    
-0.0572 
(0.0700) 
 
coh‡ 
 
0.2885*** 
(0.0859)    
0.0564 
(0.0702) 
divwids‡ 
 
0.3671*** 
(0.1032)    
0.0710 
(0.0802) 
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Table A2.1: (continued) 
 Notes: all variables are defined in tables 2.1 (chapter 2) and 3.2 (chapter 3) apart from 
variables 
          denoted by ‡ which are defined as follows. “disabled” is a binary variable indicating if the 
individual 
            is disabled “married”, “coh” and “divwids” are all binary variables indicating whether the 
individual is married, cohabitating or divorced/widowed respectively. The base category 
for this set of dummies is single individuals. “mortgage” and “outright” are binary 
variables indicating whether the individual own their house with a mortgage or outright, 
with          the base category for estimation being having rented accommodation 
  (***) denotes significance at the 1% level  
 (**)  denotes significance at the 5% level 
                   (*) denotes significance at the 10% level
 Males  
 
Females  
childlessthan5 0.0092    
(0.1047)    
-0.7413*** 
(0.0650) 
child5to11 
 
0.2365*** 
(0.0815)    
-0.2378*** 
(0.0548) 
childolderthan12 -0.2446*** 
 (0.0703)    
-0.1209*** 
(0.0544) 
mortgage‡  
 
0.7184*** 
(0.0647)    
0.5710*** 
(0.0549) 
outright‡ 
 
0.2325*** 
(0.0747)    
0.2295*** 
(0.0694) 
Household non-labour 
income 
-0.0527*** 
(0.0033)    
-0.0341*** 
(0.0030) 
london 
 
0.3093**  
(0.1290)    
-0.11083 
(0.1094) 
south 
 
0.0888    
(0.0971)    
-0.1540** 
(0.0794) 
north 
 
0.0322    
(0.0810)    
-0.0526 
(0.0688) 
eastanglia 
 
0.0120    
(0.1709)    
-0.2181* 
(0.1336) 
midland 
 
0.0677    
(0.0969)    
-0.0935 
(0.0815) 
wales -0.0856 
(0.0789) 
-0.0895 
(0.0670) 
female_unemployment 
 
-1.6557    
(3.9771)    
4.0860 
(3.5049) 
male_unemployment -4.5719*** 
(1.8355)    
-5.2174*** 
(1.6290) 
constant 0.2538    
(0.2373)    
0.4366* 
(0.1930) 
Sample size 4454 4724 
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Table A2.2: Male and Female wage regressions  
 Males Females 
age 0.0830*** 
(0.0062)   
0.0627*** 
                     (0.0053) 
age_squared -0.0009*** 
(0.0001)   
-0.0007*** 
                     (0.0001) 
educ1 0.7378*** 
(0.0617)    
0.8419*** 
(0.0507)    
educ2 0.6024*** 
(0.0477)    
0.6863*** 
(0.0400)    
educ3 0.2850*** 
(0.0365)    
0.3237*** 
(0.0340)    
educ4 0.1855*** 
(0.0335)    
0.1556*** 
(0.0306)    
london 0.1852*** 
(0.0487)   
0.2484*** 
(0.0494) 
south 0.0678*** 
(0.0279)    
0.0387    
(0.0255)   
eastanglia 0.1385**  
(0.0571)    
-0.0377    
(0.0474)   
midland -0.0261    
(0.0290)    
-0.0075    
(0.0337)    
north 0.0297    
(0.0295)    
-0.0006    
(0.0237)    
wales -0.0330    
(0.0303) 
-0.0663*** 
(0.0233)   
Inverse Mills ratio -0.2582*** 
(0.0880)     
-0.2121*** 
(0.0389)    
constant 0.3231**  
(0.1383)    
0.5351*** 
(0.1065)   
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Calculation of marginal effects in a bivariate probit model. 
Two types of marginal effects (marginal probability and conditional probability), which 
are used in chapter two, are derived in this section. 
The bivariate probit model used in chapter two is:  
 
mmmm Xy εβ += '*  
ffff Xy εβ += '*  
 
with 
1=my  if 0* >my , 0=my  if 
0* ≤my  
1=fy  if 0* >fy , 0=fy  if 
0* ≤fy  
fm εε , ~ ),1,1,0,0( ρBVN  
 
Following Greene (1996, 1998), let ),,( fmfm XXyyP = ],,[ ρfmffmm qqaqaqB , 
1,0=jy  for fmj ,=  
where 12 −= jj yq   
           jjj Xa 'β=  
and B(.) denotes the bivariate normal CDF.  
Define 
m
fm
fmm c
ccB
ccg ∂
∂= *),,(*),,( ρρ   
                                  ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
−
−Φ=
2*1
*
)( ρ
ρφ mfm ccc  
 
and define *),,( ρfmf ccg in a similar way. Let jjj aqc = , let mγ contain all the nonzero 
elements of mβ as well as some zeros that correspond to variables that are only present 
in the female equation and finally let fγ  be defined in the same way. 
The marginal effect for the conditional probability is derived to be equal to:  
 
X
yyob fm
∂
==∂ ]11[Pr
= ])
)'(
)'(
([
)'(
1
2 f
f
f
fmm
f X
X
gg
X
γγ
γφγγ ΦΦ−+Φ  
 
A similar expression can be derived for 
X
yyob mf
∂
==∂ ]11[Pr
 
The marginal effect for the joint probability is equal to: =∂
==
X
yyob fm |1,1[Prδ  
ffmm gg γγ +  
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A similar expression can be derived for 
X
yyob fm
∂
== ]0,1[Prδ
 
Christofides et al (1997, 2001) show how to obtain the marginal effect: 
X
yob m
∂
=∂ ]1[Pr
 
X
yob m
∂
=∂ ]1[Pr
=
X
yyob fm
∂
== ]1,1[Prδ
 + 
X
yyob fm
∂
== ]0,1[Prδ
 
The same methodology can be applied to obtain the marginal effect: 
X
yob f
∂
=∂ ]1[Pr
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Table A2.3:Mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) for components of non-labour income 
(all couples)   
 
 
All 
households 
Dual-earner 
households 
Male earner 
households 
Female earner 
households 
Zero-earner 
households 
      
invest_male_income 41 
(192) 
40 
(186) 
47 
(250) 
40 
(111) 
32 
(115) 
invest_female_income 26 
(135) 
27 
(136) 
23 
(163) 
15 
(43) 
25 
(95) 
trans_male_income 4 
(68) 
4 
(77) 
4 
(43) 
2 
(14) 
7 
(50) 
trans_female_income 10 
(76) 
11 
(78) 
9 
(58) 
10 
(63) 
10 
(101) 
benefit_male_income 
 
65 
(256) 
22 
(217) 
41 
(120) 
251 
(349) 
418 
(419) 
benefit_female_income 
 
128 
(201) 
85 
(125) 
224 
(240) 
92 
(167) 
363 
(407) 
pension_male_income 54 
(233) 
29 
(167) 
43 
(194) 
225 
(439) 
207 
(448) 
pension_female_income 7 
(55) 
3 
(32) 
12 
(69) 
11 
(66) 
35 
(129) 
      
Sample size 2641 1852 461 153 175 
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Table A2.4: Marginal effects for model with distribution factors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: (***) denotes significance at the 1% level 
              (**)  denotes significance at the 5% level 
               (*) denotes significance at the 10% level 
                                  (†) variable omitted from the regression  
 
 
 
 
Marg (m) Marg(f) Marg (m) Marg(f)  
male_wage 0.1696***
(0.0197) 
-0.0464
(0.0328) 
0.1690*** 
(0.0198) 
-0.0484 
(0.0330) 
female_wage 0.0466***
(0.0178) 
0.3843***
(0.0338) 
0.0463*** 
(0.0178) 
0.3856*** 
(0.0340) 
male_income † -0.0746***
(0.0192) 
† -0.0762*** 
(0.0192) 
female_income † -0.3291***
(0.0327) 
† -0.3282*** 
(0.0327) 
couple_income -0.0865***
(0.0092) 
† -0.0871*** 
(0.0092) 
† 
age25_34_m -0.0186
(0.0317) 
† -0.0196
(0.0314) 
† 
age35_44_m -0.0436
(0.0345) 
† -0.0346 
(0.0337) 
† 
age45more_m -0.0745**
(0.0321) 
† -0.0743** 
(0.0313) 
† 
age25_34_f † -0.0873*
(0.0468) 
† -0.0455 
(0.0431) 
age35_44_f † -0.1610***
(0.0513) 
† -0.1242*** 
(0.0474) 
age45more_f † -0.2113***
(0.0482) 
† -0.1800*** 
(0.0457) 
male_unemployment -0.6627***
(0.1984) 
† -0.6445*** 
(0.1980) 
† 
female_unemployment † -0.4188
(0.7185) 
† -0.3132 
(0.7181) 
childlessthan5 0.0311**
(0.0129) 
-0.1627***
(0.0287) 
0.0341** 
(0.0126) 
-0.1559*** 
(0.0284) 
child5to11 0.0348***
(0.0116) 
-0.0224
(0.0214) 
0.0362*** 
(0.0115) 
-0.0198 
(0.0214) 
childolderthan12 0.0210*
(0.0116) 
0.0445**
(0.0207) 
0.0203* 
(0.0117) 
0.0430** 
(0.0207) 
motherinlaw_ 
work 
† † † † 
motherinlaw_misc † † † † 
sex_ratio -0.0452***
(0.0167) 
-0.0802***
(0.0317) 
† † 
age difference 
 
† † -0.1373*** 
(0.0563) 
-0.0937*** 
(0.0996) 
female_older † † 0.0002
(0.0193) 
-0.0034 
(0.0308) 
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Table A2.5: Specification with male and female participation as an endogenous variable 
 Model with male participation 
endogenous 
 Male Female 
male_wage 1.2827***
(0.1378) 
-0.5794*** 
(0.1299)     
female_wage 0.4716***
(0.1330)
1.2855*** 
(0.1221)    
male_income † 0.0413    
(0.0861)     
female_income † -0.9907*** 
(0.1187)    
couple_income -0.6089***
(0.0604)    
† 
age25_34_m -0.2353   
(0.2065)    
† 
age35_44_m -0.6885***
(0.1986)    
† 
age45more_m -0.3506*  
(0.2137)    
† 
age25_34_f † -0.0966    
(0.1404)     
age35_44_f † -0.2743*   
(0.1489)     
age45more_f † -0.4238*** 
(0.1414)    
male_unemployment -4.3766***
(1.4789)    
† 
female_unemployment † 0.8284    
(2.5314)    
childlessthan5 0.2886** 
(0.1244)     
-0.5235*** 
(0.0823)      
child5to11 0.2915***
(0.1028)    
-0.1216*   
(0.0732)    
childolderthan12 
 
male_working 
 
0.1804*
(0.0995) 
† 
0.1118    
(0.0785)  
1.3668*** 
(0.2249)      
female_working † † 
Constant -1.6302*** 
(0.3395)    
-1.0895*** 
(0.2930)    
Correlation coefficient -0.3970*** 
(0.1193) 
  Notes: (***) denotes significance at the 1% level 
              (**)  denotes significance at the 5% level 
               (*) denotes significance at the 10% level 
                                  (†) variable omitted from the regression  
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Appendix 3 
 
Table A3.1: chi-square statistics (at one degree of freedom) for cross-equation equality of 
impacts of dependent variables on male and female attitudes 
 Specification 
one 
Specification 
two 
Specification 
three 
Specification 
four 
Specification  
five 
age 
age_squared 
2.86 2.59 3.04 1.37 6.88*** 
other_white 
other_ethnic 
0.71 0.72 0.63 0.68 3.16** 
books_unknown 
books_few 
books_lot 
 
 
0.03  
 
0.03 
 
 
0.02 
 
 
0.02 
 
 
0.03 
suburb 
town 
village 
rural 
move 
 
0.002 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
live_father_only 
live_mother_only 
live_mother_ 
stepfather 
live_father_ 
stepmother 
live_other 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.006 
mother_som_educ 
mother_further_educ 
mother_uni_educ 
mother_educ_ 
unknown 
 
 
8.17*** 
 
8.28*** 
 
7.5*** 
 
7.3*** 
 
11.6*** 
 
mother_work 
mother_work_mis 
 
0.0003 
 
0.0006 
 
0.0006 
 
0.0006 
 
0.0003 
siblings 0.01 0 0 0 0.04 
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TableA3.1:(continued) 
 
 
educ1 
educ2 
educ3 
educ4 
 
0.003 
 
 
0.003 
 
0.003 
 
0.003 
 
0.002 
 
male_income 
 0.44 0.33 0.30 0.85 
 
female_income 
 0.37 0.50 0.68 2.36 
 
male_unemployment 
  2.51 2.52 1.90 
 
childlessthan5 
   0.14 0.10 
 
child5to11 
   0 0.06 
 
childolderthan12 
   0.68 0 
 
cut off1 
 
0.01 
 
0 
 
0.09 
 
0.24 
 
6.05*
** 
cut off2 0.02 0 0.06 0.18 5.95*
** 
Notes: ** denotes significance at the 5% significance level 
*** denotes significance at the 1% significance level  
